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ABSTRACT
DECIPHERING FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
(1933-1940)
by
Permeil Dass

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was the longest serving president in the history of the
United States, and he served during the U.S.’s worst economic crisis. During his tenure,
approximately 80,000 public school teachers were left unemployed and 145,700 students
had their schools closed. Furthermore, public schools and their teachers were under
attack for the large number of unemployed and illiterate people. Despite these public
school challenges, the literature rarely mentions FDR’s reactions or thoughts; instead, the
literature focuses on the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the National Youth
Administration (NYA), two New Deal youth programs. The New Deal assisted many
institutions, and educators assumed public schools would also receive assistance. Under
FDR, the federal government became increasingly involved in the lives of its citizens in
terms of housing, food, transportation, and employment, but it did not increase its
involvement in education. In this dissertation, I decipher FDR’s educational policies by
analyzing his administrative actions that supported or hindered education from 19331940. In particular, did FDR’s governmental programs emphasize or encourage the
education of youth? Did his administrative decisions support public schools? What was
FDR’s policy towards federal aid to education and why? Additionally, by analyzing how
educational policies were developed within FDR’s administration, educators today will
better discern how they can influence policies during each step of the policymaking

process. In doing so, educators will be better prepared and positioned to support
American schools.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was born January 30, 1882 in Hyde Park, New York
to a wealthy family. He had private tutors and attended an elite private high school,
Groton. After high school, he went to Harvard University, where he focused on his social
life and earned B’s and C’s. He then pursued a career in law and upon passing the bar he
dropped out and went to work. He was not excited about what he learned at Harvard or
law school since he did not learn much practical knowledge. Academics were boring to
FDR and he started to pursue a political career. He knew he wanted to be the president of
the United States early on and worked towards this ultimate goal.1
FDR has captured people’s interests for decades. Historians have described him
as strategic, while others referred to him as indecisive. Even those who worked closely
with him stated they had a hard time understanding his methods or administrative style. 2
FDR’s traits are not the only reason researchers are interested in studying him.
He served as president of the United States from 1933-1945, which is the longest term
ever served. During his presidency, many significant events occurred that forever
changed the United States: the Great Depression, Pearl Harbor, World War II, and the
Manhattan Project.

1

Jeffrey W. Coker, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Biography (West Port: Greenwood Press, 2005), 7-9. Robert
S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America 1929-1941 (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), 99 and
100.
2
John Q. Barrett, ed., That Man: An Insider’s Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 111.

2
An increasingly desperate economic situation was well underway by the time
Roosevelt began his presidency. The Great Depression was marked by the stock market
crash in October 1929, during the presidency of Herbert Hoover. After the stock market
crashed, a large number of banks failed, and the United States experienced high
unemployment. Around 25% of the workforce, which was more than 15 million people,
were unemployed and seeking jobs. As the Depression continued, cities, states, and
charities became financially overwhelmed with the number of people who required
assistance, and the public, out of desperation, waited for the federal government to
intervene. FDR, during his election, promised change and won the trust of the public,
providing them with the hope they so desperately needed. The foundation of American
society was shaken due to national bank failures and wide-spread poverty; consequently,
the public’s belief in capitalism plummeted. Young people, as well as adults, became
disillusioned. What concerned the adults about the effects of the Great Depression was
the fear that youth would be easily co-opted by Communists, susceptible to
totalitarianism, and become so jaded as to not value democracy. Between 1930 and
1937, young people comprised a larger proportion of the unemployed population, from
27.5% to 36%, which represented 16% of all youth. Without jobs, youth became idle and
loitered in streets. Their unsupervised time made adults increasingly concerned; they
became labeled as disrespectful or trouble-makers. Fueled by their increasing presence,
concerns of an immoral and rebellious generation grew. Public concerns about

3
troublesome youth were fueled by the fact that 75% of all crime was perpetrated by 16-25
year olds.3
To move these young people from the streets and into the labor market, school
attendance laws were more strictly enforced. Some students chose to stay in school
because of the unlikely chance of finding employment. The number of high school
students swelled. In 1929, only half of 14-17 year olds were in school, compared with
73.3% by the end of the next decade. As student enrollment grew by 2 million from
1930-1940, school funding was drastically cut due to the effects of the Great Depression.
From 1929 to 1933, the tax base used to financially support schools decreased by nearly a
third.4
To compensate for this economic decrease, schools were consolidated, and
building repairs, new construction, classes (gym, art, health, home economics, and
music), and programs (kindergartens, night school, Americanization classes) were cut or
eliminated. Teachers’ salaries were decreased, paid late, or not paid at all. Almost
80,000 teachers were left unemployed. Many school systems shortened the school year
and one-fourth of all students had a school year that was half its normal length. Even

3

David B. Tyack, Robert Lowe, and Elisabeth Hansot, Public Schools in Hard Times: The Great
Depression and Recent Years (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984), 3; “National Youth
Administration,” 2003, http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/nya.htm (accessed September 18, 2009);
Richard A. Reiman, The New Deal & American Youth: Ideas & Ideals in a Depression Decade (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1992), 18–20, 32, and 143; Elmer Cook to Joseph T. Robinson, April 25,
1935, Folder Robinson, Joseph T., Box 96, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
(FDRL), Hyde Park, NY.
4
Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot, 360; Theresa Richardson, “Rethinking Progressive High School Reform in the
1930s: Youth, Mental Hygiene, and General Education,” American Educational History Journal 33, no. 1
(Spring 2006): 79; Gilbert E. Smith, The Limits of Reform: Politics and Federal Aid to Education, 19371950, ed. Frank Freidel (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 2.
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more disconcerting, 2,269 schools, which affected 145,700 students, were closed entirely
as a cost-saving measure.5

Research Questions and Methodology
During the Great Depression, public schools were certainly in need of the hope
and change FDR promised. I will describe what administrative actions FDR took to
support or hinder education from 1933-1940. An analysis of FDR’s actions will be used
to decipher his educational policies. In particular, I will address the following questions:
Did FDR’s governmental programs emphasize or encourage the education of youth? Did
his administrative decisions support public schools? What was FDR’s policy towards
federal aid to education? Under FDR, the federal government became increasingly
involved in the lives of its citizens in terms of housing, food, transportation, and
employment, but as will be discussed, this level of government involvement with
educational institutions did not occur. The New Deal assisted many federal institutions,
and educators consequently assumed public schools would also receive assistance. 6
Despite many attempts, particularly by the National Education Association (NEA),
federal assistance for schools failed. Why this occurred and FDR’s role in this issue will
be discussed.
Another facet of this study is to learn about the complexities of how educational
policies are made in order to help educators better understand the ways in which they can

5

John F. Lyons, “Regional Variations in Union Activism of American Public Schoolteachers,” in
Education & the Great Depression: Lessons from a Global History, ed. E. Thomas Ewing and David Hicks
(New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 23; Robert H. Bremner, ed., Children and Youth in America: A
Documentary History, vol. 3, 1-3 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1580 and
1581.
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influence federal educational policies. By understanding why and how policies are
created and implemented, educators can be more effective policy advocates. The
findings of this study will provide educators with additional information as to how
educational policies are determined, which will then allow them to be better prepared and
positioned to support schools.
A study of archival materials from the following repositories were used in this
study: the New York State Archives in Albany, NY; FDR’s Presidential Library in Hyde
Park, NY; the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD and in
Washington, D.C.; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; the Catholic University
of America in Washington, D.C.; George Washington University in Washington, D.C.;
and on-line transcripts of oral histories from the Truman Library. Dissertations,
contemporary and historical newspaper and journal articles, and books were also
reviewed for this study.
Despite the rich archival sources and secondary literature, one of the biggest
limitations in this research is FDR. Like most political leaders, FDR made important
decisions based on information provided to him during private meetings and gatherings.
These types of meetings were often not transcribed, and when participants recounted
what FDR said, the reader is reliant upon their memory and interpretation of the
conversation. In the archives, there were many copies of unsigned letters that may or
may not have been signed by FDR. At times, FDR requested another person to draft a
response on his behalf so it is unclear whether the reader is viewing a rejected draft or
correspondence that was actually accepted and signed. If I questioned whether a letter

6

Smith, 6.

6
was signed and accepted by FDR, I only used it if other literature sources confirmed what
I was reading.
During FDR’s presidency, the telephone became an increasingly used mode of
communication, but most calls were not transcribed. To the researcher who is reviewing
archival documents, at times there was a lack of documentation to pinpoint FDR’s
opinion on an issue until decisions are made by himself or staff members. A member of
the Brain Trust and close adviser of FDR, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., commented in an oral
history that:
“Roosevelt had one habit, however,” Berle recollected, “which I think
made it hard on historians. He talked to everyone and he rarely gave any
very clear forecast as to what he intended to do. All his political instinct
was to keep all options open, as far as he was concerned, even though he
might have a perfectly clear idea of what he wanted. He rarely said, ‘No,
this is foolish,’ and he usually let someone go off thinking he’d scored a
great point. Then they accused him of inconsistency because he decided
something else. Actually, he listened to everyone, talked a bit himself,
ranging over the subject, and rarely admitted the fact that he’d just about
made up his mind and was going in that direction.”7
Within these limitations, I used a variety of sources to document FDR’s actions and
statements in order to construct FDR’s educational policies.
To decipher FDR’s educational policies, I examine what actions FDR took with
regard to New Deal programs that had educational components. In the following chapter
I examine FDR’s communications and decisions he made with the Office of Education,
educational groups, and his Advisory Committee on Education. The third chapter
explores FDR’s influence in Congress, particularly with bills relating to federal aid to
education. At the end of each chapter I analyze the information and begin to outline a

7

James E. Sargent, “Oral History, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the New Deal: Some Recollections of Adolf
A. Berle, Jr., Lewis W. Douglas, and Raymond Moley,” The Oral History Review 1 (1973): 99.

7
pattern of decisions FDR made with regard to education. In the final chapter, I
summarize my ideas to try and understand the overall effect of FDR’s educational
policies on public schools.

The Policymaking Process
A large amount of literature is written on the creation and administration of New
Deal programs. These details are critical because those involved in the policymaking
process will have considerable influence on programs and policies. Although policies
can be created in various ways, the general steps are to 1) identify a problem or issue, 2)
gather information, 3) formulate what action(s) will be taken, 4) ensure the policy is
accepted and made into law, 5) administer the policy’s program, and 6) evaluate the
policy and its program. 8 Each step of the policymaking process provides an opportunity
for individuals or groups to influence the policy.
Problems will be identified and defined differently depending on who is chosen
by the president to complete the first two steps of the policy-making process. The
president could select an individual, an advisory committee, an agency leader, a close
associate, a nonprofit organization, a congressman, or himself to gather information. The
background of an individual or the agendas of a group would steer how the policy is
framed.9
As a policy begins to form, it undergoes more changes in steps three and four as
the president negotiates with Congress and accommodates their requests. This step is

8

James E. Anderson, Public Policymaking: An Introduction, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
2006), 3.

8
highly political and the duration of these negotiations can be lengthy. This step also
leaves a window open for those who were not part of the policy formation to sway
congressional leaders in their preferred direction. Once Congress and the president have
accepted the policy, it is made into a law.
The person who the president or Congress delegates to administer the program
will make major and minor decisions as he or she implements the program, based on his
or her political agenda, local politics, and cultural interpretations. Moreover, the
president has the right to reorganize the executive branch, which is the branch of
government that administers the policy; in doing so, programs or their administrators can
be created, strengthened, minimized, or collapsed. 10 Approving a budget that is sufficient
to administer the program is one way the president and/or Congress supports,
disapproves, or ends a program. Lastly, Congress, the president and his administration,
interest groups, the media, and the public will impact how the program is evaluated.

FDR’s Policymaking Process
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the programs developed under his presidency have
been the topic of many academic publications. Past research about FDR explores the
development of his various policies, paying particular attention to how he conceptualized,
created, and implemented a wide variety of federal programs. As much of the literature
explains, FDR’s personality and managerial style played an essential role in the
development of his policies and programs. With FDR’s approval, policymakers

9

James G. Benze Jr., “Presidential Reorganization as a Tactical Weapon: Putting Politics Back into
Administration,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 147.

9
generated innovative programs. By indirectly generating policies, FDR could
strategically dissociate himself from those policies if they became unpopular or drew
criticism. The head of agencies knew they had to fend for themselves when problems
developed. 11 In the following section, I summarize how FDR used his presidential
powers, personality, decision-making style, and publicity to insert his influence into
educational policies.
FDR’s policymaking process ushered in a new era for presidential powers. For
the first time, Congress consented to permitting the executive branch to participate in the
creation of policies and programs. The shift in legislative power from the Congress to the
executive branch occurred because the country was in a state of emergency brought on by
the Great Depression. FDR used the economic crisis to justify why Congress should give
him powers reserved only for presidents during a war. Money from private, local, and
state resources was not enough to financially assist the public; the country needed the
federal government to act quickly. FDR used his delegated powers to create new
government programs and agencies. Congress placed few restrictions on these agencies,
allowing them to determine their own course of action. These new presidential powers
were unprecedented.12
FDR’s personality matched the innovative character of his policies, and he was
described as someone who liked:

10

Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998), 21; Benze Jr., 147 and 148.
11
Patrick D. Reagan, Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890-1943 (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 193.
12
Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985), 52; Anthony J. Badger, FDR: The First Hundred Days (New York, NY: Hill and
Wang, 2008), 166.
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novel ideas, bold courses, and dramatic actions, and he liked the sort of
men who could come up with such suggestions. Some associates had
influence in the sense that many of their suggestions bore fruit. But I
knew of none who did not have many of his suggestions rejected also.
The man who influenced Roosevelt most, as is the case with most
of us, was the one who would marshal him the way that he was going,
would provide reasons and arguments for doing what he wanted to do. I
never knew any man to dominate him – there was no one to whom he
would surrender his own judgment. No one could overbear him and he
never abdicated.13
People were drawn to FDR and desired his attention. His close associates and
staff were loyal to him, which he thought was key to having good workers. Those who
were faithful and loyal were rewarded by FDR in many ways. Specifically, they were
allowed to spend more time with him, their programs and projects were more likely to be
financed, and they were often given more administrative power. He purposefully
orchestrated a sense of intimacy with his personal phone calls, one-on-one conversations,
and social invitations. Staff members paid attention to and became envious of those who
interacted with FDR, and consequently they often vied for his attention. His
administration spent many hours designing policies and programs for which he would
advocate. Working hard became an incentive for FDR’s staff, which resulted in
competitive, industrious, and resolute staff members. 14
In order to assess staff members’ loyalty and to show he knew what was
happening beforehand, he placed informers in departments to monitor and keep him
abreast of activities. When a staff member’s work was contrary to his policies, he would

13

Barrett, 15.
Charles E. Jacob, Leadership in the New Deal: The Administrative Challenge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J:
Prentice-Hall, 1967), 29 and 30.
14
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not confront the individual. Instead, he would usurp his or her decision-making power
and transfer it to a new agency, thereby provoking him or her to resign. 15
FDR intentionally assigned different people or agencies, without their knowledge,
the same task of creating a program or policy, realizing and anticipating a conflict. In the
end, after power struggles and bickering, the conflict would subside when FDR either
formed a compromise or waited until he was needed to settle the issue by making a
unilateral decision as to how they would proceed. A competitive environment not only
gave FDR the opportunity to finalize decisions, but it also gave him the opportunity to
hear and discuss diverse ideas. Through his use of conflict and the desire of his staff to
please him, FDR believed his administration produced higher quality, prudent, and
unique programs. 16
His policymaking style was advantageous for FDR, but it frustrated his staff
members. Adding to their difficulties, his often undefined goals and plans gave staff
members only a vague idea of what their assignment was and what he was trying to
achieve. This indecisiveness vexed many of them, and his administration was noted for
its chaotic way of functioning.17
Unlike FDR, many presidents relied on their cabinet members as a hub for
information and used meetings to make collective decisions. FDR, however, did not pay
attention to or show interest in cabinet meetings. Instead, he preferred private meetings

15

Richard E. Neustadt, “Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK,” The American
Political Science Review 57, no. 4 (December 1, 1963): 857 and 858; Jacob, 30.
16
Patrick Anderson, The Presidents’ Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S.
Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson (Garden City, N. Y: Doubleday,
1969), 70; Barrett, 111; Jacob, 25; William W. Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing
Leadership Styles, FDR to Clinton (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2000), 46.
17
Jacob, 23; Barrett, 111; Neustadt, 23 and 24.

12
where major decisions were made. 18 During these meetings, FDR relied heavily on his
administration and advisers throughout the policymaking process. They brought their
personal perspectives, professional training, and past work experiences to his
administration.
The way FDR made decisions could explain why he vacillated between ideas.
Denton and Hahn, in their book, Presidential Communication, identified FDR’s decision
making process as collegial; he consulted with a diverse group of advisers, assessed and
analyzed their ideas, and then decided which ones were the most practical and useful.
FDR was cautious about his sources of information. He became wary if his knowledge
base emanated from a single source without any alternate perspectives. It would seem
that it would be difficult and time-consuming to generate and compile a decision after
consulting many advisors, but, “There was nothing he liked more than to be able to bring
together divergent ideas and have them apparently complement one another.”19 Although
FDR enjoyed and benefited from the interactions of diverse (or even divergent)
perspectives and ideas, his apparent wavering gave his staff mixed signals, making their
work more complicated.
While being characterized as indecisive and one who conferred with multiple
advisers, the literature conversely described FDR as impulsive. FDR sought out and was
excited by new ideas. At times he prematurely approved of plans instead of deeply
investigating their quality or before they were fully developed. His hasty decisions were
sometimes based on his gut feelings; consequently, he made decisions without consulting

18

Barrett, 28–31.
Robert E. Denton and Dan F. Hahn, Presidential Communication: Description and Analysis (New York:
Praeger, 1986), 233; Neustadt, 858; Carl N. Degler, The New Deal (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 7.
19
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the department head whose jurisdiction was involved. After the decision became known,
he would have to quickly find solutions for any conflicts it may have caused. 20
Roosevelt was not a thinker; as such, Hoover was much more effective.
Roosevelt was a broker, an eclectic, a pragmatist, an improviser, one who
lived comfortably with great inconsistencies. Nevertheless, when there
were conflicts among organized interests over what to do and how to do it,
Roosevelt displayed a consistent preference for writing the conflicts into
the legislation and providing for the group interactions to continue within
the administrative process itself. 21
FDR’s characteristics spilled over into his policies, which meant that many of his policies
were criticized as not well thought out and inconsistent. FDR often marketed his policies
in order to ensure they would gain congressional approval and be treated favorably by the
media and public. Through the use of press conferences, radio addresses, fireside chats,
speeches, and press releases, FDR educated the public on his plans for the future, how his
current programs were helping the country, and the support needed for his policies. He
tried to push Congress to act in accordance with his will by using the media and by
dedicating time to working with congressional leaders on legislative issues. He gained
voters’ trust with his enjoyable personality and friendly manner. Although he lacked
knowledge and relied on the ideas of others, he was a very confident leader and talented
at getting people to agree with him. 22
During his campaign and into his presidency, FDR addressed the public to
describe his policies with few details. FDR’s ambiguous way of speaking was intentional
so that he could appeal to a wider range of voters. He could then worry about the details

20

Jacob, 12 and 26; Adam Cohen, Nothing to Fear: FDR’s Inner Circle and the Hundred Days That
Created Modern America (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 6; Barrett, 111.
21
Lowi, 59.
22
Reiman, 192; John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), 79; Degler, 6; Lammers, 33, 36, and 49.
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later because it was easier for the public to agree on broad ideas and concepts. According
to FDR, when details were provided, voters were turned off. Being vague gave him the
freedom to tweak his plans and make changes as he went along. 23
The way FDR managed his staff, created a competitive environment, spoke in
vague terms, occasionally made major decisions impulsively, negotiated in private
meetings, and obtained unprecedented presidential authority provided him with indirect
decision-making power in the policymaking process. Neustadt concluded that FDR,
“relied on contention underneath him to produce a show and test of bureaucratic stresses,
congressional reactions, interest-group alignments, political pressures, which he could
weigh before he chose his timing and his course.”24 The way his administration
functioned under FDR may have seemed disordered to the outside, but I agree with
Sherwood, a historian, that FDR’s disorganization was actually well thought out.25
The following chapters will provide examples of FDR’s managerial style
impacting his educational policies. Because of youth’s high unemployment, FDR had
different agency leaders competing to create a youth program. By waiting to announce
who would control the youth program, FDR create tension amongst his administration
until his interference was needed to resolve the problem. These tense moments provide
FDR opportunities to steer educational policies. Such policymaking steps can be
analyzed to reveal FDR’s own educational policies. In doing so, a pattern of FDR being
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indifferent towards education, avoiding and having little respects for educators, and not
supporting public schools emerges.
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CHAPTER 2
NEW DEAL PROGRAMS WITH EDUCATIONAL COMPONENTS

The stark conditions of the Great Depression allowed FDR to ask Congress for
unusual presidential powers. FDR was thus able to quickly create large relief programs.
In the first few months of his presidency new relief agencies were put into place with
large budgets: the Public Works Administration (PWA) was allocated $3.3 billion, the
Civil Works Administration (CWA) had a budget of $400 million, and the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) was provided with approximately $323 million. These New
Deal agencies administered the majority of education and youth programs. By analyzing
their creation, implementation, and administration a better understanding of FDR’s
educational policies will be deciphered.

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)
Having been given unusual presidential powers by Congress, FDR was able to
create the CCC program three weeks after his inauguration, and he consequently was able
to place 250,000 young men working in camps within three months. The CCC was one
of the first New Deal programs to be implemented and, unlike other programs under the
New Deal, FDR was directly responsible for its creation. During his childhood FDR was
exposed to the benefits of the outdoors as his family spent their summers at Campobello
Island in New Brunswick, Canada where he hiked and sailed. His interests in nature as a
young boy lead him to catalogue birds where he grew up in Dutchess County, New York.
His enthusiasm for the natural world triggered his family to give him a lifetime
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membership to the American Museum of Natural History as a gift when he was a boy.
Like his cousin Theodore Roosevelt, FDR wanted to be a conservationist. FDR’s love of
nature grounded him in the belief that nature could strengthen and heal people. His belief
in nature as a source of healing was true not only for one’s body but also for the mind and
soul. This belief brought him to Warm Springs, Georgia to seek comfort and
rehabilitation after he contracted polio, which consequently left him bilaterally paralyzed
at the age of 39. Despite his diagnosis and accompanying paralysis, FDR continued his
involvement with the outdoors and became an avid supporter of the Boy Scouts.1
The hardships of young people looking for work during the Depression left them
frustrated and dispirited. Based on FDR’s belief in the benefits of nature and his passion
for conservation, the CCC employed young men to preserve the country’s natural
resources.2 The concept of youth camps was not new to the world and had already been
implemented in European countries like Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and Poland,
providing FDR examples to emulate. The administrators chosen by FDR to assist with
running the CCC were from the Army, the Department of Interior, the Forest Service, and
the National Parks Service. These selections suggest that FDR thought of the CCC as
primarily a forest and conservation program that would follow strict routines set by the
Army.
FDR designed the CCC’s organizational structure by placing its administration
within the Department of War and choosing and monitoring its personnel. The daily
1
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activities were delegated to former labor union leader Robert Fechner, who became the
Director of the CCC. General Douglas MacArthur, from The Department of War, was in
charge of running the camps. The National Parks and the Forest Service oversaw the
conservation and work projects including: constructing public facilities, cleaning
beaches, planting trees, building dams, assisting flood relief organizations, preventing
soil erosion, fighting fires, laying telephone lines, and maintaining roads. The young
men were provided with housing, board, and paid for their work. The majority of their
pay went to support their families. FDR believed that “the way to economic recovery lies
through increased purchasing power for the masses who have the desire but lack the
means to consume the products of industry.” 3 The main goals for the CCC program were
to decrease unemployment and competition for jobs, to make young men productive, to
conserve natural resources, to provide money directly to the public, and to build character
and discipline amongst the enrollees. 4
Despite its mission, a CCC advisory council member W. Frank Persons, from the
Department of Labor, suggested in 1933 that the CCC have more educational activities.
He stressed that no formal schooling should occur. Prior to this recommended
educational plan, MacArthur had called for a “welfare program,” to create activities
including reading, worship services, sports, forestry education by the Forest Service, and
a minimal vocational program by the Army to keep the young men occupied after work.
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Such activities were not created out of concern for the youth’s academic skills but to
provide productive activities for the evenings after their work was complete.5
Of the men who were enrolled in the CCC in 1934, approximately 20% were
either illiterate or lacked basic academic skills. This fact emphasized the importance of
Persons’ suggestions regarding the development of an educational program for the young
men. In early August of 1933, George Zook, who was the U.S. Commissioner of
Education, received a letter from the Dean of the School of Education at the University of
Michigan promoting the idea that an educational program be developed in the CCC due
to the enrollees’ low academic skills. In late October, H.C. Bryant of the National Park
Service, along with representatives from higher education institutions submitted plans for
a CCC educational program. By this time Zook was already pushing for a welldeveloped CCC educational plan. 6
Zook laid out a proposal for Fechner, but he and the Army officials resisted the
idea of its establishment. Zook received positive feedback from the president. FDR was
interested in educating the enrollees but in the subject of forestry. 7 For FDR, Fechner,
and the Army officials, the work program was the primary objective of the CCC and they
were concerned that an educational program would detract from CCC’s main function.
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Colonel Duncan Major, from the War Department, also complained about the increased
pressure he was receiving from educators to Louis Howe, a closer advisor to FDR:8
We are going to be hounded to death by all sorts of educators. Instead of
teaching the boys how to do an honest day’s work we are going to be
forced to accede to the wishes of the long-haired men and short-haired
women and spend most of the time on some kind of an educational
course.9
FDR also did not want the education program to overshadow CCC’s conservation plan.
Politically, a focus on helping youth through physical activities was more palatable than
formalized educational training. The pressure from state selecting agencies was
pressuring Fechner to have a formal education program. Eventually Fechner and General
McArthur recognized the importance of preparing the young men with poor academic
skills to become productive citizens upon returning to society and agreed to an
educational program.10
In November of 1933, Zook submitted an education plan for the CCC to the War
Department. One part was altered by the War Department, giving it more control over
the program. For example, Zook stated the Office of Education would “…recommend to
the Secretary of War the courses of instruction.”11 The War Department changed it to
state, “The Office of Education will recommend to the Secretary of War the outlines of
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instruction, teaching procedures and types of teaching materials for use in the camps.” 12
Zook’s administrative plan placed ultimate responsibility of the educational program with
the Secretary of War. The Office of Education served as the advisor for CCC’s
educational program. Administration of the program became the duty of the Corps Area
Commander and instruction was conducted by the Camp Commanders, with assistance of
the Army workers, the Forest Service, and the National Park Service. All of these entities
reported to the War Department.13 Zook, Fechner, and the War Department agreed on
this educational plan. It was then submitted to FDR and approved in November of 1933.
Although no documentation was found indicating why FDR decided to accept CCC’s
educational program, the educational need of the enrollees, the fact that the classes would
include forestry conservation work, and agreement on an educational program by Zook,
Fechner, and the War Department most likely made him more comfortable with the idea.
FDR’s personal goal for the education program was based on his ideas and values of
nature and outdoor living:
It is the hope of the President that the educational program, by
emphasizing forestry, agriculture, and like subjects will assist the men in
readjusting themselves to a new mode of living – to country life instead of
city life – and to assist them to improve themselves educationally and
vocationally. 14
Unlike Fechner and the War Department, Zook was excited about the unique
teaching opportunities in the CCC camps. Each camp, depending on the needs of the
enrollees, created its own unique educational program. Based on students’ interests and
12
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experiences, self-paced student programs were designed by educational advisers. Zook
stated, “If the conservation camps continue we may be able to develop a program which
will be a new departure in America education.” 15 Zook told the educational advisers that
“the exact character of the program which they carry on in these camps will depend on
what they themselves feel is the desirable thing to do in the camps. They are very largely
on their own initiative….” 16 The educational program was not mandatory for enrollees in
the earlier years of the CCC yet the program had seven main objectives:
1) Elimination of illiteracy, 2) Removal of deficiencies in common school
subjects, 3) Training on the job, 4) Cultural and general education, 5)
Health and safety education, 6) Character and citizenship training, and 7)
Assisting enrollees in finding employment.17
Of the men who were enrolled in the CCC in 1934 approximately 20% were learning
literacy and basic skills, 30% were working on high schools diplomas, 7% were taking
college level courses, 12% were enrolled in the arts and crafts, and 30% were in
vocational training.18 The CCC education program was primarily focused on vocation
and basic skills.
The Army estimated the cost of the educational program as $3.45 million per
year. But FDR’s lack of enthusiasm for this program was demonstrated by the amount of
money he allocated for it, a mere $2.5 million. The American Council on Education, in a
letter to FDR, confronted him regarding the insufficient funds for the CCC’s educational
program. In their letter, they asserted that the money allocated was not enough to support
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an educational adviser in every camp. An educational program where one adviser is
assigned to two camps rather than one camp was shown to be less effective. At the time,
only 1,092 of the 1,468 camps had education advisers. In addition to under-funding the
established camps, the budget did not include any of the new CCC camps created in the
severe drought areas in the West. The Office of Education applied for educational
programming funds for the 50,000 men enrolled in these new CCC camps, but Fechner’s
office denied the request after the War Department had approved it.19 The American
Council on Education further criticized FDR’s budget by stating:
Only $146,800 is included in the budget for books, equipment, and study
materials. This is an average of only 50 cents per enrolled man during the
year. On account of this parsimony in a critical place the Commissioner
of Education found it necessary to appeal to the General Education Board
for assistance. That organization came to the rescue with an appropriation
of $40,000 for study materials. It ought not to be necessary for the
educational service to depend on subsidies of this kind to carry on a clear
obligation of the Federal Government. 20
Two years later, in 1936, a similar situation with the budget arose when the Office of
Education and the CCC Education Director requested more money for the educational
program. The president told Fechner that, “it is regretted that additional funds cannot be
provided for this work, and that the problem will have to be worked out within the funds
available.”21
More problems with the CCC’s educational program were revealed by the U.S.
Army, represented by Major General A.J. Bowley, who wrote a memorandum on
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August 9, 1934 titled, “Value of the Educational Program in the CCC Camps.” He
summarized his thoughts on the program:
1. When the idea of adopting an educational program for use in the CCC
Camps was first broached, it was the opinion of this headquarters that any
program adopted which was suitable to the needs of the enrollees could be
carried out better by the military personnel than it could be by any other
agency. The experience of the past six months has proved the correctness
of this opinion. 2. With few exceptions, the Camp Educational Advisers
selected lact [sic] initiative and imagination, and appear to lack experience
and aptitude necessary to initiate and carry on the Educational Program
which has been adopted. They have, however, contributed substantially to
the promotion of camp recreation, moral and social activities. 3. The
present educational program is too ambitious in its scope, considering the
facilities available, the length of the enrollment period, the time the
enrollees can devote to it, and the qualifications of the present Camp
Educational Advisers. 4. Most of the literature recommended for use in
the camps is of excellent character, but scattered thru its pages, one finds
material of a subversive nature, material which tends to tear down our
existing order of society and which is inimical to national defense. 22
In 1934 the educational community erupted when a piece of literature, You and
Machines, created under the direction of the Office of Education and the CCC’s
Educational Director, became an example of subversive material. You and Machines was
written by William F. Ogburn, a sociology professor and member of the American
Council on Education. It was written to provide the CCC enrollees engaging reading
material at an appropriate reading level on U.S. social structures. The story described
how rapid industrialization can lead to unemployment and loss of family time. Fechner
thought the book might lead the young men to think that the economic and social
structures of the U.S. were to blame for the Great Depression. Banning this piece of
literature added to the complaints that CCC was an attempt to militarize young men.
Fechner’s rationale for prohibited reading material was that he did not want enrollees to
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become despondent after reading stories that questioned capitalism and analyzed socioeconomic structures. Many educators were upset that Fechner was suppressing
discussions and censoring enrollees’ reading material. 23 John W. Studebaker, FDR’s
second U.S. Commissioner of Education, and Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, shared their concerns with FDR and asked to administer the
CCC’s educational program. Willard W. Beatty, president of the Progressive Education
Association (PEA), wrote to FDR with a similar request and also shared his outrage that
“educational activities of such a federal projects as the CCC should be in the hands of a
layman….”24 After receiving this letter, the president requested to see Mr. Studebaker. I
found no documents that described their conversation, however. John S. Nollen of
Grinnell College disagreed with Fechner’s decision to ban the material and was less
flattering of him. He though it was unfortunate that “efforts to introduce proper
educational methods and materials should be systemically nullified by a man who is
thinking with his adrenal glands.” 25
The placement of the Office of Education in the CCC’s structure described earlier
left the office with limited power:
The Office of Education can only recommend to the War Department
concerning educational procedures and materials. In turn the War
Department recommends to the Director. If he disapproves, the War
Department is disposed to accept his judgment without debate.26
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General Andrew Moses, Assistant Chief of Staff of the War Department, reiterated
Fechner’s control and decision-making power in an advisory committee meeting. “We
consider that Mr. Fechner represents the president in these matters. His decisions are
Fechner’s prerogative.”27 Indeed they were; despite the large volume of complaints
against Fechner’s decision to ban the piece of literature, FDR supported his decision. 28
Such incidents informed Clarence S. Marsh, the CCC’s educational director, of
Fechner’s sentiment as Marsh’s attempts to build up the educational program were
rebuffed. Eventually, Marsh’s inability to perform his duties as educational director led
to his resignation in March 1935; he stayed in the position for only a little over a year. 29
Two months before resigning, Marsh sent Studebaker a four-page memorandum with
“Barriers to Success of the CCC Educational Program” as the subject. Marsh criticized
the CCC’s structure:
There are too many controls.… Special study materials prepared for
specific use in CCC Camps have little chance of approval because they
must pass through the War Department to be sanctioned by the Director
and his staff whose training and experience are inadequate to qualify them
for final judgment of such materials…. The fact that every major
recommendation to strengthen and enrich the Educational Program has
been disapproved by the Director seems to indicate on his part, either lack
of interest in or active hostility to the Educational Program. 30
When Studebaker discussed the problems of administering the CCC educational program
with FDR, FDR stated, “This work must be under final control of the Director, Mr.
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Robert Fechner– that Mr. Fechner is the responsible head and he must have the final
say.”31
Howard Oxley succeeded Marsh, becoming the second CCC educational director.
In 1937, Fechner made an attempt to have increased control over the CCC educational
program by trying to garner support to have this position removed from the Office of
Education and transferred to his own office. Upon learning of this information,
Studebaker wrote to the head of his department to warn him of such an attempt:
Mr. Fechner’s proposal would likewise remove the Office of Education
and thereby the forces of education throughout the Nation from the proper
relationship to and control of the educational program in the camps. I
presume he feels that his proposal would provide a certain amount of
administrative convenience which he desires, but it would without doubt
add another influence toward the destruction of proper coordination of
educational functions and would thereby dissipate the control and
effectiveness of these functions.32
FDR supported Studebaker and kept the position in the Office of Education.
When Harry Hopkins, head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), wanted
to remove the WPA teachers from all the CCC camps and place them on other projects,
FDR did not show concern for the CCC’s education program. Approximately 1,800
teachers were assisting the camps with educational programs but were reassigned to other
relief programs.33 FDR’s response to Fechner’s letter informing him of the problem was
delayed and merely stated that he, “did not care to interfere with decisions made by the
Administrator….”34
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Support for the CCC’s educational program came from Congress in 1937 during
its hearing and discussions on a bill to make the CCC permanent. During Fechner’s
testimony in the House Committee on Labor, he angered congressmen during his
questioning. Fechner was not in agreement with many of the congressmen’s views on the
value of the CCC’s educational program. He referred to the objective of helping the boys
with their future as an “incidental objective.” 35 He stated, “I wish to emphasize that the
CCC is a work organization.” 36 He then stated that the work catered to those who were
not interested in academic training. According to Fechner, the kind of vocational training
that the boys received in the CCC “recognizes the special needs of the type of boy who
has been neglected in other educational plans.” 37 Some of the congressmen refuted
Fechner’s ideas. They argued that teaching an enrollee to shovel did not prepare him for
a productive and financially stable future. Their main point was that this governmentsponsored program should prepare the young men to be able to earn a living, and that
consequently these young men would not require relief in the future. They argued that
the enrollees represented the underprivileged population in society, and they should be
given every opportunity to succeed.38 After the hearings the committee bolstered their
support for vocational and citizenship training by making the educational program
mandatory, even if it cut into the eight hour work day. For both the House and the
Senate, a surprising amount of time was spent discussing the education program. There
was agreement that the education program needed to be strengthened and that it needed to
35

Howard Oxley to John W. Studebaker, July 2, 1937, Folder CCC Folder #2 July 1, 1937, Box 2, Records
of Special Projects and Programs, RG 12, NACP.
36
Statement of Robert Fechner with regard to the proposed bill for making the CCC permanent, Folder
CCC Legislation 1937, Box 22, CCC General Correspondence, 1933-42, RG 95, NACP.
37
Ibid.
38
Howard Oxley to John W. Studebaker, July 2, 1937, Folder CCC Folder #2 July 1, 1937, Box 2, Records
of Special Projects and Programs, RG 12, NACP.

29
be mandatory, but the terms vocational education, general education, and citizenship
training were debated. Following the lively debates in the House and the Senate, FDR
addressed the Congress on April 5, 1937 to provide reasons why he supported making the
CCC permanent. Although he fully supported making the CCC permanent, not once did
he mention the benefits of the CCC’s educational program. Instead, FDR only focused
on the benefits of the work projects. To him the benefits of the CCC for the enrollees
were improvements in “moral and physical well-being….”39 Contrary to FDR’s wishes,
Congress did not follow through with his desire for a permanent CCC, despite knowing
the CCC was considered his pet project.40 Congress did extend the CCC for three years,
and education was made mandatory and was elevated as a major objective of the CCC.
The new purpose became: “providing employment, as well as vocational training, for
youthful citizens…. at least ten hours each week may be devoted to general educational
and vocational training.”41 Moreover, they, unlike FDR, focused on the value and
importance of the CCC’s educational program. When Oxley and Studebaker tried to
incorporate the ten hours of educational programs into CCC’s weekly schedule by
decreasing time spent on work projects, Fechner defended the forty hours of work each
week. FDR upheld Fechner’s decision and agreed work was the most important
component in the CCC program. 42
Although Congress showed support for the CCC’s education program by making
participation mandatory, the purpose of the educational program continued to be debated.
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For example, the Technical Services (the National Parks Service and the Forest Service)
argued that the emphasis on CCC’s education program should be job training rather than
studying for a high school diploma since enrollees were from the working-class. 43 A
member of the educational advisory committee, H.R. Kylie, representing the Forest
Service, stated in April 1940:
All academic training in the camps should be related to the project and
camp work jobs. All applicants for CCC should be excluded from
enrollment who are more interested in continuing their academic
education than in the training to be secured on the job and in related work
in the camps.44
The fact that this discussion was still occurring in 1940 indicates that the disagreement
over the type of education the CCC enrollees should receive continued throughout the
program’s existence.
J.C. Wright of the Office of Education commented on Technical Service’s attitude
towards the CCC’s educational program:
Although no survey was made, it was a common thing to encounter
individuals from the technical staff - - foremen and others - - who felt that
the educational program belonged to those in charge of the project…. It is
plain to be seen, however, that some camp superintendents, foremen, and
members of the technical staff do not feel their responsibility for the
educational program. They are responsible for the training of their own
workers, but feel little responsibility for the success of the educational
program. 45
Technical services promoted learning that occurred through their work projects, which
consisted of on-the-job training, and they believed that hands-on training was the type of
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education best suited for the CCC enrollees. They resisted programs that competed with
their job training and work program.
Tensions rose further between those who wanted the CCC to focus on work
projects, such as Fechner, the Army, and the Technical Services, with those who wanted
the CCC to have a stronger education program, such as the Office of Education, Ickes,
and the Director of the CCC education program. Studebaker, at a CCC Educational
Advisory Committee meeting in 1938, stated clearly that his office was not pleased with
the current CCC educational program. 46 The attempts by his office to improve the
program were often rejected by Fechner’s office. Some of the challenges educators
struggled with in the camps were: the limited hours available devoted to the educational
program, the quality of the educational facilities, the lack of freedom educational advisers
were allowed to have by the Army, the lack of cooperation from people in Technical
Services, and the lack of decision-making power in the educational program overall.
Similar to the wishes of Congress, Studebaker wanted the enrollees to do more
than work because the jobs available to them would likely not be in forest, soil, and park
related jobs. He wanted to see general education courses tie into the work projects, like
math and measurement. According to a Corps Area Educational Adviser, the
organizational setup of the CCC itself contributed to problems. A duality between the
Army, who oversaw the activities on the campsite, and the Technical Services, who
controlled the work projects offsite, left authority in two entities, often resulting in
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conflict and confusion. The educational adviser, not overtly welcomed by either, had to
contend with both men.47
Although Studebaker wanted an educational program that tied into the work
projects, he did not instruct educational advisers to learn more about the work projects
and watch what was happening in the field. A meeting of representatives from Technical
Services indicated that they also wanted learning about conservation projects to be
incorporated into the education program, but not one person could say they ever saw an
educational adviser on the field. They wondered how this goal could be achieved when
the educational adviser did not have any idea of what is going on outside of the camp.
There was agreement that more of their staff should teach workshops in the evenings.
The problem was many of these people were busy preparing for work the next day and
tired from working on the work projects for eight hours. Additionally, not all of the staff
had college degrees; some foremen had less education than the enrollees themselves and
might have been intimidated by educational advisers and the classroom setting.
Technical staff members felt that their knowledge was not valued by other CCC staff
members and therefore were resistant when people tried to tell them what to do.48 In the
end, the educational program for the CCC enrollees never became fully developed.
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Despite the arguments among educators and the CCC staff, the organization was
highly regarded by the general public and both parties in Congress. FDR’s fireside chats
advertised the CCC’s goals and accomplishments to ensure it maintained its popularity.
Those educators who did not support the CCC knew it would be ineffective and
damaging to their image to publicly criticize a program that was so well liked. 49
Educators continued to try and promote CCC’s educational program and make it valuable
to enrollees.

National Youth Administration (NYA)
In an article published in School Life during FDR’s first month as president, FDR
was quoted as acknowledging the worth of young people and the schools that support
them. Specifically he stated, “Our schools need the appreciation and cooperation of all
those who depend upon them for the education of our youth – the state’s most valuable
asset.”50 FDR was not the only one who was concerned about youth; Eleanor Roosevelt,
the First Lady, told Hopkins, “The youth of the country is still very much on my mind.” 51
The young adults in the United States were frustrated for many reasons. Many could not
afford to attend secondary or post-secondary schools, as even the cost of food, clothing,
school supplies, and transportation were too high for most. Jobs were scarce, and they
consequently could not earn their own money. In short, the youth faced an insecure
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future. To speak out about the issues that youth faced, a group of active youth formed an
organization called the American Youth Congress (AYC) in 1934. AYC gained the
attention of Mrs. Roosevelt and Charles W. Taussig, FDR’s close adviser, not only for its
Communist leanings but also because of its frustrations with FDR and the New Deal.
Observing youth activities in Europe, the Roosevelt administration was well aware of
how susceptible youth could be to groups with a strong figurehead.
Mrs. Roosevelt had sincere concerns for youth; according to an AYC member,
“her interest was not primarily a political interest, it was concerned with young people
and what was happening to them in the Depression.”52 Through her wit and warm
disposition she was able to influence the leaders of AYC. She encouraged them to
believe that their goals could be accomplished more easily if they worked alongside the
White House as opposed to against it.53 Under Mrs. Roosevelt’s care, the AYC became
an ally of the New Deal and participated in creating the National Youth Administration
(NYA).
Before the NYA was created, college officials acted as a sounding board for
students who were upset over their inability to afford college. Institutions of higher
education were also struggling financially as states cut their budgets, and they looked to
the federal government to help bring students back. They campaigned for aiding needy
students and were able to bring this issue to the attention of the Congress and the
president. Attuned to these concerns was George Zook, as head of the Office of
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Education, and a former college official himself, he helped put into place a student-aid
program. Zook, in the early part of 1934, had suggested to Harry Hopkins, who was in
charge of a $500 million program - the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA), to use some of the relief funds to financially support needy college students.
The program would provide students with a campus job to help pay for their education.
A 15% decrease in college attendance warranted his recommendation. 54 By early
February 1934, Hopkins announced a student-aid program providing $5 million of relief
funds to help students pay for their college education.
Zook also proposed a position in the federal government under the Office of
Education to focus on people under the age of 30 years old. He recognized that youth
needed guidance to help with job placement, counseling, and schooling. He advocated
for learners receiving:
a subsistence wage in the later years of education for pursuing an
approved educational program. In this program, both through their
participation in active community life and through further preparation for
greater social, economic, and civic helpfulness, youths are performing a
service to the State, and should be paid accordingly just as military
training is today subsidized. 55
John W. Studebaker, who succeeded Zook as Commissioner of Education, also
devoted time to the youth issue by developing a long-term and emergency youth
program. The long-term youth program would have created a Division of Youth in the
Office of Education and assisted two million young men and women who lived at home
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and were between the ages of 16 and 25. Under Studebaker’s proposal, the youth
program would be administered by the educational system and provide guidance
assistance, educational programs, recreation, and part-time employment, for a cost of
$480 million per year.56
After much deliberation a proposal was drafted and submitted for criticism
on February 11, 1935, to a small group of national leaders in the various
aspects of youth activities. After a full day’s conference the proposal was
endorsed in all of its essentials and became the program actively
advocated by the Office of Education. The Commissioner of Education
conferred with many Government representatives concerning the proposal,
and finally, on April 26, released to the press its outlines in order to obtain
the reactions and criticisms of interested persons throughout the country.
The proposed program was discussed in radio addresses and on the
platform. The response appeared to be not only generous but
enthusiastically favorable to the type of program advocated.57
Studebaker’s youth plan was not the only one in the making; the Department of
Labor, the WPA, Taussig, and Mrs. Roosevelt were also involved in formulating a youth
plan. Taussig and Mrs. Roosevelt spent a lot of time discussing what could be done with
troubled youth. Taussig feared that students who dropped out-of-school due to a lack of
financial resources or those youth who could not find a job would view America’s
democratic system as unfair. The youth’s frustration could make them susceptible to
Communist ideas. Taussig realized the best way to resolve this dilemma would be to
give youth jobs and not just relief. His hope was that by providing students with jobs,
they would be allowed to pursue their interests and in doing so, renew their belief in
democracy. Because of the high unemployment of youth, assistance from the federal
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government was required to move youth from being excluded from society to being
socially integrated.58
Hopkins and Aubrey Williams, Deputy Administrator of the WPA, proposed that
youth in school train for a particular vocation while working within that same field for a
small stipend. According to their proposal, student aid should be expanded in order to
keep poorer students in school. Frances Perkins, Secretary of the Department of Labor,
wanted to recreate the WPA for youth to provide them with jobs. From her perspective,
learning was implicit with any job and it did not need to be a major part of the program.
She also called for agency cooperation for all the various youth organizations, including
the Office of Education, in order to come together and design a youth program. 59
FDR tried to remain diplomatic but pressure was building on him to make a
decision on the youth program’s administration. FDR was not satisfied with
Studebaker’s, Perkins’, or the Hopkins and Williams’ youth proposals. According to
FDR, the program needed to accomplish three goals: provide youth with jobs, vocational
training, and citizenship education, meaning understanding the responsibilities of citizens
in a democracy and the importance of civic duties. He asked Taussig to design one youth
program that would address all three of these needs. Taussig organized a group of people
to assist him, including Mrs. Roosevelt. The result of these meetings reflected what
Williams had previously suggested, a program that integrated jobs, student aid, and
vocational training, most likely because Taussig consulted with Williams throughout the
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process. Enrollees would have direct experience with citizenship education through their
experiences of democratic principles in action within the NYA.60
Competition for controlling the new youth plan was becoming intense and in June
1935, FDR created the NYA program by executive order and provided the following
rationale to the public:
I have determined that we shall do something for the Nation’s unemployed
youth because we can ill afford to lose the skill and energy of these young
men and women. They must have their chance in school, their turn as
apprentices and their opportunity for jobs - - a chance to work and earn for
themselves. 61
The decision of which agency FDR wanted to place the youth program under and who
would administer it required some deliberation. Placing the youth program under
Studebaker in the Office of Education was expected by educators.
Prior to the setting up of the National Youth Administration considerable
research to discover the needs of youth in various sections of the country
and to find plans for meeting the needs of unemployed youth and those
who are not financially able to continue their education, had been carried
on through the United States Office of Education. The Commissioner of
Education had formulated and announced certain plans for carrying on a
national program for youth. He had delivered several addresses on the
subject and had published articles in the leading newspapers of the
country. He had requested that funds be allocated to the Office of
Education for the administration of the youth program. It was generally
thought by educators throughout the country that his request would be
honored.62
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The problem with having the program under the Office of Education was the focus would
be primarily on education. FDR wanted the NYA to focus on education in conjunction
with work relief.
Eleven days before the NYA’s Executive Order was given, FDR requested
Hopkins to call Father John Burke, General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference (NCWC), for advice about the administration of the NYA. FDR viewed
Catholics as an important political group that had influence that he needed to use. 63
Hopkins asked Father Burke what his opinions were on having the youth administration
under Studebaker. Father Burke’s response was it would be “a grave mistake…putting it
in under the Office of Education would give the impression it was Federal Education and
would be an opening wedge to Federal control of education.” 64 He told Hopkins that
FDR had spoken previously to him about this issue and FDR confirmed Studebaker
would not be administering the program. Father Burke then inquired if funds would be
available under the youth program for private institutions and Hopkins could not see a
reason why funds would be withheld from private institutions since they assist with
education and recreation. Next he asked to have a Catholic on the National Committee
and Hopkins said he would speak to him about that in the near future. Hopkins returned
to the question of Studebaker and told him FDR was interested in offering Studebaker the
position of Chairman of the National Committee. Father Burke again stated it would be a
bad idea and Hopkins concurred. Four days later, Hopkins called Father Burke again and
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informed him that there were “great influences that persuaded the president” to have
Studebaker administer the youth agency. 65
The pressure to assign Studebaker as the administrator of the NYA was
apparently not as great as Hopkins had thought. FDR outraged educators by placing the
youth program under Hopkins’ WPA and assigned Aubrey Williams as its Executive
Director. Studebaker was placed on the NYA’s executive committee to placate
educators, but it was a committee with little control over the NYA’s decisions. The
decision-making power resided with the National Advisory Committee (NAC), chaired
by Taussig. FDR created the NYA without congressional approval under an Executive
Order, and its $50 million budget came from the WPA’s $5 billion budget.66 Williams,
under Hopkins, was chosen to head the NYA program, which showed FDR’s support of
his ideas and skills.
FDR explained to the National Education Association (NEA) that the NYA was
designed to provide relief to youth, and Williams, with his background in social work,
was more experienced in relief. 67 Williams believed that:
the schools had failed to adequately train youth before the depression, and
that the schools were continuing to fail youth during economic hard times.
He was willing to work with educators, but he felt that the professional
educator could not be trusted to give all the youth of America the help and
training they needed. Williams believed that someone or some outside
agency had to force the educational system to do what had to be done. He
consistently and publicly expressed his belief that the NYA could do for
youth what the schools could not or would not do. This criticism of
education was a basic rationale for the NYA’s efforts to provide
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vocational training for youth who had been unable to get that training in
school.68

Since Williams publicly expressed his disappointment of educators and schools, it seems
likely that FDR must have been aware of Williams’ distaste for public schools and
educators, yet Williams was the person FDR decided to have administer the youth
program. Disagreements and tense relations continued to persist between Williams,
Studebaker, and other educators, however, FDR showed approval for the NYA by
upholding Williams’ decisions.69
FDR’s placement of the NYA in a relief agency rather than the Office of
Education was supported by the President’s Advisory Committee on Education which
studied the NYA a few years after its inception. This committee was formed to study
federal aid to vocational education within the context of general education and was
chaired by FDR appointee, Floyd W. Reeves. They concluded that the NYA was not an
educational organization. The student-aid program was regarded as a way to help
students obtain an education and the work projects were purely an employment
program. 70
In June 1935, high school, undergraduate, and graduate students received NYA
money for the work they provided their schools. The hope was the money would be
enough to keep them in school. As FDR wanted, money went directly to the youth.
Those who were not in school saw their first work relief jobs in January of 1936. During
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the day they were apprentices and at night they would take courses to reinforce the skills
learned during the day. Community service projects were assigned to youth based on
their interests. The skills gained would help make the youth more competitive in the
future.71 Providing youth with a job was a key relief measure, but the job training
component allowed the NYA program to also act as a reform program. The NYA, in the
end, became a mixture of relief and reform measures.
The NYA training programs were primarily conducted outside of public
vocational schools with uncertified instructors. Educators complained about the NYA
training programs, arguing that they followed their own curriculum and did not conform
to traditional vocational education standards. Educators complained of duplication,
inferior instruction, and poor training. The Office of Education wanted to take over the
training aspect of the NYA and in doing so obtain federal money to implement its
program. By November 1939 Williams agreed that traditional vocational educators did a
better job of training youth, but he argued that they should cooperate with him since he
was more experienced with handling youth on relief. By the summer of 1940,
Studebaker and Williams agreed to let the Office of Education have control over the
NYA’s training program, but Williams ignored that agreement.72
In 1941, the National Education Association (NEA), at the time an educational
organization of educational administrators and teachers, and the American Association of
School Administrators wrote a report stating their reasons for not supporting the CCC or
the NYA. The report was entitled The Civilian Conservation Corps, The National Youth
Administration, and the Public Schools. The NEA went further than stating their
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disagreements with the CCC and the NYA; it called for their termination. Their rationale
for wanting these programs to end was: 1) educational programs are to be created and
administered by state and local authorities; the federal government’s function was to
support these authorities without interference; 2) it was a waste of public funds to create a
second educational system; and 3) the intent of Congress was to provide relief and
assistance with conservation activities, and the CCC’s educational programs were above
and beyond its original mandate. With the same amount of financial support, states
would be able to assist more students than the NYA and the CCC, and individual states
would be able to expand services such as career support, job placement, and vocational
education. 73
By the time NEA’s report came out, Studebaker and members in the Defense
department had overhauled the CCC’s education program to benefit the Army. Enrollees
were learning skills such as cooking, electronics, demolition, and radio operations to
make their transition into the Army easier. This transition was, in part, because FDR and
his administration in the late 1930s were preparing for war. By this time, CCC’s program
was already progressing to an end. There were fewer young men enrolling into the
program since they no longer required work relief. Employment opportunities in the war
industry were opening up and the armed forces needed young men. 74 FDR, who did not
want to see his CCC program end, cautioned, “the conduct of the war must not cause the
loss of ‘social gains.’”75 He suggested combining the NYA and the CCC into one
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program but Congress was uninterested.76 A congressional committee, the Joint
Commission for the Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, officially
disbanded the CCC in 1942.
Like the CCC, the NYA switched its focus to national defense training. Taussig
suggested to Mrs. Roosevelt, who was close with Williams, that the NYA should
participate in the war effort. By revamping the premise of the NYA, Williams did his
best to maintain the NYA’s importance. Defense training was occurring in both the NYA
and through the Office of Education. The fact that the NYA duplicated defense training
provided by the Office of Education became an obvious issue and Congress ended the
NYA in 1943. 77
The difference between the educational components in CCC and NYA are
attributed to their leaders. Fechner and Williams were in many ways opposites of each
other. CCC educational programs focused on basic skills, literacy, and job training for
the poor people instead of providing them with general education that is associated with
middle and upper classes, which was represented more in NYA programs. Tyack, Lowe,
and Hansot summarized these differences well:
CCC stressed conservation and the discipline of work, the NYA embodied
alternative values. Aubrey Williams, director of NYA, had such a
different conception of both relief and education that it is a tribute to the
President’s catholicity –or inconsistency – that he could have supported
both Fechner and Williams. Both the CCC and the NYA were work-relief
projects aimed at youth. But one can hardly imagine a sharper contrast
between their directors, their guiding philosophies, or their modes of
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operation. Fechner was a conservative trade unionist who endorsed the
army’s hierarchical operating procedures [who] feared radicalism …
Williams was a social worker and lay minister who sought to use the
government’s resources to bring about social justice…. Like Hopkins, his
boss, Williams sympathized most “with these people at the bottom of the
heap” and wanted to redistribute economic and cultural rewards…. 78
FDR was able to support both leaders because the two programs that helped youth had
different political benefits for him. According to Reiman, FDR allowed Williams to
design NYA as a radical reform program because he needed to gain the support of those
who were extremely liberal. To the public, NYA was presented as Mrs. Roosevelt’s idea
in order to appear as a nurturing program for youth. NYA was introduced a few months
before the elections for FDR’s second term and he needed NYA to unify his party and
help him win the election. CCC, which was a relief rather than a reform program,
captured voters’ approval who thought young men required discipline and would benefit
from hard work. FDR knew youth were a special group in society that could cause the
country much anguish if neglected. FDR acted strategically when he introduced his
youth plans so as to gain political and popular support for his various initiatives. 79
Knowing the public was also concerned about schools closing due to a lack of funds,
FDR supported Hopkins giving financial aid to schools in need.

Emergency Educational Program (EEP)
In late 1933, Hopkins, under the FERA, created the Emergency Educational
Program (EEP), which was later transferred to the WPA in 1935. The EEP began as a
result of Zook calling a meeting to discuss the emergency in public schools. The main
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issues facing public schools were: 80,000 unemployed school teachers on or about to be
on relief rolls, rural schools in poor conditions, vocational training needed for those who
were unemployed, pre-school children in need of social services, and a disproportionate
number of illiterate citizens. Hopkins, as the head of the FERA, immediately began to
address these issues under the umbrella program of the EEP. Two individuals from the
Office of Education were borrowed to administer this program, Lewis R. Alderman and
Cyril F. Klinefelter.80
The EEP courses were taught by unemployed adults knowledgeable about a
subject or field. It was difficult for educators to understand that EEP classes did not
require certified teachers. Quite often adults with non-academic expertise were sought
for EEP teaching positions. People who had experience in a field were selected to teach.
The EEP classes included: literacy, vocational training (trades, home economics,
agricultural, bookkeeping, accounting, typing, industrial, and vocational adjustment and
counseling), vocational rehabilitation for adults with physical impairments, and general
education (workers’ education, parent education, arts & crafts, general academics, and
cultural education).81 Adult education was available to those people who were on relief
rolls. The EEP program also included nursery schools and college student-aid. The one
EEP program that required certified teachers was the rural school teacher program, which
paid the salaries of rural school teachers on relief in public elementary and secondary
schools. Hopkins, in early February 1934, notified FDR that “every rural school in
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America which had made reasonable effort to remain open but had been closed because
of lack of funds, will be reopened.”82
Zook, during a White House conference in 1934, told the audience of educators
that the Office of Education had no administrative authority over relief funds for
education but had been serving the FERA in an advisory capacity. 83 The FERA and the
Office of Education worked together in developing the EEP:
We quite consciously selected fields of work that were outside of the field
regularly occupied by the present school system. We did that because we
did not want, through the use of Federal funds, to form a relief program to
interfere too much with the regular conduct and responsibility of the
educational work in the States…. It is our conception that education is
primarily the State and local responsibility. Hence, we have attempted to
place upon you people the real responsibility for the conduct of this work,
interfering as little as possible in an administrative way with the actual
conduct of it.84
The EEP varied by state and was created by the State Superintendent of Education and
the State Relief Administrator.85 In a memorandum to state relief administrators Hopkins
stated:
It is my desire that the emergency educational program covering various
phases of adult education and nursery schools shall be so administered in
the States as to build toward a permanent and integral part of the regular
established public school programs….86
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Through local administration of the EEP programs, Hopkins hoped they would become
incorporated into the public school system. Zook shared these sentiments.87
In terms of vocational programming, state educational administrators were not
including the EEP in their established adult education programs. Klinefelter, in the early
years of the EEP, was disappointed with state education officials for not wanting to
incorporate the EEP into their current vocational programs. State officials instead used
the EEP funds to create auxiliary programs. Klinefelter reported many cases where state
rehabilitation officials wanted the EEP money to pay workers to continue programs that
the state was already offering and resisted hiring staff to work on new EEP. Because of
this resistance, the Emergency Relief Administration stated it would be looking in reports
for an appropriately sized staff to show that the EEP was being sufficiently supported or
else funds would be stopped.88
In a letter to state officials, Hopkins mentioned that a lump sum of money would
be given to the State Relief Administrators to provide unemployment relief to rural
school teachers. Hopkins had to resort to dispersing money in lump sums because “of the
slowness with which States are gathering the needed information on weak school
districts, and the pressure to make funds available to take care of unpaid teachers….”89
Conversely, the people working in the states complained that the WPA and
Hopkins’ administration was working too slowly in getting the funds to the states. One
educational group from Chicago was baffled at the “demoralizing delay” when funds
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were allocated and teachers were financially suffering.90 A more condemning statement
of Hopkins, as well as FDR himself, came in a letter to Studebaker from Charles W.
Taylor, Nebraska State Superintendent of Public Instruction:
You will recall that during the last two years the commissioners of
education and the state superintendents of the various states have
repeatedly urged upon Congress the necessity of appropriating a definite
amount to be used in supplementing the available resources of the various
states in order that the schools might remain open. At various times when
the state superintendent and commissioners of education were urging this
matter upon their representatives in Washington and appealing to the
President of the United States, we were told that a reasonable amount of
the relief funds would be set aside for education.
Mr. Hopkins now definitely states that the FERA has no intention
of extending this type of relief. It seems to us that we should now appeal
to our Representatives and Senators at Washington, knowing that we need
no longer hope for favorable action from Mr. Hopkins.
Mr. Hopkins may say that certain funds are being earmarked and
made available to the various states for an Emergency Educational
Program. The fact remains that this program is limited to emergency
nursery schools and adult education, all of which means that nothing can
be done for the boys and girls who will be deprived of their opportunities
for a common school education….
When we were in Washington last spring and again last fall, we
were given rather definitely to understand that there would be such a thing
as aid for needy school districts. Now Mr. Hopkins insists that it is a
matter of relief for the individual school teacher, rather than to the school
district. Such an arrangement is wholly unsatisfactory insofar as Nebraska
is concerned. It does not serve the best interests of the boys and girls
residing in districts that are unable to carry on their normal program.
In conclusion, may we say that as we view the situation, it appears
that we may as well definitely decide that, insofar as the allocation of
relief funds is concerned, Mr. Hopkins and the President of the United
States are determined that almost every other agency of government shall
take precedence over the education of the youth of the nation. We have
reached this conclusion reluctantly. Why cannot the people at Washington
see that the education of the children of people on relief is a fundamental
relief program?91
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After the creation of the WPA on May 6, 1935, by Executive Order 7034, the
cooperation between states and the federal government decreased further. The WPA
programs, in comparison to the FERA, had more federal oversight and authority. 92
Tensions were also building between the two personnel borrowed from the Office of
Education (Lewis R. Alderman and Cyril F. Klinefelter) and the WPA administration.
The NEA stated, in a document entitled “Public Education and the New Deal,” that the
Office of Education personnel do not have an influence on the FERA’s educational
programs since they are without administrative authority. “Judging from the action
which has been taken on the recommendation of these professional people, the use of
their services is apparently a gesture of cooperation with educational people rather than
an intention to administer educational affairs in a professional manner.” 93 One
memorandum, sent from Aubrey Williams to Alderman, supported the NEA’s
conclusions as Williams told him to not give out instructions or information to state or
local officials without approval. There was no additional information in the
memorandum to provide a reason for his directive. Klinefelter stated to Williams that he
felt the education division was subconsciously thought of as a “stepchild” of the FERA
because the personnel were actually from another department.94
Despite the FERA having an education division, the rural teacher program of the
EEP was primarily a relief program to help teachers who were unemployed rather than an
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educational program. This conclusion was made by the President’s Advisory Committee
on Education that reviewed the EEP’s rural teacher program. Additionally, the federal
government created, administered, and controlled the program, leaving needy states to
comply with their decisions and requests. Because state administrators felt educational
programs are under their jurisdiction, they did not continue the rural teacher program
when their economic situation improved. Their dislike for federal control over education
contributed to the discontinuation of the rural teacher program.95
The President’s Advisory Committee on Education also noted some of the
problems with the EEP in general. Those teachers who were unemployed tended to lack
experience and were either very old or very young. The low salaries for the teaching
positions attracted this segment of teachers. Other issues included “poor and ineffectual
coordination and integration ... Lack of cooperation from some state and local officials or
agencies. Lack of assurance of the work’s continuing over fixed and effective terms.
Frequent unexpected and radical change of policy.”96 Even though there were problems
with the EEP, the President’s Advisory Committee on Education concluded it should be
made permanent. Its educational programs had decreased illiteracy in the U.S. by 16%,
operated 1,600 nursery schools, provided jobs to unemployed teachers, educated groups
that were previously not given consideration such as adults, and developed new
techniques that were “free from orthodox educational traditions” relying heavily upon
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individual teacher’s ability. 97 The experiences and results of the EEP highlighted
problems within the public school system.
Not only did the educational programs of the New Deal address indigent students,
they were also able to make them literate. New Dealers were frustrated that schools
under-served and even excluded students who had the capacity to excel in their studies.
The teachers in the programs were aghast when they learned the large number of people
who were illiterate or those who had obsolete job skills. Because students lacked
relevant job skills, the bulk of New Deal educational programs were vocational. The
ability of the New Deal leaders, who were not educators, to design and implement
educational programs that attracted and assisted many students was a critique of
professional educators and the public school system in general. 98
The NEA had a different opinion on the EEP programs and its relationship to
public schools:
Much of the emergency educational program was concerned with fields of
work which for a long time had been fostered by state and local
educational authorities. For example, a definite part of the Smith-Hughes
vocational work was concerned with the organization of part-time and
evening classes for adults. Many state departments of education had been
engaged in campaigns for the eradication of illiteracy and marked results
had been attained through this work. Vocational rehabilitation has for
some years been carried on through state departments of education by the
aid of federal and state funds. Nursery schools have been developed in
our better city school systems. It is quite evident that what was needed in
these fields was further financial support for the regularly constituted
public school systems.99
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The NEA thought of EEP programs as primarily educational and argued its funds should
go be allocated to regular school channels. FDR avoided this funding structure by
labeling the EEP as a relief program. FDR stated that the New Deal’s federal educational
programs were created as a way to provide work relief.
“It has been the relief feature which has justified the Federal
Government’s supplying funds for programs so largely educational. Had
these programs been wholly educational and had they represented
essentially a Federal plan to aid in the support of education, it would have
been my policy to use only the regularly constituted agencies of education
to administer them.”100
The President’s Advisory Committee on Education agreed that new educational programs
like those found in the EEP should be placed in public schools. The accomplishments of
adult education programs helped to highlight problems with similar programs in the
regular education system. The committee suggested that the best parts of the programs
be maintained and transferred from their relief programs and incorporated into permanent
educational systems. 101 In fact, the President’s Advisory Committee on Education’s
recommendations for the EEP emphasized a program
founded on an educational basis and not on a relief basis. It will be
operated by educators and not be relief administrators. This statement
should not be taken to imply that nothing good has evolved from the
emergency education programs. The statement is made entirely on the
thesis that education carried on by trained educators and administered
through regularly constituted and equipped educational agencies promises
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to be the most effective, as well as the most economical type of
educational program. 102

Of all the New Deal programs, the EEP was unique in that it was directly related to
educational programming. Unlike the CCC and the NYA, it provided services to preschool children through adults. CCC and NYA focused on helping youth learn basic
academic skills and to secure employment. Vocational training was emphasized in all
programs.

Analysis of FDR’s Educational Policies in New Deal Programs
Since policies are derived from the people that create and administer programs, it
is noteworthy that all of the New Deal programs were headed by non-educators. The
administrative decision was a logical choice for FDR because public and vocational
schools failed to assist youth in gaining employable skills. According to FDR, the New
Deal programs were centered around relief, not education. FDR never intended for New
Deal educational programs to become permanent. The educational components in the
New Deal youth programs were to help youth train for jobs. The target population for
New Deal programs was for people who were unemployed and not being served by
public schools. 103 Zook was a key person in the inspiration of the educational
components of the CCC and some of the EEP programs, but that is where his role ended.
The power and funds to carry out these programs were left with Hopkins, Williams, and
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Fechner. Having personally selected these individuals, FDR knew the policies they
would adhere to and therefore FDR’s educational policies were aligned with those
developed in New Deal programs.
The NEA, which wanted a prominent role in education, became frustrated that
educators were not included in New Deal programs. The NEA reacted by repetitiously
demanding that educational programs be handed over to the experts but that did not
happen. Even after the government reorganization in 1939, the EEP remained a WPA
program and the Office of Education, the NYA, and the CCC were transferred to the
Federal Security Administration (FSA). Moreover, the majority of those who taught
classes in the CCC, the NYA, and the EEP (besides those in public schools) were not
certified instructors, resulting in a distrust and lack of support from educational
administrators. Complaints regarding quality of instruction ensued and these problems
upset the NEA because it gave the title of teacher to people without teaching
certificates.104 In doing so, New Deal programs stripped educators of their
professionalism and made certificates in teaching insignificant. To FDR, people other
than educators were capable of developing educational programs; in other words, in
FDR’s mind, educators are not professionals with specialized knowledge.
FDR’s decision to not have Studebaker head the NYA despite pressure from
educators showed that educators influence over the president was weak and that he cared
more for Father Burke’s opinion. FDR needed Williams’ reformist ideas to capture leftwing Democrats, and the NYA to FDR was not primarily an educational program but a
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relief program. In its review of the NYA, the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education agreed that the NYA’s programs required expertise from education, public
works, labor, and relief. Its recommendation was to combine the NYA and the CCC into
a new agency since their programs held many similarities. They believed it should be
placed under a department that included public health, education, and welfare. 105 This
recommendation made sense since the NYA helped youth through work projects, studentaid, and apprentice programs. The only activity that was clearly educational was the
supplemental evening classes taken by youth in the apprentice program.
FDR’s silence after Congress had elevated the educational program as a main goal
for the CCC in 1937 revealed his indifference towards the CCC’s educational program.
Had FDR wanted to bolster CCC’s educational programs but his concern over being
accused of providing federal aid to education or trying to initiate federal controls on
education prevented him for doing so would have been diminished since Congress
initiated this push. But FDR did not emphasize CCC’s educational program and it
continued to exist in the background of the CCC. The actions and decisions of FDR
regarding the CCC’s educational program illustrates that he did not support or value
education for the CCC enrollees. In the end, the failure of the CCC’s educational
program to reach its full potential and have a positive impact on the enrollees rests with
FDR himself.
FDR’s decisions regarding the CCC’s educational program indicated he did not
consider it an important component to the CCC. Marsh’s statement before his resignation
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summarizes these sentiments, “While the CCC Camps were established in the spring of
1933, the present Educational Program was not set up until December, 1933. It was,
therefore, given an incidental rather than a major place in the CCC scheme of things.” 106
The CCC, envisioned by FDR, was a conservation program. Educational programming
was only added into the camps after Zook and other educators pressured FDR. FDR had
no intention of education becoming a main objective for the CCC, indicated by his
removal if decision-making power from Marsh and Studebaker in the Office of Education
and depriving the program of financial resources. Fechner proved to be a good
representative of FDR’s views as Director of the CCC. On the majority of occasions,
whenever FDR was asked to step in to resolve an issue, he took Fechner’s side.
FDR communicated to the public that the educational components in relief
programs were only created because of their ability to provide economic relief. When the
need changed from relief to war preparation, youth programs were quickly adjusted to
meet war needs. Relief programs, along with their educational components, ended
shortly after the economy improved and unemployment decreased, suggesting the main
purpose of the programs was indeed relief. 107
In short, New Deal programs were focused on unemployment and providing
youth a structured and productive environment. For the CCC, the educational program
was not valued or considered desirable by FDR since conservation was its primary
purpose. The NYA’s educational component was only one part of the youth program but
student aid and work projects were the main objectives. The EEP was an educational
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program that was kept under Hopkins as a relief program despite educators’ concerns.
FDR’s decision not to place the program in the Office of Education could have been
justified out of his concern of being accused of trying to control education at the federal
level, but the fact that the staff from the Office of Education under Hopkins was devoid
of decision-making power leads one to believe FDR was wary of educators. An
examination of the educational components of New Deal programs showed that FDR’s
educational policies indicated that education was viewed broadly and was valuable to
assist in employment and job skills.
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CHAPTER 3
EDUCATIONAL ADVOCATES AND RESEARCHERS

Despite little attention to statements made by Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR)
regarding education in the literature, he was consistent when he spoke of his views and
values on education. 1 Even as governor of New York, before his first presidential term,
FDR not only talked of the value of education, but he supported schools financially.
There is another reason why the expenditures of the states have gone up.
The educational standards are higher. In 1920 the State of New York was
extending state aid for education at a cost of ten million dollars; it is now
extending it at the cost of more than one hundred million. Nearly onethird of all the expenditures of the State government are going as aids to
education. Perhaps this is not the right policy, but it seems to be in line
with modern thought, and I do not believe there is anybody who can
suggest any alternative that would not be reactionary. 2
FDR was aware of the financial disparities between school districts in his state and spoke
about educational inequalities. He was particularly concerned for poorer districts that
“fail to receive their fair share. The method of apportionment should be simplified and
made to conform more closely to the relative wealth of the districts.” 3
As president, he gave a speech at Temple University where he reiterated his belief
that all children have the right to equal education no matter where they reside. 4 To him
the education of citizens was important because their security forms the basis of the
security for the country. All levels of government were responsible to make sure as many
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citizens were provided an education. Without a proper education, the people would not
be able to “react intelligently to public problems.” 5 In a message sent to the National
Education Association (NEA), FDR stated “that it is the responsibility of government to
carry out the will of the people. But it is the responsibility of organized education to
make sure that the people understand their problems and are prepared to make intelligent
choices when they express their will.” 6 If democracy was to thrive, then its citizenry
must be able to participate in government.
Although FDR valued education, he shared his concerns with educators about
schools. He thought teachers needed to be better trained and schools must change with
their students. Since the students have diverse interests and needs, the schools must
match those interests and needs. He also thought that education should not begin and end
with elementary and secondary education, but that people should be able to receive an
education at any age. 7 In a speech to the Citizens’ Conference on the Crisis in Education
on April 5, 1934, FDR stated that “the scope of education becomes such as to provide
educational opportunities for every person from early childhood on into adult life.” 8
In terms of the relationship of the federal government to education in the states,
FDR as governor stated that education fell under the jurisdiction of states and noted that
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the federal government “can act as a clearinghouse of information and as an incentive to
higher standards.”9 Even though this statement was made during his governorship, FDR
as president seemed to continue this view of the Office of Education.

FDR and the Office of Education
The Office of Education was in the Department of Interior and administered by
Harold L. Ickes, who recommended George Zook to be FDR’s first Commissioner of
Education. Roughly a year later Zook resigned from his position and started a career
with the American Council on Education. Unfortunately, I found no personal insight in
the archives with respect to why Zook resigned. Warren, author of To Enforce
Education: A History of the Founding Years of the United States Office of Education
stated Zook expected FDR’s New Deal would include federal aid to education and when
that did not occur, he resigned. 10 Zook’s desire for federal aid to education without
federal control was well known. He also wanted the Office of Education to have
departmental status. John W. Studebaker became the next Commissioner of Education in
mid-1934. Studebaker’s first few months allowed him to become acclimated to his new
work under FDR’s administration. Unfortunately, he quickly butted heads with those
around him as indicated by rumors that Robert Fechner, director of the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC), and Studebaker were not getting along in their administration
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of the CCC educational program.11 The “limited results [in CCC education programs]
infuriated government education officials, and bitter inter-departmental outbursts erupted
periodically.”12 Moreover, Harry N. Rosenfield, assistant to the Federal Security
Administration (FSA), admitted years later that “Studebaker wasn’t liked in many
quarters.”13
In April 1935, a representative from the National Catholic Welfare Conference
(NCWC), Father George Johnson, sent a concerning letter to Father John Burke regarding
Studebaker’s activities:
The United States Commissioner of Education, John Ward Studebaker,
has been working very actively in the past two months to have the
direction and control of the educational phases of the emergency program
concentrated in the Office of Education…. Studebaker is asking for
control of the $300,000,000 allocated under the Works Bill for clerical,
professional and educational services. A large portion of this money will
no doubt be used to pay the salaries of teachers in impoverished school
districts. Studebaker wants this money distributed through the state
departments of education by the United States Office of Education.… If
Studebaker is successful in accomplishing his present purposes, the
Office of Education will assume a place in the direction of Federal affairs
that is was never supposed to hold, and a long step will be taken toward
the establishment of a Federal Department of Education with legal and
financial power by which it may control the social purposes and specific
processes of American education. 14
The next day Father Burke wrote to FDR and advised him to not give the Office of
Education control over emergency relief funds. He furthered stated that if these funds
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were placed under Studebaker it would be a step towards federal control of education.15
A few days later FDR told Father Burke, “Your letter presents very clearly a point of
view that will be taken into consideration in determining this matter.”16 Whether Father
Burke convinced FDR or if FDR was already against Studebaker’s idea is not clear, but
nearly all of the relief funds remained with Harry Hopkins, head of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which was replaced by the Works Progress
Administration (WPA) in 1935.
On July 1, 1935, Mr. Strauss, the Director of Press Relations in the Department of
Interior, received a letter from a news reporter named Mr. Boutwell. Harold Ickes, the
Secretary of the Department of Interior, after having read the letter, was concerned
enough with its contents to send it to FDR. Mr. Boutwell was covering the American
Library Association and the NEA conventions and wanted Mr. Strauss to know how
negatively the members were talking about FDR. Their shock was due to the fact that
Studebaker’s youth program ideas were used to create the National Youth Administration
(NYA), yet he was not given any administrative leadership in the agency. Studebaker
was questioned by other educators as to why he would tolerate such treatment and has
not resigned yet. The reporter described Studebaker as loyal to FDR and unwilling to
side with those present at the conference. Mr. Boutwell then summarized the problem
educators were having with FDR:
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These groups are ready and eager to be friendly to the President. His
declared aims to help the common people are the aims they have pursued
for years. But when it comes to carrying out some of these social
improvements the leadership of these groups has been flouted. Their
proposals have received a chilly reception. Writing as an objective
reporter I can say that person after person in education, librarianship and
recreation feels that the President has gone out of his way to kick their
professions in the shins. The only group that gets a break is the social
service group…. In my opinion the growing gulf between the White
House and these professional groups is quite unnecessary. By moving
along two lines which requires little effort and little money the President
could win their goodwill. The first is that by messages and statements he
pay tribute to the work and achievements of these professional groups.
The second is that the President place in the hands of leaders of these
groups -- (and especially the Office of Education) -- responsibility for
carrying out Government emergency activities that fall within their fields
of work.17
Had FDR followed Studebaker’s youth program and placed the NYA under him,
the program would have gone through state and local units of public schools. There was
tension between FDR as well as his staff and public schools. Many of his staff members’
stereotyped educators as lacking ingenuity, being reactionary, and being protective of the
continuance of a traditional educational system. 18 “New Deal leaders, including
President Roosevelt and Hopkins, were often irked by inertia in the state and local
education hierarchy and these reactions created tensions and distrust.”19
The head of the NYA, Aubrey Williams, like other New Dealers, thought
educators did not think most people could learn, would not be honest in their teaching
about social problems in society, and were not bothered by an educational system that
focused on preparing a small wealthier segment of society to go to college. 20
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The New Dealers who were developing a new style of education were
primarily concerned with the poor and with the working class. By
contrast, educators who had long trumpeted the notion that schools should
be class-blind blamed the New Dealers for creating programs designed
primarily for those on the bottom of society. People like Williams knew
that the schools were in fact neither class-blind nor color-blind, and they
believed it a virtue that the educational programs of the NYA, the CCC,
and the WPA deliberately favored families on relief. 21
Because of Mr. Boutwell’s letter FDR asked Studebaker to come and see him. 22 The
topics discussed during the meeting were not recorded but Studebaker’s letter to FDR
after the meeting provides some insight. Studebaker met with FDR and Hopkins and was
excited about the projects the Office of Education could get involved in to help “our
common cause [in education] … I want to arouse to a state of enthusiasm the million
public school workers of this country and all of their intimate friends and relatives. I
need concrete evidence of Federal interest in the organization of public education in order
to do this.”23 Essentially, Studebaker told FDR he would not be able to have educators
on his side unless FDR showed them he was willing to trust educators such as himself.
One way he suggested FDR to provide evidence of his confidence in educators was to
approve his budget for the Office of Education.
Making sure he maximized the benefit of his meeting with FDR and Hopkins,
Studebaker sent a follow up letter to FDR in late August because he had not heard from
Hopkins regarding his plans for relief funds in the Office of Education.
I bring this problem directly to your attention because I am
discouraged and embarrassed. My feeling of discouragement and
21
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embarrassment is daily becoming intensified as I realize how the
conditions which affect me will inevitably embarrass you and your
Administration. Moreover, I am growing restive in a situation in which a
peculiar combination of circumstances restrains me from administering
educational activities which educators in the country believe should be
administered through this office.
And, Mr. President, any embarrassment which may later come to
you because of lack of opportunity for me to work effectively from my
strategic, but at present relatively impotent position, is utterly unnecessary.
Only a few very practicable changes in organization combined with an
allocation of relatively small sums of the emergency funds to the Office of
Education will make all the difference between what can be a growing
confidence in your Administration and opposition to it among several
million adults directly or indirectly very definitely interested in public
education. 24
Studebaker created five proposals: 1) transfer the Emergency Educational Plan’s (EEP)
adult education and nursery school program to the Office of Education 2) give $369,300
of emergency funds to the Office of Education for adult programs 3) approve a research
project for white collar workers 4) provide money requested in the Office of Education’s
budget and 5) grant $5 million for adult and youth forums. Studebaker ended his letter
with a defeated tone: “If these proposals are not approved it will be difficult for me to see
that the Office of Education is regarded as of much importance or that it has reason to
hope for any proper development in the future.”25 FDR met with Studebaker about his
requests and required additional information from him, which Studebaker submitted in a
memorandum dated August 30, 1935. In the memorandum Studebaker expressed his
enthusiasm for getting the chance to do something: “I am eager to do something worth
while that will really help in the great cause for which we work. I want the chance to
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prove that we can do it.”26 The letter focused on two areas, the forums and a statement
on the emergency needs of education. The forums provided a space for the community to
come together and talk about current event topics. Studebaker estimated the cost of
experimental forums would be $1,170,000. He justified this amount of money by
focusing on the how education could help the unemployment problem.
To enable the Office of Education to extend its service in meeting the
needs of youth and adults resulting from the emergency and
unemployment, I respectfully request that you authorize the Works
Progress Administration to make available for the use of the Office of
Education for the year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $190,360. The
money will be expended in such a way as to emphasize the needs of the
unemployed and will stimulate activity in the fields of general adult
education, fine arts, extension of library service, and health education; for
preparation and broadcasting of radio programs, and for incidental
expenses. 27
By September, Studebaker was still trying to convince FDR to allow him to have his
forum project. He pleaded with FDR: “You know how eager I am to help you to do this
significant thing and a few others too. At present I am enslaved by the puerility of
routine. Please emancipate me. Set me free to do something that will make my job
count.”28 In late September FDR sent a memorandum for the secretary of interior
instructing him to tell Studebaker his papers and request were out of order and did not
represent their agreement. He then went point by point over each of Studebaker’s
programs and summarized the amount each should cost and his thoughts. FDR had
approved of testing forums in ten locations, an emergency radio program, library
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services, administrative assistants, a study on local school units, college research,
demonstration of radio and motion pictures in schools, and a survey of vocational and
educational opportunities for Negroes. In terms of Studebaker’s request for
administering the EEP programs, FDR stated:
There was no thought …. of transferring things that have been in actual
operation under F.E.R.A. for the past two years, except in those instances
where the objective is wholly educational…. There is no earthly use in
transferring the borderline cases which have been in operation
successfully for some time. 29
In the end, on September 23, 1935, FDR approved the Federal Forum Project using the
WPA money. The program functioned from 1936-1941. The forums were setup like
town-hall meetings where citizens shared their opinions and debated a current event
topic. The goal was for citizens to hear diverse perspectives and to think critically about
an issue. FDR liked the idea of forums because they encouraged and promoted
democracy. 30
More problems came for Studebaker when a letter dated August 30, 1935, was
shared with FDR and his administration. The letter was from Mr. Voelker,
Superintendent of the Lansing, Michigan school system to Emil Hurja of the Democratic
National Committee. Voelker discussed a conversation he had with Studebaker where
Studebaker stated FDR was not concerned with education and catered to Catholics. In
contrast to Boutwell’s version of Studebaker’s mannerisms and loyalty to FDR at the
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NEA conference, Voelker stated the opposite. He referred to Studebaker’s conference
address on the federal relationship with states as harshly condemning. 31
Then, in September 1935, Willard Givens, the Executive Secretary of the NEA,
published a critical article of FDR and his handling of public schools. A hand-written
note in the archives indicated that Hurja stated Williams asked Studebaker to stop the
article but Studebaker was noted as saying, “he wouldn’t stop it – he believed in it.”32
Williams told Hopkins in a memorandum that he thought the information used in Givens’
article came from Studebaker himself. 33 The article further intensified the tension
between Studebaker and other New Deal administrators.
According to an oral history interview of Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator of the
Federal Security Agency (FSA), Studebaker did not work well with FDR’s
administration, and the only exception to this was Mrs. Roosevelt. Mrs. Roosevelt would
intervene when FDR, based on his superior’s recommendation, Harold Ickes, would try
to fire Studebaker. Because of Studebaker’s background in the public school system,
they considered him a part of that system. This association was problematic for
Studebaker since FDR, Frances Perkins, and Williams were not impressed with
educators. Ickes urged FDR to fire Studebaker a few times, but Mrs. Roosevelt would
support Studebaker and would persuade FDR to do likewise. Mrs. Roosevelt and
Studebaker had a close relationship and would help him try to accomplish his goals by
talking with FDR. He, in turn, would sometimes ask her to speak to Studebaker when
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issues with the Office of Education would arise. Even with Mrs. Roosevelt by his side,
Studebaker’s attempts to gain control of some of the emergency funds were fruitless. He
was only able to secure five projects with emergency money: forums, radio, and three
research studies.34
One of the reasons Studebaker sought emergency funds was because the Office of
Education’s budget was inadequate. The President’s Advisory Committee on Education
noted:
Notwithstanding its many worthy contributions, there have been very few
periods when the Office of Education has provided national leadership of
the quality needed for the best development of American education. It has
existed as a minor bureau in an executive department whose major
interests have been foreign to education. It has been chronically
understaffed. Prior to 1930, it had great difficulty in attracting and
retaining a competent staff because of the unfavorable relation of its salary
levels to those of major universities and city school systems…. The
Committee recommends that the Office of Education remain
predominantly an agency for research and leadership, as distinguished
from an administrative agency. 35
Not only were the Office of Education’s budgets minimal but the number of employees
was cut back. “The office had more money in 1932 under President Hoover ($280,000)
than during the New Deal through 1939. In 1935 the staff dwindled to eighty-three from
a high of one hundred in 1933-34, and only rose slowly to ninety-two in 1939.”36
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Studebaker personally suffered from budget cuts as evidenced by his low salary in
comparison to other heads of offices. The situation escalated to the point that Studebaker
told an interviewer that his salary would not permit him to live in Washington and that
was why he resigned.37
Studebaker’s position as Commissioner of Education held little power, especially
without an adequate budget. He made efforts to exert the power he did have by designing
new programs, requesting money for projects, and recommending changes to his agency.
Most of the time he was not able to achieve his goals but he was persistent, although
blunt and intemperate. The Office of Education under FDR was minimized.

FDR and his Relationship with Educators
Immediately as FDR came into office he received letters and requests for
meetings from educators. One such letter, which came before FDR was even
inaugurated, was from a small group of educators at Teachers College in Columbia
University including George Counts and William H. Kilpatrick, two highly regarded
progressive educators. The letter included a nine-page document designed to help FDR
formulate an economic plan for public schools. The letter also included 220 signatures
from educators representing elementary grades through college. The author of the letter,
Clyde R. Miller, an original member of this group of educators, thought FDR would find
the document helpful since it encapsulated many of FDR’s own ideas. The document
began with descriptions of New York children, one-fourth of whom were malnourished
and fed from a teachers’ relief fund, and it continued on to describe graduates of high
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school and colleges who could not find employment. “Though highly trained they wait
vacantly in dangerous idleness, feeling that society has no place for them and seemingly
does not want them.”38 The conditions these educators had to witness compelled them to
try to help schools. They referred to the lack of opportunity for young people to reach
their full potential as a “conflict of ideals.” These comments were in addition to attacks
on public schools via budget cuts, decreased staffs, increase enrollment of students,
proposals of tuition fees for high schools, supplementary health services eliminated from
elementary schools, and focus on merely the 3Rs.
These proposals are discriminations against the poor. As teachers and
school officials, we willingly accept our fair share of reduced income, but
we cannot consent to economies made at the expense of the children. That
would be an irreparable damage, not to be considered even as a last
resort.39
The document then referred to the outrage their students must have had as they sat in
their classes learning about democracy and the American ideal of equal opportunity when
reality told them it was all hypocrisy. They felt in order to not be hypocrites, educators
must work towards making these ideals possible. Their proposed solution was to redirect
society to focus on helping the majority of people through interdependence. They
suggested that a National Coordinating Council be formed to help devise policies to meet
the needs of the public. A month later, FDR’s secretary wrote to Miller stating they were
not able to write earlier since FDR had received so much mail after his inauguration.40
Although it is probably true that an incoming president during an economic crisis would
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have an enormous amount of mail, FDR’s response letter did not address any of the
content that was so passionately written by these educators; in fact, there was no mention
of anything about the document at all.
A request to meet with the president to secure federal loans to keep schools open
was submitted by an alliance of eight educational organizations, including the NEA and
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),. An appointment for this request was
attempted to be made but the details were not provided in the note attached to the letter.
Another request was for FDR to write a statement of encouragement to California that
public schools would not be harmed by the economy. Stephen T. Early, the Assistant
Secretary to the president, replied to this request and stated that FDR was busy, and if he
gave a statement to one group of people he must do so to all who requested such
statements.41 Another request for a general statement by FDR to citizens in general was
made by a superintendent from a county in Arkansas:
If you believe in our free system of public education, will you please at
some appropriate time make a public statement to the effect that you do?
In our part of the country we are facing the fact that there is an ebbing
confidence in the public schools.... A word from you at this time regarding
the American policy of public education and its contribution to economic
and social welfare will restore the faith of teachers and patrons and make
all of us more willing to carry on until a new day dawns for the common
schools.42
Howe, FDR’s advisor, responded by stating, “The President has received your letter of
March twenty-first, and has asked me to thank you for your kindness in presenting your
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views.”43 Similarly to the other responses from various staff members of FDR, the
response did not acknowledge the content of the letter and made no statements as to what
would be done in regards to the problems discussed in the letters. In early April, FDR’s
office received several letters and telegrams informing him of the situation in Chicago
where teachers were working without pay. Some of those teachers had lost their homes
and faced a desperate situation. A committee of unpaid teachers requested to meet with
the president. There was no mention of a meeting in the records. 44 By July 1933, the
situation in Chicago had further escalated but Ickes responded to letters from Chicago by
stating he had talked with Commissioner Zook about the situation. “Both of us have a
very sympathetic interest in the Chicago schools but neither of us can see that either the
Office of Education or the Interior Department can do anything about it, since we have no
supervisory or coercive powers.”45 Ickes then asked Howe to meet with him since he was
concerned the problem might make the administration look bad. FDR’s response to the
large volume of communications regarding Chicago’s situation was to tell his secretary to
acknowledge the problem and let people know they were allowing Ickes to respond.46
Adding pressure to FDR to give a radio address in support of public schools,
many people wrote to their congressman to ask that they discuss the matter with FDR.
There were copies of the congressmen’s letters at the Roosevelt Library with responses of
acknowledgement by FDR’s secretary. One letter from a parent in South Carolina
concerned about not having enough funds to send his/her child to college received a

43

Louis Howe to Miss Willie Lawson, March 31, 1933 Folder 1933 Jan-Sept, Box 1, OF107 Education,
FDRL.
44
See Folder 1933 Jan-Sept, Box 1, OF107 Education, FDRL.
45
Harold Ickes to William Page, July 18, 1933, Folder 1933 Jan-Sept, Box 1, OF107 Education, FDRL.

75
proper response by Howe, who had Zook draft a response. Howe told the parent the
matter was currently being worked on by Zook and others in Washington. Another
typical response to educational problems was to encourage people to ask state
representatives to handle educational situations since the federal government did not
control education in the states.47 Overall, FDR’s response to educators and citizens was
notably neutral and uninterested.
When relief came to education it was placed under Hopkins in the FERA, and
FDR tended to create new programs rather than assist existing ones. Executive Secretary
of the NEA, Willard E. Givens, wrote an angry article in September of 1935 in which he
criticized FDR’s educational relief programs. The article was entitled, “New Deal a Raw
Deal for Public Schools.” Givens stated his reasons for disliking the new programs:
In October 1933, President Roosevelt, after paying tribute to the schools,
said, “We need to make infinitely better the average education which the
average child now receives.” Instead of following this policy of
improving the everyday educational offering of the average child, the New
Dealers invented plain and fancy schooling, managed in a way to give the
jitters to educators whose policy it is to shun waste. While a few
youngsters were being taught harmonica playing, fancy lariat throwing,
and boondoggling, some hundreds of thousands of less fortunate ones
thruout [sic] the United States were being denied a decent health program
or were doing without a full year’s work in arithmetic, reading, and
history. The millions expended in building a parallel system of education
for relief purposes have done some good, but better results could have
been achieved more economically by strengthening the alreadyestablished school systems….The National Education Association
believes in federal aid to education without federal control. 48
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Moreover, Givens wrote that relief programs were administered by politically appointed
people, but he stated that education should be impartial to politics. Givens personally
sent FDR a copy of the article along with a letter stating that his intentions were to see
that public education was carried out in accordance with democratic principles. Givens
advised that the Office of Education should control the educational activities of the
federal government and work with State Departments of Education, who would
communicate and plan together with local districts. FDR asked Studebaker to draft a
response of what he should say in regard to the letter and article. Unsure of Studebaker’s
draft, FDR forwarded it to Williams who advised FDR to not utilize it; instead, he
recommended that FDR’s secretary acknowledge the letter and tell Givens that
Studebaker will be writing a response directly to him. 49 That advice was taken.
Not all of the people in the NEA liked the article or even supported it. Joseph
Rosier, a past NEA president, thought the article created animosity between educators
and FDR and his administration. He argued that the NEA could not exert influence if
they did not have a good working relationship with the president. Williams corresponded
with the current president of the NEA, Agnes Samuelson, and felt confident she did not
like Givens’ article. He was also aware of other major leaders in the NEA who were
upset by the article as well. 50 Williams used this knowledge to isolate those individuals
responsible for the article and to provide evidence that the article did not represent the
majority of the NEA members.
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By mid-1936, FDR was continuing to receive letters asking for public school
assistance. A congressman from Texas shared a letter from a principal who argued that
state control over education was not working, and that federal assistance was needed.
The principal said that he would have to shorten the school year if his school did not
receive federal assistance. FDR asked his secretary, Marvin H. McIntyre, to formulate a
response. In essence, the response stated FDR was aware that situations existed but they
were less frequent since the states were coming out of the economic Depression. The
increased financial stability of states did not require money from the federal government
to states for public schools. He ended the letter with an apology for the difficult situation,
and he assured the principal that a solution would be found. 51
In April 1936, Frederick L. Redefer, executive secretary of the Progressive
Education Association (PEA), composed a letter:
The approaching campaign for the Presidency of the United States
should be an educational experience for the American people. In the past,
our political campaigns have not always resulted in a growth in real
understanding by our citizens. Too often issues vital to public welfare
have been camouflaged by rhetoric and mystifying generalities.
The educational profession has grown tired of vague statements in
which comparatively meaningless phrases are used to cloak muddled
thinking or to appeal to popular bias….
Members of the Progressive Education Association at their recent
annual conference requested me to write to you urging you to speak
clearly and frankly on the crucial problems confronting the United
States.52

50

Joseph Rosier to Charl O. Williams, May 8, 1936, Folder Franklin D. Roosevelt, Group Conference of
Committee of Educators with President (April 30, 1936), Box 4 Papers of Charl O. Williams, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Aubrey Williams to FDR, November 27, 1935, Folder
1935 July-Dec., Box 2, OF 107 Education, FDRL.
51
FDR to Senator Morris Sheppard, March 30, 1936, Folder 1936 Jan-May, Box OF 107 Education,
FDRL.
52
Frederick L. Redefer to FDR, April 16, 1936, Folder 1936 Jan-May, Box OF 107 Education, FDRL.

78
Redefer then posed questions that he wanted FDR to answer. The first question wanted
FDR to discuss his proposals of federal plans for young people who were unemployed.
The next question asked how could elementary students who were hungry and in need of
medical attention be helped. The third question asked FDR what would be done with
public schools that were not paying teachers enough money or were not operating. The
last question inquired as to FDR’s willingness to defeat legislation that inhibited free
speech and ensuring that words like “fascism” and “communism” would not be used to
control discussions. A staff member responded to this letter on behalf of FDR. The letter
insisted that Redefer’s ideas would “receive careful and sympathetic consideration.” 53
On April 30, 1936, a meeting was held at the White House between FDR and the
legislative committee of the NEA to discuss issues between his administration and school
teachers. FDR addressed the problem of schools closing due to insufficient funds but
was interested in a program that would help only those schools that really needed money.
He was against a law requiring federal funds to be distributed to states since, he argued,
that went against the Constitution. He also worried that funds would be given to states
that really did not need the assistance. Federal aid to education if provided at all should
only be used to help equalize education throughout the country, according to FDR. This
statement was FDR’s compromise on federal aid to education. He would consider
allowing federal aid to education but only if it went to the poorest districts that truly
needed financial assistance. 54
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During this meeting, FDR stated he had stretched the law by using federal funds
to employ school teachers and assist high school and college students to continue their
education. The NEA’s arguments were similar to those made in the past. They wanted
an executive order for all emergency relief education programs to be conducted by
established agencies of education - the Office of Education and the states. FDR stated
that relief funds could not be used for schools since it was not appropriated for such a
purpose. The representatives from the NEA also suggested that a Department of
Education be created. FDR told them it would not be possible, but they pressed on,
stating if it was created in the context of a financial decision then “the problems of state
rights, Federal control, and the religious question” would be circumvented. 55 FDR was
not in favor of a Department of Education by itself but was open to the idea of a
Department of Education and Welfare. The committee felt so confident that this would
happen that the field secretary of the NEA, Charl Ormond Williams, asked each
committee member to write down their description of the meeting. “Some day some
people will want to know how a Department of Education was created and how the
federal aid policy was finally established.”56 James H. Richmond, a college administrator
from Kentucky, who also attended the meeting, further stated the meeting’s significance:
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“Our conference with President Roosevelt, last Thursday, was most significant and, in all
probability, made educational history.” 57
A month later, FDR was corrected when he mentioned the term Department of
Education and Welfare to a Senator. Father Johnson recited the conversation as:
“The President said that ‘soon we will establish another Department of the
Government, to be called the Department of Education and Welfare.’
Senator Walsh said that he said at once, ‘Mr. President, you will have to
take education out of that.’ The President answered, according to Senator
Walsh: ‘Yes, for obvious reasons, we will have to use some other
name.’”58
FDR was reminded that concerns of federalized education were strong. A new
department was created four years later, in 1939, that housed the Office of Education, but
it was nothing similar to what FDR promised the educators. The department was called
the Federal Security Administration.
Studebaker’s close ties with the NEA aligned him with policies that contrasted
with the administration’s, leaving the Office of Education with little decision-making
power. The NEA was a group that primarily represented educational administrators and
teachers and focused on teachers’ jobs and financial support of schools. The NEA
lobbied FDR, requesting that he support federal aid to education. Specifically, the NEA
wanted federal funds to go directly to the states, without any federal stipulations. Since
he was opposed to federal aid for education, FDR avoided the NEA and gave educators
little attention. Educational programs within the New Deal were meant to be temporary,
according to FDR, but the NEA envisioned the exact opposite. When FDR needed an

57

Sidney B. Hall to Charl O. Williams, May 6, 1936, Folder Franklin D. Roosevelt, Group Conference of
Committee of Educators with President (April 30, 1936), Box 4 Papers of Charl O. Williams, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
58
Memorandum, May 28, 1936, Box 132, NCWC, CUA.

81
educational consultant, he would not turn to educators in the public school system or to
even Studebaker, but instead he would consult with professors at Ivy League Schools.
He also relied on Mrs. Roosevelt, Williams, Perkins, and Hopkins for advice on
education and youth.59
Though there may be other illustrations, one example in the archives of an
instance when an NEA leader advocated for non-educators to have control over schools.
In a document titled, “The Price of Educational Reform,” in the summer of 1936,
William G. Carr, Director of Research and Secretary of the Educational Policies
Commission (EPC) of the NEA, addressed problems associated with reforming public
schools:
Pick up any professional magazine and you will readily find several
articles prophesying the doom of the public schools unless reforms are
instituted. These are not new phenomena. A superficial student of our
educational history might well conclude that the schools have been
skidding along the thin edge of utter ruin for at least a century and a
half…. Again, there is a group which believes that the modern curriculum
is so varied as to be confusing and so rich as to be indigestible. At the
same time, another group finds the curriculum too narrow, too formal, too
traditional. “Character education comes first,” cries on group. “Back to
the three R’s,” answers another… lack of a strong centralized control over
education which characterizes most other countries is another reason why
educational reform comes slowly…. The teaching profession must be less
conservative and more objective in its approach to educational problems.
It must get rid of the idea that the schools belong to the teachers. It must
reject the notion that teaching is a professional monopoly. It must
recognize the part which the public and other institutions in society
inevitably play in the work of education. 60
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This document was atypical of the NEA’s thinking, since protecting educational turf had
long been associated with the organization. 61
Educators did not pretend that the public school systems were problem-free, and
they were willing to acknowledge some of their challenges. Even though education
administrators were not in favor of New Deal educational programs, they could not argue
the fact that there was evidence that their schools were not serving all youth. The NEA
wrote a paper in January 1936 titled, “Problems Facing the Public Schools.” It stated that
the funding system for schools was insufficient, and that this was especially true during
economic depressions. Money from federal, state, and local entities were necessary to
ensure that all students received an equal education. The NEA argued that, in a
democracy, it was essential that the citizens be given educational opportunities that are
approximately equal. Therefore, the Federal Government should share in extending
financial support to the public schools of the states. The existing financial structure
caused great inequities affecting the quality of a child’s education. They also discussed
the importance of curriculum and potential curriculum changes; they highlighted the
importance of a strong curriculum for all students, regardless of their post-secondary
plans. Last, the paper blamed low wages for the poor quality of teachers. Vocational
education was criticized even more severely than general education for its inability to
train youth, particularly by Secretary Perkins. But budgets cuts to vocational education
that started with Hoover’s presidency were noted as reason for a decrease in enrollment. 62
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Despite acknowledging the need to change, the fact was, schools were still
traditional. The President’s Advisory Committee on Education researched public schools
and reported that they had been aware that schools needed to revamp their curriculum to
meet the needs of a larger portion of youth, specifically to do a better job incorporating
an educational program that would provide all students with general knowledge. Schools
also wanted to provide guidance programs to help students make plans after leaving
school; however, their desires to do so were not supported by actual programs in the
schools. The lack of appropriate programming continued despite knowing how many
youth looked for work. The President’s Advisory Committee on Education noted that the
unemployed were not provided with either general knowledge or skills in vocational
fields. Many youth were essentially illiterate. They blamed this lack of preparation on
secondary schools, as well as colleges and universities. The awareness of the need to
change did not result in the development of school programs. A lack of money was
certainly a reason why schools did not continue or maintain reforms that began in the
1920s. New courses and programs were often the first items to be cut from the budget
and labeled as fads and frills, resulting in an increase of traditional classes. 63
The President’s Advisory Committee on Education’s report extended its
complaints about education to nursery school children and adults. The need for
emergency education programs was necessary since they provided unique educational
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opportunities that were not provided by regular educational institutions. For example,
less than 10,000 children were enrolled in public and private nursery schools in 1935.
Moreover, elementary schools did not service 10% of students aged 6-13 years old,
secondary schools enrolled only 33% of students aged 14 to 17 years old, and colleges
enrolled 10% of the students aged 18-21 years old. The reason for the low enrollments in
secondary school and colleges was primarily due to economic factors, but the types of
subjects that were taught have also been cited as a reason. Schools for adults were nearly
nonexistent, particularly with programs designed to decrease illiteracy and target lowincome farmers. Most state departments of education did not have an adult education
division. The President’s Advisory Committee on Education concluded that federal
programs with educational components were not duplicating programs under the state
departments of education, contrary to what the NEA claimed.64
In a letter from Father Burke to a concerned citizen, Father Burke stated he did
not think the educational policies of the NEA represented most educators but merely the
inner-circle of the NEA’s administration. He questioned the significance of the NEA’s
large membership, hinting that many teachers most likely joined because of pressure
from their principals. When asked by a Catholic teacher if he recommended joining the
NEA, Father Burke was indecisive since he could not decide if it would be better for
teachers to make a statement by refusing to join, or if they should join in order to
facilitate changes to the organization from the inside. His concern about the NEA was its
anti-Catholic partners and promotion of legislature that was against Catholic interests,
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particularly federal aid to education or a stronger federal presence in education. One
other Catholic representative stated the NEA was too closely associated with the Office
of Education and saw itself as the authority on educational affairs for the country. 65
After many failed attempts to get FDR to speak at an NEA event, FDR addressed
the group on June 30, 1938:
No one wants the Federal Government to subsidize education any more
than is absolutely necessary. It has been and will be the traditional policy
of the United States to leave the actual management of schools and their
curricula to state and local control. But we know that in many places local
government unfortunately cannot adequately finance either the freedom or
the facilities to learn. And there the Federal Government can properly
supplement local resources…. There is probably a wider divergence today
in the standard of education between the richest communities and the
poorest communities than there was one hundred years ago; and it is,
therefore, our immediate task to seek to close that gap — not in any way
by decreasing the facilities of the richer communities but by extending aid
to those less fortunate. We all know that if we do not close this gap it will
continue to widen… All of this leads me to ask you not to demand that
the Federal Government provide financial assistance to all communities.
Our aid for many reasons, financial and otherwise, must be confined to
lifting the level at the bottom rather than to giving assistance at the top….
In line with this policy, the Federal Government during the past five years
has given relatively far more assistance to the poorer communities than to
the rich. We have done it through direct relief and through work relief…
We have placed many millions of dollars in the field of adult education
through the Works Progress Administration, and here, again, most of the
money has been expended in the poorer communities of the land.66

FDR clearly articulated his position on key education topics. He was not against federal
aid to education because of his understanding that some schools were financially
suffering, creating a disproportional amount of spending on students throughout the
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country. FDR believed that federal educational aid was necessary to end inequality
between schools, but he was unwilling to spend money on all schools because he did not
believe that all schools needed such aid. New Deal programs were believed to be good
examples of targeted federal aid. To better understand the complex relationship between
the federal government and education, FDR created a committee to make recommend
how the federal government could support schools.

President’s Advisory Committee on Education
This committee, originally called the President’s Committee on Vocational
Education, was formed by FDR on September 19, 1936 under the chairmanship of Floyd
W. Reeves. FDR created this committee after he signed the George-Deen Act
(HR12120) on June 8, 1936 calling for more vocational training. He signed this bill with
concerns over the bill’s criticisms on vocational education. In order to fully understand
these criticisms before the bill would become effective in July 1, 1937, he wanted the
committee to study the relationship of federal aid to vocational programs. Compared to
Hoover’s President’s Advisory Committee, which was comprised of 80% educators,
FDR’s group consisted of fewer educators and more liberal-minded individuals. 67
As his work on the committee continued, Reeves thought the topic of federal aid
to education in general would be a better directive for the committee. Reeves’ rationale
for wanting to broaden the committee’s focus was due to the fact that:
At the present time there is an unprecedented number of bills before the
Congress proposing Federal aid to education. Great legislative pressure is
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being placed behind the Harrison-Black-Fletcher Bill. A situation of
administrative complexity exists due to the number of Federal agencies
dealing with education. There is a recognized need for a reorganization of
the entire field of secondary education, including both the vocational and
the non-vocational fields. Vocational education at the secondary school
level cannot well be considered in isolation from non-vocational
education. Furthermore, it is difficult to arrive at sound conclusions as to
the need for Federal support for an expanded program of vocational
education without considering at the same time all aspects of Federal
relations to education. 68
He shared his thoughts with Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins who then forwarded the
suggestion to FDR in early April 1937. Perkins suggested to FDR that the expansion of
the committee’s objective would help interrupt consideration of the Harrison-BlackFletcher bill and avert the George-Deen Act from being fully funded. FDR agreed with
Reeves and Perkins’ recommendations. Frank Graham, Luther Gulick, Charles H. Judd,
and former Commissioner of Education George Zook were added to the committee, now
referred to as the President’s Advisory Committee on Education. In late May, a press
release was sent out stating that FDR had asked the committee to consider the larger
question of the federal government’s connection with state and local education. 69
FDR told Reeves that, in the committee’s research, he wanted to make sure that
the committee considered the effects of asking the federal government to pay for the
education that was currently being paid for from state and local funds. Once the federal
government started to pay this cost, it might find itself stuck with an increasing bill and a
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greater dependence from the states on federal funds. 70 This possible predicament
troubled and worried FDR.
Reeves did consult with FDR during the research process to assess what FDR
thought about certain issues. In one memorandum, Reeves wanted to know where FDR
thought the NYA and the CCC should be placed within the field of education. On this
issue, FDR did not influence Reeves’ thinking and instead referred him to confer with
Williams and Fechner. Reeves and his committee did meet with many of FDR’s
administrators; Studebaker and the Office of Education was the only agency singled out
for being uncooperative.71
In February of 1938 the report of the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education was released. The report noted that from a historical perspective the federal
government had become more involved in education and could assume that it would
continue to do so in the future. Despite FDR’s warning, it recommended that the federal
government provide financial assistance to states and local school districts to make sure
educational opportunities were present and that funds were distributed equally. 72 Their
conclusions showed concern about the fact that the public was fearful that financial aid
from the federal government would necessarily mean federal control of education;
however, the committee suggested that the federal government should not make financial
contributions without ensuring they were spent appropriately. Oversight, rather than
control, was promoted throughout the report. Federal funds should be spent primarily on
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areas that would decrease inequalities between and within states, especially between rural
and urban schools and white and black schools. The report stated that curriculum and
methods of teaching should not be influenced by the federal government. Resonating
many of the concerns of the NEA, the report suggested that “Federal grants should be
used to build up and strengthen existing educational agencies and institutions insofar as
they are able to serve important needs, and not to establish competing agencies and
institutions.”73
In terms of curricular changes, the President’s Advisory Committee on Education
advocated for schools to incorporate vocational education within their school systems.
The committee acknowledged that educators were still adjusting to this change since in
years past vocational education was part of an employee’s training as he entered
employment within a corporation or industry. The report suggested that skills required in
a variety of fields, as well as introductory courses in common fields, should be the focus
of a school’s curriculum. The committee recommended that the employers had the
responsibility to further train their employees for a specific occupation and build upon the
foundation of skills and knowledge the school had instilled within students.74
The President’s Advisory Committee on Education also differentiated between
relief programs that would remain with the WPA and those which should be transferred
to the Office of Education. They suggested that WPA administer programs related to
relief and vocational placement. Those individuals who were unemployed after attending
regular education and training programs should be provided assistance by the WPA. The
report also mentioned that individuals in charge of the WPA classes who were not

73

Ibid.

90
certified should be trained until deemed as qualified instructors. They recommended that
the following programs be considered separate from relief in the WPA and consequently
transferred to the Office of Education: naturalization and illiteracy, workers’ education,
vocational education, adult education (civics, contemporary affairs, and forums), nursery
schools, parent education, recreation and fine arts. By providing the states with research
and examples of how to improve these programs, it was believed that the Office of
Education could help these programs become fully developed. The report suggested that
states and local educational agencies should ultimately have control over these programs
and make all final decisions. 75
The report also tackled the issue of federal aid for tuition-free or parochial
schools. The report suggested allowing states to create their own definition of what
constituted a public school. It also encouraged states to distribute funds to nonpublic
schools for reading materials and services such as transportation and medical care. This
recommendation was purely a suggestion and the committee left the final decision to the
states.76
According to Niehoff, this report was no doubt controversial and FDR was aware
of this fact. Rather than immerse himself in political fighting, he passed the report on to
Congress without any comments or endorsements. When questioned about his neutral
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stance on the report, Mrs. Roosevelt stated that only legislation that is deemed critical
would warrant FDR’s attention. 77
The response to the report from educational organizations and major newspapers
was favorable. The PEA and the AFT held meetings in order to garner support for
legislation based on the report’s recommendations. They wanted to keep pressure on
Congress to enact such legislation. Even the NEA approved of the report, despite its
insistence that federal funds be monitored and regulated. 78
After the committee’s research was complete Reeves served:
as Chairman of the “Commission on Educational Reconstruction” as an
active member of the American Foundation of Teachers (AFT). The
principal purpose of this activity was to mobilize national educational
organizations to support the basic recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Education. The recommendations of the Committee got
into a log-jam of federal legislation which was stymied by the
preoccupation of President Roosevelt with more urgent matters related to
the war and to his loss of leadership of the Congress…. 79
By 1940, Reeves confronted FDR’s inattention to educational issues during a conference
speech of the Washington Youth Council. Reeves noted that FDR, who purported to
believe in helping schools which were financially in need, did not act on the President’s
Advisory Committee on Education’s recommendations which advocated for the very
same ideas. FDR’s lack of support for the report’s recommendations was surprising since
Reeves shared many of the same values as FDR. Reeves had close relationships with
many of FDR’s closest advisors, namely Mrs. Roosevelt, Williams, and Hopkins. They
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encouraged Reeves’ placement as administrator of national educational projects. 80
Despite these connections and similarities, FDR did not push for legislative action based
on the committee’s recommendations. The next chapter will provide more details on
legislation for federal aid to education.

Analysis of FDR and Educational Advocates and Researchers
Based on the information found in the archives regarding the President’s
Advisory Committee on Education, FDR’s approval of Reeve’s suggestion to allow the
President’s Advisory Committee on Education to study the larger question of federal aid
to education was conflicting considering FDR was not in favor of general federal aid. If
FDR wanted to avoid opening the door to general federal aid going towards schools, he
should have disapproved of Reeves’ suggestion for expanding the President’s Advisory
Committee on Education. He expanded the committee to take attention away from two
popular education bills and was probably surprised at the committee’s recommendations
for federal aid for education, especially because FDR warned Reeves about its great
consequences for the federal budget. Once the report came out FDR most likely used the
committee’s report to test the idea of targeted federal aid in Congress. Testing political
issues before reacting was a common tactic employed by FDR. Since the idea did not
come from FDR, but rather from the report, he was safer from being blamed for trying to
stimulate legislation for federal aid to education. Had the Congress thought the
recommendations in the report were sound then they could have passed such legislation
without FDR’s influence. A fuller discussion of federal aid to education can be found in
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the following chapter. Unfortunately, he used this committee to divert Congress away
from federal aid to education only to find that the report excited education advocates by
giving them well researched data to support their federal aid proposals.
FDR designed the President’s Advisory Committee on Education with people
whom he trusted, primarily non-educators. The recommendations in the report given to
Congress represented some of FDR’s own ideas but at no political cost to him. The
committee’s report matched FDR’s desire to target federal aid to only the weakest
schools, but FDR did not respond with any approval to those recommendations. The
report was too politically liberal at the time, and FDR did not want to associate himself
with its ideas by urging Congress to enact the committee’s recommendations. More
importantly, FDR’s fiscally conservative concerns were thwarted by the report’s
conclusion that federal money should be used to help public schools. FDR specifically
told Reeves that he was concerned about starting such federal aid because it would
potentially grow exponentially. FDR’s experience as governor of New York taught him
how large an education budget can become. FDR did not think educators were interested
in improving the economic situation or even helping youth; rather, he believed that they
were primarily interested in protecting their profession and increasing the amount of
control they had over educational matters.81
Throughout the years, the NEA’s political platform essentially stayed the same; it
continued to argue for federal aid to states for schools without restrictions. But the lack
of political strength of the NEA, a major proponent of federal aid to education bills, left

81

Ibid., 69; Kliebard, 188.

94
the bills weak and politically impotent.82 NEA relied on data and research to convince
congressmen and political leaders to support their cause. Harry Zeitlin in his dissertation
on education and the federal programs critiques NEA in the following statement:
Continued failure in utilizing this technique should have led, it would
seem, to more forceful lobbying and political activities. The political
naivete of educators during this period is nowhere so clearly disclosed as
in their constant expressions of confidence regarding the ever “imminent”
passage of a Federal aid program whose actual changes of passage were
probably never bright.83
NEA argued for state and local control over educational decisions. FDR and his
administrators saw educators as rigid. New Dealers did not want to comply with
demands of dispersing federal money directly to the states without monitoring how the
money would be spent, because they believed that that would be supporting the status
quo in school systems. To ensure federal money was being spent on educational
innovations and used to equalize educational opportunities for all students, they would
not allow federal funds to be spent without being monitored and regulated. Clashing
ideologies between FDR and his administration with the NEA, Studebaker, and educators
limited the role that the latter three had in the policymaking process. The educational
components of relief plans were neither created, negotiated, monitored, nor administered
by the Office of Education or educators in any significant way. During FDR’s 12 years
in office, educators’ inflexibility resulted in FDR ignoring most of their ideas,
suggestions, and recommendations. 84
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Schools moved too slowly for FDR and New Dealers. Vocational educators
continued to adhere to training programs that took a long time for students to complete,
whereas New Deal training programs were quick because of fewer standards and less
thorough training. The large number of youth who dropped out of general education
programs was evidence that schools were not responsive to the changing needs of youth.
One author stated that FDR believed that federal programs would be necessary to quickly
help the youth who were being underserved by public schools. 85
Schools may have moved slowly because they did not have the financial freedom
to try new programs, especially during an economic depression. New Dealers like
Williams, who thought educators would not teach about the injustices of society, were
naive in understanding how desperate teachers were to keep their jobs. Concerned about
their employment during the Great Depression, teachers were not likely to be engaged in
politics. Teachers believed that they would be more likely to keep their jobs if they did
not speak out.86 Instead of teachers initiating changes in the curriculum, the state
departments of education and local administrators could have pushed for changes and
created different expectations of teachers. This push did not occur and teachers
continued doing as they were expected, which consisted of teaching a traditional college
preparatory curriculum.
Outside of the teaching field, reviewing the correspondence from educational
organizations, principals, and superintendents, almost all of them asked for federal
assistance, particularly financial assistance. FDR’s cold and disinterested responses,
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when he did respond, might have reflected his policy of not supporting schools with
federal funds. Instead of upsetting educators by stating his policies he acknowledged
their concerns without commenting on the content of their communication. FDR’s
silence or ignoring people he disagreed with was one of his common characteristics. 87
FDR’s educational policies, based on his interactions of educators and his own
Office of Education, indicated he firmly believed that education was the responsibility of
states and local agencies. His financial support of education as governor of New York
represented this position, and it points to the fact that FDR did believe in supporting
education. In speeches as governor and as president, he made it clear that he was
troubled by the differences in money spent on students between school districts. The
NEA and Studebaker’s insistence that he use federal funds, even those designated for
relief, and place them in the hands of state and local educators was against FDR’s policy
of state control over education. Moreover, because he and his administrators were
doubtful of educators’ willingness to change rapidly and meet the needs of the public, he
ignored their consistent request of federal money without federal control.
Many of FDR’s New Dealers had backgrounds in social work. These people
often were at odds with educators. New Dealers wanted to address the unemployment
needs of people from lower social classes, whereas educators emphasized equal treatment
of students. When Studebaker wanted to administer programs that focused on people
who were on relief, FDR chose relief administrators over educational administrators from

86

David Hicks and Stephanie Van Hover, “‘A Magnificent Adventure’: Negotiating and Structuring
Curricular Change in Virginia,” in Education and the Great Depression: Lessons from a Global History,
ed. E. Thomas Ewing and David Hicks (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 281.
87
Katie Louchheim and Jonathan Dembo, The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders Speak (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), 201.

97
the Office of Education for a few reasons: 1) allowing the Office of Education to handle
relief programs would concern people, Catholics for example, that FDR would be moving
towards federal control of education, 2) The New Deal programs were primarily designed
to help those who were unemployed and would therefore be better handled by relief
administrators who were trained in social work. The educational components in the New
Deal programs were related to job training, which fell under the Department of Labor,
and 3) FDR wanted to help students in schools that were suffering the most and did not
trust that state educators would equalize schools if federal money was given to state
departments of education. New Dealers were irritated that educators were unwilling to
change traditional teaching practices and try new ideas. 88 No matter how hard
Studebaker tried and even begged FDR to allow him to use relief funds, FDR was
cautious and provided Studebaker few opportunities to administer relief programs.
Besides relief funds, FDR cut the Office of Education’s normal operating budget,
thus showing he had little value for Studebaker or his work. FDR was known to
encourage people to resign by usurping their decision-making power and transferring it to
a new agency. Loyalty was key for FDR and Studebaker promoted his own agenda over
what FDR wanted. Moreover, as previously stated, there was evidence that Studebaker
supported FDR’s critics, including NEA’s article on the New Deal and Mr. Voelker’s
letter sharing Studebaker’s condemning comments at a conference.
Despite funds being cut, Studebaker did not quit despite FDR’s indirect
devaluation of his job and the Office of Education. Harry N. Rosenfield, principal
attorney and assistant to FSA, described Studebaker as, “trying to break the bounds of the
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ordinary classroom concept of teaching, but at the same time, had come out of the school
system so that he was part of the fundamental thinking.” 89 He said Studebaker’s greatest
accomplishment was making the Office of Education a more important agency. 90
However, Studebaker’s fight for the Office of Education to have a larger role in FDR’s
New Deal programs led him to latch onto the NEA, further alienating himself from FDR
and his administration.
In short, educators during the 1930s were heavily involved in the policymaking
process with various degrees of success. NEA, other educational organizations, and state
and local educational administrators had little impact on changing FDR’s educational
policies. They were politically weak and inflexible. Zook had the most influence as
shown by helping to start CCC’s educational program and work-study jobs for college
students. His involvement in research on the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education continued pushing for quality education. Reeves also accomplished an
impressive study of education in the U.S. that was used to advocate for federal aid to
education.
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CHAPTER 4
FDR, CONGRESS, AND FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

According to the 10th Amendment of the Constitution, the federal government is
not responsible for public education; rather, states are expected to control and administer
education. Consequently, the concept of federal financial assistance for public schools
had few precedents and invoked controversy over federal control and states’ rights. Up
until the 1930s, the federal government’s involvement in education was limited to
reserving or donating land to support public schools. In 1787 the Northwest Ordinance
reserved 1 of every 36 pieces of land for public schools. Similarly, the Morrill Act of
1862 donated land to the states for them to use the proceeds to build public agricultural
and mechanical arts colleges. One of the purposes of the Freedman’s Bureau, which was
created in 1865 by the federal government, was to promote the education of former
slaves. Two years later the first government agency, named the Department of
Education, was created to research and disseminate information related to education.
Another two years later, this non-cabinet level department was demoted to an office level
agency under the Department of the Interior, called the Office of Education. Then, in
1917, the Smith-Hughes Act used federal funds to assist states in providing vocational
and technical training. These federal programs promoted education in the states to help
develop new territories and have an educated citizenry. Never before did the federal
government give money to elementary and secondary schools. The idea of federal
financial assistance to schools, even without stipulations of federal requirements,
translated to some people as federal control.
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The term “federal aid to education” is very broad and includes aid to the Office of
Education, libraries, elementary and secondary schools, higher education, vocational
programs, adult education, and more. In this study, I focus on federal aid to schools but
have chosen to use the phrase “federal aid to education” because the literature used this
phrase as do legislative bills. Even when the phrase actually does refer to different types
of education, aid to elementary and secondary schools is the most controversial and
usually receives the most attention.
This chapter will discuss major education bills that appeared in Congress in
chronological order. Breaking the chapter by sessions of Congress is helpful since bills
are usually acted upon in the session they are introduced. Major legislative achievements
and failures are highlighted in each session of Congress.

73rd Congress
Despite the fear of federal control, educational organizations continued to push
for federal aid to education. They and congressional representatives did not stand by as
public schools suffered during the Great Depression. Representatives, particularly in the
South, felt the pressure on state budgets that struggled to finance public schools. They
needed the proposed funds in federal aid to education bills. During the 73rd
Congressional session (March 9, 1933-June 18, 1934), Congress introduced more than
ninety bills relating to education but only nine bills passed. Of those nine bills, four were
related to the education of Native-Americans, two were related to the education of
“handicapped” people, three were related to changes to specific colleges or universities,
and one was related to vocational education. In addition, seven of the ninety bills were
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identical to one of the nine bills that passed. More interestingly, considering the context
of the economic crisis, none of the fifteen bills to assist schools operating through grants
was passed, not even by one chamber of Congress. There were eleven bills that called for
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) loans for districts to refinance debt that did
not pass in either chamber of Congress. According to an National Education Association
(NEA) document, the members of the House Committee on Education agreed with each
other that public schools were in need of financial assistance and that federal aid should
be allocated. These bills, regardless of their approval, were never voted on by that
committee.1
On February 2, 1934, Harry Hopkins announced that funds from his relief
administration would be used to help pay the salaries of rural school teachers whose
school districts were struggling financially. The rural teacher fund was created at the
same time that congressmen had requested the creation of very similar programs, except
that their programs would be administered through established educational agencies
rather than through the relief administrator himself. Senator Walter F. George (D-GA)
made a statement in the Senate that questioned Hopkins’ motives:
I do not know why the Administrator of Emergency Relief Works is not
willing to accept a bill which has been thought out with some care and
administer it thru established authority existing in every State and why he
wishes to elect to hold the entire administration of the $950,000,000 in his
own hands…. I think Mr. Hopkins has done a magnificent service. I am
rather criticizing that legislative cowardice which is unwilling to say to a
friendly administration that here is a legislative body that also may express
its will and may make legislative provision for the expenditure of public
money. 2
1
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The sentiment in an NEA document was that Hopkins wanted to kill education bills that
were gaining popularity in Congress by administratively creating similar programs
housed in different agencies, thereby making the education bills superfluous.3
On February 26, 1934, a hearing of the Committee of Education in the House of
Representatives was held for 11 different education bills that all related to federal aid to
education. James H. Richmond, a college administrator from Kentucky and chairman of
the National Committee for Federal Emergency Aid for Education,4 testified of the
challenges schools were facing because of the economic depression. The committee’s
chairman, John J. Douglass (D-MA), responded by questioning why the federal
government should become involved in education since it was the responsibility of states.
The chairman thought that the states should do everything financially possible, including
reorganize their taxing system, before requesting help from the federal government.
Douglass believed that the real intent of the legislation was to make the federal
government permanently committed to paying for education in the states even though the
bills were emphasizing temporary emergency measures. Richmond stated the chairman’s
ideas of permanent federal aid were incorrect and countered the chairman’s idea by
pointing out that the federal government was currently assisting states in areas that have
traditionally been the responsibility of states. He then promoted the bills’ idea that
money should be given to the Commissioner of Education who would then distribute
funds to the states without any controls. Richmond described the committee’s six point
plan as follows: 1) distribute $50,000,000 to schools for the remainder of the 1933-1934
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school year to keep them functioning as normally as possible, 2) provide twice the
amount to the neediest school districts the following year, 3) give a larger amount of
money for the 1934-35 school year for all schools to increase their efficiency, 4)
restructure school debt through refinancing and loans to help maintain schools, 5) utilize
the Civilian Works Administration (CWA) funds to build new schools, and 6) provide
financial assistance to college students in need. Richmond then acknowledged that
Hopkins’ Emergency Educational Program (EEP) program had addressed two of these
six points.5
Hopkins spoke next to explain how his relief program had helped schools and to
articulate his opinion on the education bills. Based on his reading of two of the bills,
Hopkins stated he was opposed to the bills because money from the relief program was
appropriated to help the unemployed and if money was needed by the schools then it
should be appropriated for schools rather than taken out of the relief fund. 6 Moreover,
Hopkins did not agree that his department should participate in educational affairs:
Now, if there is to be an appropriation for education in any form it seems
to me it should be a direct appropriation on the merits of the case, and not
by means of taking a part of the money which has already been
appropriated for a totally different purpose. We need all of the funds
which have been appropriated to us by the Congress for the purpose for
which they were given, and if any of our funds are taken for this purpose it
will simply mean that needy, unemployed people are not cared for to
whatever extent this fund is tapped. The whole question of whether the
Federal Government should give aid to schools is something which is
entirely outside of my province, it is not my field, and it is not what I am
here to do, and I certainly would not wish to express any judgment as to
4
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whether the Federal Government should give financial aid to school
systems or not.”7
Richmond agreed with Hopkins that the relief administration should not be involved in
education and funds to support education should be allocated separately from relief. 8
According to Father Butler of the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), these
bills that attempted to use relief funds were unlikely to pass. “Without the support of the
Federal Director of Emergency Relief they cannot be enacted and the Administration has
opposed all efforts in Congress to restrict the authority of the president over these relief
funds.”9
Father Butler and Father George Johnson of the NCWC met with Chairman
Douglass (who was Catholic) to discuss federal aid for education. Douglass told them
that members of the House Committee on Education, including himself, formed a group
that drafted HR9544, whose original content came from Commissioner George Zook.
Unlike previous bills, this bill provided that federal funds be appropriated for education
and given to the states based on need without federal control. The House Committee on
Education, according to Douglass, believed that a critical situation existed within public
schools and that federal aid was necessary. After their draft was made they would meet
with FDR and hear his recommendations. Father Johnson wanted parochial schools to be
included in this bill but Douglass did not make any promises and stated he would defer to
the group drafting the bill and FDR. A few days later Douglass suggested that Johnson
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meet privately with the House Committee on Education to provide a perspective on
federal aid and parochial schools.10
Catholics were aware of the growing demands for federal aid to education and
assumed such legislation would become a reality. Since it would not be easy to stop
federal aid to education, they had to make sure they positioned themselves to benefit
from it. A decision on how the NCWC should respond to the bill was discussed, and they
decided that it would not be beneficial to be vocal against the bill. They did, however,
want to be given assurances that parochial schools would not be excluded. Archbishop
Murray told Father Ready:
Concerning the proposed legislation for educational relief I am convinced
that it would be poor strategy for any of us to plead for economy and
restriction of aid …. Hence, if the wording of the bill can be broadened so
as not to exlude [sic] private schools, I shall voice no objection even
though no private school will get a cent in view of the present trend which
is annihilating everything private.11

As the position of the U.S. Catholic Church began to shift its approach to federal aid to
education, not all of their public and private statements were consistent.12
William F. Montavon of the NCWC was given information about the outcome of
FDR’s upcoming meeting with the House Committee on Education. FDR was expected
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to tell them he did not want any federal appropriation for education, however, they could
use new relief funds to aid education. The pressure on the committee from constituents
to obtain aid to education was strong.13 More information came from the NCWC General
Secretary’s report of his meeting with FDR regarding HR9544. The summary of the
discussion is stated at length to highlight FDR’s resistance to using federal funds for
schools.
I told the President that the Bishops were unanimously and emphatically
opposed to such a proposed appropriation. Asked FDR to not mention
publicly about this meeting but privately wanted him to know how they
felt. They would not come out publicly against the federal grant because
their opinion might be misconstrued to be in opposition to public schools.
… this would be the opening wedge and would soon change from an
emergency to a permanent measure; that the amount of seventy-five
millions would be increased to five hundred millions…FDR responded
saying Burke should know he is opposed to all and every kind of
centralization of education and all Federal financial aid to education. “I
learned my lesson from my experience in New York State. I was lead into
approving the resolutions of a committee because it was, at that time, Al
Smith’s committee, in 1924, whereby the State appropriation of eight
millions was given to the municipal and rural schools of New York and a
great outcry had been raised in favor of the Little Red Schoolhouse. I saw
the folly of this first step afterwards, for when I was Governor I found that
this had grown to an appropriation of ninety millions a year, and that this
ninety millions was forty-five percent of the entire yearly budget of the
State of New York. I found also that in four years’ time the ninety
millions would have increased to one hundred and twenty-five millions.
The best I could do as the Governor was to prevent this increase. Now, in
the same way, if I allowed any appropriation at all from Federal funds for
education by the State, I do not know where it would end. I am not in a
position to allow any such funds to be used, and I am determined, as I told
Director Hopkins the other day, that there would be no Federal funds
available for educational purposes except those of the Relief
Administration…. Mr. Hopkins spent seventeen millions for educational
relief during the past year… and I instructed Mr. Hopkins that is was to be
13
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kept to that, or approximately that, during the coming year. And this is the
only sum I will allow.”14
Despite what the House Committee on Education was told by FDR, it wanted to have a
federal aid to education bill pass. The bill requested $75 million from any funds
available given to the states by Hopkins with the assistance of the Commissioner of
Education without federal controls. Although the committee agreed that an emergency in
education existed, members felt the emergency was due to a number of factors outside
the purview and control of educators and individual schools, including the Depression,
poor fiscal management of states, outdated state tax laws, ill prepared for the monetary
needs of schools, and failure to consolidate small rural schools. Money was needed now
because it would take some time before states could address these financial issues, and
the committee warned that if these issues were not attended to, then states would find it
harder to ask Congress for relief.15
The NCWC was not happy with Section 6, which read, “Nothing in this Act shall
be constructed to prevent the distribution of funds, upon application, to privately-owned,
free-tuition schools in need” and debated with each other if they should support the bill.
They wanted this section to be clearer but Douglass stated it had already been heavily
discussed and finalizing that section was a major achievement. In the committee’s report
that recommended HR9544 be approved it included a paragraph encouraging private and
free-tuition schools be eligible for aid. 16
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The popularity of HR9544 in both houses of Congress was growing, and the
educational community felt confident that it would pass if put to a vote. But the second
session of the 73rd Congress ended with HR9544 never coming to a vote because Hopkins
stated during a House Appropriations Committee meeting he would provide $48 million
of relief funds to help schools in need if FDR requested it. Mr. Braswell Deen (D-GA) of
the House Committee on Education explained how the bill died:
Mr. Douglas [sic], and other members of the committee who were here at
the time recall when he pressed the matter of the bill and the committee
reported it to the House, a $75,000,000 appropriation, that in the
discussion it was brought out by the Chairman, Mr. Buchanan, and the
House was assured, the members of the committee were assured, Mr.
Douglas [sic] was assured that it would not be necessary to press our bill
or to go to the Rules Committee to get a rule, but simply let the matter
stand as it was and it would be taken care of in the Appropriation Bill.
The discussion, which I read recently in the record, shows that it was well
understood by the chairman of the committee and members of the House
understood it; therefore we did not press the bill reported by the
Committee on Education.17
Joshua B. Lee (D-OK), a member of the Committee on Education, added that next time
they have a bill they must not accept statements as insurances of action or fact. 18
Excerpts from a hearing on May 16, 1934, at the House Appropriations committee
regarding this issue showed that Hopkins had reserved $48 million for schools. This
amount was a forecast of expenditures and not an allocation. Below is a lengthy
transcript of an Appropriations Committee meeting where Hopkins stated how he
planned to use the $48 million for education, presented in full to provide evidence of
Hopkins evasiveness on committing funds for schools.
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Mr. Hopkins – I would want and I would expect to get Executive approval
for granting relief to rural schools. Beyond that I am certainly not in a
position to make any informal assurances to this committee.
Mr. Oliver – Since you are authorized to extend relief to rural schools
under appropriations which are made available to you during the present
year, have you any reason to believe that, if there should be some need for
help, you would not be directed to extend like help in the future?
Mr. Hopkins – None whatever; I am quite confident that would be the
case.
Mr. Chairman – If you found, however, in rural communities the need of
real relief among teachers, or real distress among teachers, there would be
no reason why you would not extend relief to them as you would to any
other class of people.
Mr. Hopkins – No, sir. The problem is that the bill the Committee on
Education has presented is not confined to rural schools, and the question
is will that bill be withdrawn. I am not in a position to talk about that,
because it is not my job.
Mr. Collins – The school teachers in my State receive an average of $27
per month for 8 months work. The high school teachers’ salary is about
$31 per month. Now, they do not get money when they receive that, but
they get certificates. This year the average school term in my State, unless
we do get some Federal funds, will not last more than 4 months, if that
long.
Mr. Bolton – Are you speaking of rural schools or all schools?
Mr. Collins – I am speaking of all schools.
Mr.Collins – …in Wayne County in my State, they realized that their
budget for school purposes would be only a small amount; so they called
the school teachers together and the truck drivers together, and said:
“Now, under this budget the school teachers will get approximately $19
per month. Are you willing and satisfied to take that, and let the school
term be the same as it was last year?” The teachers agreed to that, with
the result that Wayne County, in my State, but not in my district, did not
receive a single penny of money through Mr. Hopkins’ office.
Mr. Hopkins – That is right.
Mr. Taber – I wonder to what extent those units which are not able to
carry on their schools are indulging in large road and other programs that
cost a lot of money.
Mr. Collins – The best way to tell you about that, when you ask that
question, would be to take you down there and show you the misery that
exists.
The Chairman – In allocating this $890,000,000, you have tentatively put
down $50,000,000 for public education.
Mr. Hopkins – Yes.
The Chairman – If $890,000,000 is appropriated and it is determined that
you should help education, that money will be available for the purpose.
Mr. Hopkins – Yes.
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The Chairman – It is up to the President to make that determination.
Mr. Hopkins – I should think so.
The Chairman – And where school teachers are in need of real relief, they
will get it.
Mr. Hopkins – Yes sir.
Mr. Collins – When that happens the schools will be closed.
Mr. Hopkins – The problem we are facing and the problem before
Congress is whether the Government wishes to finance schools in districts
that are “busted” to the tune of anywhere from $75,000,000 up. I consider
that I am simply an agent in this matter, and I do not think I should make a
decision of that sort. That is not my business...19
By October 1934 the NEA had collected enough information to warrant sufficient
concern about the status of public schools to meet with White House officials. Based on
the meeting, a press release stated that FDR told Harold Ickes and Hopkins to create a
plan that would help schools stay open for the next 90 days. The hope was that by
January Congress and state legislatures would meet and figure out how to help the
schools.20
By the end of 1934, Sidney B. Hall, Superintendent of Public Instruction in
Virginia, Zook, and John Studebaker were meeting to strategize how the NEA could pass
a federal aid to education bill in Congress. In a letter Hall wrote to Willard Givens on
December 3, 1934, he described how Zook, Studebaker, and he perceived the political
climate on federal aid and suggested how the NEA should proceed:
We are of the opinion that the cards are stacked against us from an
administrative point of view, and that therefore we will hardly be able to
get Federal aid at this time. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Federal
government is giving aid to the various states in considerable quantities
already. We are wondering if pressing forward on different sectors of the
front, making successes of these efforts, and ultimately unifying the sum
19
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total of all of the successes made, will not give us the Federal aid which
we now desire so much. In other words, is it not better to make small
gains as we go forward each year, making the Federal government realize
gradually that Federal aid is a reality, rather than attempting to floor the
government completely with our efforts for Federal aid as a whole at the
present time? I am convinced in my thinking that small and gradual gains
will ultimately lead to the final goal, and that this can be done with less
difficulty than by attempting to do it all at once. 21
Their conclusion was that since the administration did not want federal aid it would be
nearly impossible to obtain that goal. Instead, they should try to have as much money
from the federal government as possible in the areas that were currently giving to
education. Federal aid in piecemeal was more feasible than a federal education bill.
During the 73rd Congress the concern for public schools was present, as indicated
by the large number of education bills. Hopkins, was able to keep all of his relief funds
under his control by providing minimum amounts of aid to schools, thereby making bills
redundant. His evasive comments during meetings indicated he did not approve of
federal aid to schools. Educators started off the next session of Congress with data to
show how many schools were suffering.

74th Congress
The beginning of the 74th Congress (January 1935-June 1936) included a school
closure report by the NEA. Of the 11 states that replied to the NEA’s survey, 1,584
schools were closed at the end of March 1935. Sixteen states reported to the surveyors
that if teachers were paid in cash, 10,152 schools would be closed. In March 1935 the
House Committee on Education held a hearing for HR5923, introduced by Lee, and
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HR4745, introduced by Deen. During this hearing Hopkins stated during the 1933-34
school year, all rural schools were kept open. He said it was not right to put teachers on
relief rolls but that was what he had to do in order to keep schools open. He reiterated
what he stated in the past, that his office should not be handling educational affairs but
rather focusing on those who were unemployed. He said Congress was given the
opportunity to pass a federal aid to education bill but did not, so his office used its
authority to help schools stay open by financially supporting rural school teachers and
bus drivers. He did not think handling the school problem in this manner was the best
decision but he did all he could to help schools. He agreed with Lee’s bill that the funds
for schools should be appropriated by Congress from a source it chooses and
administered from the Office of Education. He refused to state his opinion on federal aid
to education and instead stated that he thought it was best left to the executive branch and
Congress. He made it clear he was not an authority on education. In terms of financing
schools, he thought the states could do more to help schools than they currently were
doing. When questioned about whether all rural schools were open, Hopkins stated they
were at present all open, except a unique case or two. This statement was discussed
further and other congressmen were sure rural schools were closed in their districts. He
then commented on his statement that $48 million would be used for schools by stating
the money was available unless he determined that the state could help itself. 22
Studebaker spoke next and shared concerns that states had with staff from the
relief agencies. He wanted to make sure the committee was aware of who or what
managed federal aid, and he agreed with Hopkins that the Office of Education should
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handle funds dealing with education. He also agreed that some states were not doing all
they could to support schools, including his own state of Iowa.23
Dr. Howard Dawson, from the Office of Education who worked on the financial
surveys of schools, wanted the committee to know that “the States that are in the greatest
distress are the States which for years and years have been accustomed to give a larger
amount of State support to education than the other States in this Union.” 24 He also was
not happy that this school year the relief administration was purposely not working in
cooperation with the state superintendents of public instruction in determining financial
eligibility for relief funds. He submitted paperwork showing that $16,924,659.01 was
allocated from relief funds for schools during the school year 1933-34, but only
$14,500,000 were spent because some schools closed early due to funds not being
received, some districts were found to be ineligible. Also, not all rural teachers were able
to obtain relief funds because their salaries were not their only source of income. 25
During the hearing when Zook was speaking Lee asserted that public agencies in
every sector but education had been assisted with direct federal aid. Zook added that the
road in front of his old elementary school had been repaved with federal money three
times but the school continued to be dilapidated. “Now, of course, roads were formerly
just as much a local responsibility as the schools ever were.” 26
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Father Johnson spoke next and stated that the Catholic Church was against
permanent federal aid because that led to federal control of education. He further stated
that local control prevents fascism and was consequently a principle of American liberty,
but he believed that if children were not being educated because of a financial crisis than
something should be done. He questioned if the goal of the bill is to aid the children of
the U.S. then why does it stop at public schools? The committee, he argued, must keep in
mind that there are 2.5 million children in Catholic schools. He then reclassified Catholic
schools as the truest public schools because the goal was to instill citizenship within their
students. He cited the fact that anyone could attend a Catholic school regardless of their
religion. Parents of Catholic school children had to pay double their share for their
child’s education. They paid taxes required to support public schools, and they also had
to pay Catholic school tuition. He continued on to say that now under this bill, parents of
Catholic school students would have to pay a federal tax that would also be used to
support public schools. Father Johnson suggested the bill be broadened to allow states, if
they so choose, include parochial schools that do not make a profit or charge tuition. The
issue of separation of church and state was raised but Father Johnson did not think
emergency funds to Catholic schools would apply. 27
After the hearing, FDR was contacted by Senator Joseph T. Robinson (D-AR),
who was the Senate Majority Leader, to let him know the president of the Arizona State
Board of Education, along with educational organizational representatives, liked
Studebaker’s idea that federal aid to education should be administered from the Office of
Education to the states. FDR’s response informed Robinson that relief funds were for
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relief and if some of the funds were to be used for education the Commissioner of
Education would be consulted. He then commented that he wanted to stay away from
promoting permanent federal aid to education.28
Representative Jed Johnson (D-OK) spoke next and was upset that Hopkins told
the committee that monetary issues were not the cause of any rural school closures.
Johnson corrected Hopkins, but Hopkins insisted Johnson was the one in error. The state
superintendent of Oklahoma contacted Johnson and confirmed that 127 schools with
8,600 students were closed. In addition, 450 schools were only able to stay open for one
to three months. Oklahoma applied for $1.6 million in federal relief but was only
promised $200,000. He then pointed out that although money had been promised, it had
not yet been given to the state.29
By late April, the House Committee on Education met to discuss these two bills
when Lee announced that Mr. Hopkins gave federal relief funds to his state of Oklahoma.
The committee concluded that other states could also do the same and therefore these two
bills were unnecessary. The chairman stated the bills would no longer be discussed. 30
The end of the 74th Congress resulted in the passing of HR12120, the GeorgeDeen Act, which was signed by FDR on June 8, 1936. FDR was not pleased with the bill
since it gave $10,000,000 more than he initially allocated. According to FDR, there were
not enough certified vocational educational teachers to warrant an expanded vocational
program, it maintained inequality by requiring states to match funds, resulting in poorer
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states receiving the least amount of funds, and vocational educational organizations had
pressured Congress to pass the bill.
I have, with much reluctance, affixed my signature to H.R. 6958, the
Appropriation Bill for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year
1938. The principal item of difficulty was the appropriation of nearly
fourteen and a half million dollars for the further development of
vocational education – ten million dollars more than the estimate of the
Bureau of the Budget which I presented to Congress. I recognize that a
sound program of vocational education is greatly needed in the United
States, but an appropriation at this time of the full amount authorized
under the Act of June 8, 1936, known as the George-Deen act, is not the
way to meet this need…. I will, therefore, carry out what is obviously the
intention of the Congress-that as much of the total sum shall be expended
during the current fiscal year as can properly and usefully be spent-no
more and no less. 31

Although FDR thought education, and particularly vocational education, was a critical
component to the success of the country, he thought the amount associated with this bill
was too high and should be the financial burden of states, not the federal government.
The passage of this bill highlighted the difference between FDR and Congress. The
former vocational education bill, the George-Ellzey Act, was a disappointment to FDR
because it failed to help unemployed youth and adults, as directed by FDR, and because
the funds provided to the states went unused. FDR and his administration were not
pleased that more money went into existing programs rather than generating new ones.
This act did result in an increase in enrollment of students attending high schools but did
not make significant strides in helping the unemployed. Vocational schools failed to
address issues of unemployment even when given funding. Such actions reinforced what
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the Committee on Economic Security, a committee formed by FDR in 1934 to strategize
how to help the unemployed, concluded: vocational schools will fail to train the
unemployed. J.C. Wright in the Office of Education communicated FDR’s expectations
to state administrators, but they worked within traditional requirements set up under the
Smith-Hughes Act, making it difficult for short training courses to develop. The laws
would have to be changed before rapid job training courses could occur and that did not
happen until the George-Deen Act. Whether FDR was aware of these regulatory
restrictions or not is unclear. Money went unspent, particularly the first year, because the
passing of the George-Ellzey Act came after many states legislatures had approved the
next year’s budget. The federal aid and the necessary matching funds were not accounted
for in those budgets.32 These experiences that FDR had with this bill influenced his
reaction to the George-Deen Act and its large budgetary requirements.
While considering the George-Deen Act, advocates of general education and the
Advisory Committee cautioned that vocational education should not be expanded until
the Committee’s report came out.33 While arguing that the federal government had
supported vocational education, contrary to FDR’s statements that the New Deal
programs were only incidentally related to education, FDR wrote:
It should be pointed out that Federal funds spent for the promotion of
vocational education under the Smith-Hughes and related statues are by no
means the only Federal appropriations to provide vocational training for
the youth of the Nation. During the past four years the problem has been
dealt with in many ways. The Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works
Progress Administration, and the National Youth Administration are
among the newer agencies which have been concerned with problems of
31
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vocational training. The Congress of the United States has already
appropriated substantial amounts to these agencies for activities designed
to train for useful employment.34
The passing of HR12120 was not easy because the House Committee on Education
attempted to kill the bill by keeping it from a vote on the House floor. The bill started as
a Senate bill (the George Bill, S2883), which passed on April 28, 1936 without a
dissenting vote. The bill approved $1 million every year to prepare teachers for
vocational education. As explained by Studebaker to Marvin McIntyre, the bill
continued, the federal aid to vocation education according to the George-Ellzey Act that
ended on June 30, 1937. This act was created to continue the George-Reed Act from
1929 that added funds to the original federal aid to vocational act, the Smith- Hughes Act
of 1917. Studebaker expounded that S2883 allowed for states to match fifty cents for
every federal dollar until June 30, 1942, and then states would slowly be required to
match more of their allotted funds. The money was administered by the Office of
Education which coordinated a vocational program with the states. Studebaker ended his
memorandum to McIntyre by encouraging FDR to support the bill. 35
Studebaker repeated much of the same information in a letter to Frances Perkins,
Secretary of Labor, while adding how the bill would help general and adult education:
The Bills would also make available additional funds to enable the
program of vocational education more adequately to serve the increasing
needs of youth still in school who will thus be held in attendance longer
through such practical courses, the out-of-school youth who will in many
instances return if opportunity is afforded them to take vocational training,
34
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and adult who need training and retraining to enable them to reenter
employment or to continue in employment in the face of the rapidly
changing conditions in industry, on the farms, and in the home. 36

Prior to the bill passing in the Senate, Ickes was asked by a member of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, who reviewed the bill, to share his opinion on
the bill. Oddly, Ickes used two pages to describe nine points of why the bill should be
passed and then stated:
While I am in sympathy with the purposes of your bill, this report
was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, and I am advised by
the Assistant Director that the proposed legislation would not be in
accord with the financial program of the President. Therefore, I
recommend that it not be enacted.37
Despite Ickes’ advice on the bill, the bill was reported out favorably in the Senate
committee and was consequently passed. The bill went to the House Committee on
Education but was not acted upon. The vocational education organization, the American
Vocational Association (AVA), pushed a bill that was similar to S2883 on to the House
floor (HR12120), a bill that was already approved of by the House Committee on
Education. While on the floor, HR12120 was amended to be identical to S2883, and it
was passed. The Senate then voted in favor of HR12120, and FDR signed the bill into
law. The result was a dramatic increase in enrollment for vocational education courses.
Schools that never had vocational education previously had programs for the first time.
A blended program of work and training were introduced, and new opportunities were
available for youth. Despite these additions, more programs were still needed. Public and
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vocational schools were still unsure of their role and responsibility for out-of-school
youth, but it was agreed that more training for unemployed populations was needed. One
requirement for participation in vocational training was that youth had to be employed in
order to receive job training; this requirement was heavily criticized by Aubrey Williams
of the National Youth Administration (NYA). It was debated by Williams, vocational
educators, and researchers if public schools or an outside agency would be better able to
train out-of-school youth.38
Similar to the previous session of Congress, when an education bill started to gain
in popularity, Hopkins killed the bill by using relief funds to help schools. One major bill
did pass during the 74th Congress but it renewed the federal government’s commitment to
vocational education. Public schools were still unable to secure federal aid. The defeat
of education bills caused the chairman of the House Committee on Education in the next
session to suggest they move forward with bills that FDR approves.

75th Congress
A few days before the 75th Congressional session started, FDR on February 5,
1937 shocked the country by announcing his Supreme Court packing bill. Because the
Supreme Court deemed many keys parts of FDR’s New Deal program as unconstitutional
it is thought that he wanted to add six more judges of his choice to the Supreme Court,

37

John W. Studebaker to Chairman, Federal Board for Vocational Education, April 23, 1936, Folder
Legislation George-Deen Bill 1935-36, Box 1 Records of the Office of the Assistant Commissioner for
Vocational Education, RG 12, NACP.
38
Report on Pending Federal Vocational Legislation by L.H. Dennis, May 27, 1936, Folder Legislation
George-Deen Bill 1935-36, Box 1 Records of the Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Vocational
Education, RG 12, NACP; O’Coin, 299–311.

121
who presumably would vote in his favor. Fear of federal control and viewing FDR as a
dictator increased with this bill adding concerns to federal aid to education. 39
On February 18, 1937, at the start of the 75th Congress, the House Committee on
Education met under Chairman Palmisano (D-MD). He said:
The Chairman does not feel that he wants to carry the burden of refusing
hearings to various members of the House who have introduced bills. The
Chairman, personally, is inclined to withhold hearings or refuse hearings
on new matters brought before this Committee unless there happens to be
some indication from the Administration that they desire hearings on a
particular bill, but I do not want that responsibility to rest solely upon
myself. 40
Representative George A. Dondero (R-MI) agreed with the Chairman and vehemently
stated the committee should not favorably report bills that would not be taken seriously
by the administration or on the House floor. An example of such an action was when the
Appropriations Committee reduced the vocational bill to $4 million. Mr. Mason, the
former president of the NEA of Illinois, added that hearings were a way of educating the
public and providing the opportunity for action. He further stated that hearings may not
lead to a law or policy but they gave the committee an opportunity to hear the issues and
decide what was best for education. Mr. Deen made his position clear by stating he
would not go along with FDR when he was wrong. Mr. Thomas Brooks Fletcher (D-OH)
also reminded the committee that bills rarely remained the same as they progress through
Congress, and that that was just a fact they should be aware of without using that as a
reason to not have hearings. The discussion resulted in reading the list of bills the
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committee had and choosing which ones they wanted to have a hearing on. After that,
they determined, based on the administration’s opinion, how to act on the bill. 41 The first
bill they wanted to hold hearings on was Fletcher’s HR2288, which was later substituted
for HR5962.
The Harrison-Black-Fletcher bill (HR5962) was sponsored by two members of
the Senate, Pat Harrison (D-MS) and Hugo Black (D-AL), and its third sponsor was
Brooks Fletcher from the House of Representatives. The bill wanted to use $100 million
of federal funds to help schools. The funds would be given to the states based on the
population of school children, and the funds would then be distributed to the districts by
the state. Major educational organizations, namely the NEA and the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT), supported the bill. During the hearings W.E.B. Du Bois
shared his concerns that some districts, particularly in the South, would not distribute
state funds equally between white populations and black populations. Because of the
poor quality of schools for blacks, Du Bois stated, “What we have in Georgia today for
Negroes is not compulsory education, it is compulsory ignorance.” 42 He asked that the
Commissioner of Education determine district spending. Fletcher argued that any such
requirements in the bill would lean dangerously close to federal control. Mary Foley
Grossman of the AFT spoke next and chastised the government for spending $120
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million on two battleships, yet finding it hard to spend $100 million on 30 million
children. She advocated for the bill since it would help to promote democracy:
The term democracy is bandied about quite freely. It is mouthed by some
to clock outrageously undemocratic beliefs. By others it is used sincerely
but with little deep appreciation of its real meaning. Gentlemen, we mean
it. We mean rule of the people and to rule, a people must be enlightened.
It can only be enlightened through a system of free public schools of good
quality…. I am well aware that widespread education is a menace to the
power of the few. This is one of the reasons why I believe in widespread
education…. I know that one of the functions of education is that of
teaching a trade, but I also know that the fundamental function of
education is teaching to live.43
Another AFT representative said he was for the bill but was upset that it would distribute
funds based on school population since not all of the states needed the money. He would
have liked to see distribution be based on need to alleviate educational inequalities
among states. And, like Du Bois, he was upset that the law did not specifically state the
money should be divided equally amongst the races. Charles H. Houston of the NAACP
had suggestions for improving the bill, but he made it clear that his organization
supported the bill as it was currently written.44
William G. Carr, Research Director of the NEA, also supported the bill at the
hearings. He emphasized the fact that those who received a poor education tend to be the
same people who need relief funds: “The Federal Government in pouring out millions for
relief is, in many cases, attempting to ameliorate conditions which can only be prevented
or cured by an educational program.” 45 Another NEA member, Howard A. Dawson,
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Director of Rural Services, focused on the role of the federal government in education in
light of the increasing movement of people from state to state:
Public education is of vital interest to the Federal Government as well as
to the States and their communities. A citizen of one of the sovereign
States is none the less a citizen of the Nation…. In 1930 more than one out
of each five persons in the United States was living in another States [sic]
than that in which he was born…. Some of the States that now have the
best supported systems of public education have the highest percentages of
citizens born in other States…. Thus it happens that the entire Nation must
be concerned with the kind of educational opportunities offered in each
State of the Nation. 46
Dawson continued saying if education is not paid for now then it will be paid for later on
in crime, poor health, and destitution. Addressing the argument that states would be able
to pay for education if they would only modernize their taxing system and prepare for
educational expenses, Dawson clearly said this was untrue.47 He insisted that there was
too little money available amongst the public in some states to collect and meet budgetary
needs.
Reverend Monsignor Michael J. Ready, General Secretary of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), stated that he was against the bill because it did
not help schools improve as it was written. The money went directly to state legislatures,
and the legislatures would then determine how schools would be reformed without any
federal check. Giving financial support without any accompanying policy changes would
not guarantee educational reform, and the bill did not even define how schools should
improve or inquire into what the biggest challenges were facing public schools.
Additionally, the bill distributed the funds equally among the school districts rather than
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responding appropriately to those districts that demonstrated the most need. He asked for
clear definitions of what constituted public education so that he could be sure that the bill
was not discriminating against parochial schools, which he believed provided a public
service for the public good.48 Father George Johnson, Secretary General of the National
Catholic Educational Association, restated many of Ready’s thoughts but added that:
it is difficult to see how anything of consequence would emerge to
enhance the general welfare of the Nation unless one is naive enough to
believe that our educational ills can be cured by the mere spending of
more money. Lack of wealth, Mr. Chairman, is only one of the many
reasons for the ineffectiveness of our schools. Sometimes school systems
fail to function effectively because there is a manifest lack of effort or an
absence of enlightened leadership. Local as well as State administration is
frequently stupid. Few States even today have made a beginning of any
intelligent effort to equalize educational opportunities within their own
borders. Now, that a school system, whether it be State or local, at present
mismanaged or making no effort to help itself, failing to take cognizance
of the challenge which social change is making, will be transformed by the
magic of a Federal grant, is a ridiculous assumption. 49

Father Johnson was then asked whether he would be against the bill if parochial schools
would be included in the bill. He responded that he would still be opposed to the bill if
that were the case.50
When James H. Richmond, president of State Teachers College in Kentucky was
testifying in support of the bill Deen asked him if he was concerned of amendments that
could be attached to the bill in the future if it became law. Deen was worried that an
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amendment could be added to stipulate funds would not be given to states that maintain a
segregated school system. Deen asked this question of Richmond because his state of
Kentucky, like Deen’s state of Georgia, had separate schools for blacks and whites. Deen
cautioned that such an amendment could easily pass since only 17 states had segregated
schools, which was a total of only 135 House members. 51
The hearings for this bill in the House went on for many days. In the Senate, the
bill was reported favorably out of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. 52
According to Swain, Senator Harrison did not push the bill to come to the floor because
he had heard that FDR and the Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson (D-AR) were
against the bill.
Harrison had no sooner brought the measure up for discussion than
William Borah cogently asked if its passage would necessitate new taxes.
When Robinson concurred with the Idahoan that “we cannot go on
extending federal activities into new fields [and] increasing expenditures
without making some provisions for meeting them,” congressional
observers were shocked that Harrison’s Arkansas friend was prepared to
oppose the bill. “It was as if Damon had struck Pythias,” columnist Paul
Mallon wrote, adding that some spectators nearly “fell out of the gallery”
when Robinson spoke up. Actually Harrison knew exactly what bothered
his friend, for Roosevelt had just ordered a resurvey of all departmental
expenditures. In spite of the fact that Harrison had never yet left the
administration fold on budgetary matters, he was ready to do so on
education. Moreover, he was privy to information from White House
aides that FDR would veto the bill because it failed to give him a hand in
the distribution of the funds.
Behind the scenes the White House worked to prevent the
Harrison-Black-Fletcher bill from coming to a vote. When agriculturalist
Clarence Poe strongly urged his senator, Josiah Bailey, to support the bill,
50

Ibid., 424.
Federal Aid to the States for the Support of Public Schools: Hearings on H.R. 5962 before the
Committee on Education House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st Session (1937), 59.
52
Mitchell, 126.
51

127
Bailey replied that the bill would pass if brought to a vote. The only force
to prevent that, Bailey wrote, was “the influence of the President.” 53
FDR’s influence on preventing the bill to come to the Senate floor through Robinson is
clearly shown by Swain’s delineation of the dynamics surrounding the bill. Although
FDR did not make his thoughts known to the public, Swain shows that he was trying to
kill the bill. Besides Robinson and FDR’s opposition to his bill, Harrison also thought it
would be wise to wait for the President’s Advisory Committee on Education’s report to
come out before promoting it.54 That time never came because the bill was killed in the
House Committee on Education. On April 19, 1937, Braswell Deen (D-GA), sponsor of
the George-Deen bill, informed McIntyre that:
The Educational Bill was coming up in secret conference in the
Committee a week from tomorrow; that he was opposed to it in general
and wanted to have the President’s reaction on it because he thinks he can
kill it in Committee, if desired – in fact he is all for killing it…. I am under
terrific pressure from all over the state and all over the country. I have not
committed myself. If it comes to the floor of the House, it is going to be
hard to defeat it. In the Committee there are three or four fellows who
have been going along with me and I believe that at our next meeting,
which is tomorrow a week, I can defeat the Bill and I think it ought to be
defeated.55
On April 27, 1937, Deen shared his victory with McIntyre and let him know the
Harrison-Black-Fletcher bill was voted unfavorably, 12 to 5.56 This incident shows that
vocational and general educators competed for limited education funds as Deen assisted
in killing the Harrison-Black-Fletcher bill.

53

Martha Swain, Pat Harrison: The New Deal Years (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1978),
213.
54
Ibid., 213–215.
55
Telephone Office to McIntyre, April 19, 1937, Folder 1937 Jan-June, Box 2 OF 107 Education, FDRL.
56
Telephone Office to McIntyre, April 27, 1937, Folder 1937 Jan-June, Box 2 OF 107 Education, FDRL.

128
After the President’s Advisory Committee on Education’s report came out, the
House Committee on Education began working on a bill that would reflect its
recommendations. Two members of the committee told the NCWC that they were
against placing such a bill onto the House floor and felt many others were of like mind.
The NCWC thought it was unlikely that the leaders of the House of Representatives
would promote the bill to the floor for a vote, considering it was an election year. 57 Their
conclusion was correct; a vote on a bill for federal aid to schools in either the Senate or
the House did not occur.
According to a report on federal aid to education that was given to the NCWC
Advisory Board by Father Johnson, during a meeting in September 1938 between Floyd
Reeves and FDR, the president shared his concern that, “the Federal Government do
something to aid the backward States in maintaining a minimum educational program.” 58
Since he was opposed to general federal aid and the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education’s report called for it based on financial need, Reeves asked FDR if any
compromise could be made. FDR told him he would accept the plan laid out in the
report. However, the very next day Katherine Lenroot of the Department of Labor was in
a meeting with FDR who stated he would in no way support general federal aid to
education. Despite FDR’s conflicting views on a potential bill involving federal aid to
education, Reeves proceeded based on his conversation with FDR and worked with
others to present a bill based on the committee’s report.59
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FDR’s influence in Congress was noted in the 74th session. The education bill in
the Senate was unable to come to the floor and did not even get passed in the House.
Senator Harrison was willing to wait for the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education report to garner more support for his newer bill, which would be based on its
recommendations.

76th Congress
During the 76th Congress (January 3, 1939- January 3, 1941), FDR shifted his
attention to preparing for World War II. Senator Harrison, along with the Senate
Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, Elbert D. Thomas (D-UT), created
a revised federal aid to education bill, S1305. This bill was based on the President’s
Advisory Committee on Education’s recommendations and targeted inequity between
and within states. The Senate Committee reported the bill favorably because it:
accepts the proposition that the Federal Government no less than the State
has a fundamental interest in the education of our citizens;… The
committee further believes that the ideals and principles of American
democracy call for equality of opportunity. The committee finds on the
basis of incontrovertible evidence that, without a reasonable amount of
Federal assistance to the States for the support of public education, there is
not the faintest hope that any fair degree of equality of opportunity will or
can exist in these United States…. Education reduces crime, raises the
standard of culture, is associated with better health and increased
longevity, and increases the wealth and income of the Nation. The
mobility of our population and the higher birth rates among poor States
and rural areas compel the interest of each of the States, and hence of the
Federal Government, in the character of educational opportunity offered
everywhere in the Nation…. Education can be made a force to equalize
the condition of men. It is no less true that it may be a force to create
class, race, and sectional distinctions. The evidence indicates clearly that
the schools of the United States, which have hitherto been regarded as the
bulkwark of democracy, may in fact become an instrument for creating
those very inequalities they were designed to prevent. If, for a long period
of years, each succeeding generation is drawn in disproportionately large
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numbers from these areas in which economic conditions are poorest, if the
population reserves of the Nation continue to be recruited from
economically underprivileged groups, and if the inability of the depressed
economic areas and groups to provide proper education for their children
is not corrected by aid from areas and groups more prosperous, the effect
on American civilization and on representative political institutions may
be disastrous.60
The bill had unanimous backing from major education organizations, including the
American Association of School Administrators, the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), the AFT, the American Library Association, the NEA, the National Council of
Chief State School Officers, and the Progressive Education Association (PEA). In
preparation for Floyd Reeves’ testimony for the S1305 hearings, he asked Daniel W.
Bell, Acting Director of Budget, if this bill was aligned with FDR’s program. Reeves
entered Bell’s response into the Congressional Record; “I have taken this matter up with
the president and you are advised that the proposed legislation would not be in accord
with his program.”61 The Senators argued with Reeves that a statement from the Budget
Director was not an indicator of FDR’s thoughts on the bill and merely represented
financial concerns. Due to a lack of communication with FDR, Reeves was unable to
confirm their assumptions. 62 But a memorandum from Bell to FDR had a handwritten
note by FDR, “Not in accord with program.”63 The decision was definitely FDR’s.64
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The main difference between this bill and previous education bills under Senator
Harrison is that the money apportioned to states would be based on need. Reeves
assuredly reported that money would only go to where it was needed and in proportion to
the financial stress of a state. A formula based on the number of students (an index of
educational load) and the state’s financial ability (index of financial ability) would be
used to calculate a state’s financial need. Rural children would be calculated as 1.4
children since their education was more costly. The Commissioner of Education would
approve all state plans that would be required to show that more money was going to the
poorest districts, otherwise he was expected to reject it. As a follow-up, an audit would
be completed to assess where the money was actually spent within the state.65
The Senators asked Reeves if state representatives had shown any concern about
the bill’s structure and financial plan. Reeves responded that no state representatives had
voiced any concerns about the bill. 66 Wilbur Helm of the Church League of America
spoke at the hearing concerned that the bill would become an intrusion on local rights by
the federal government. The Chairman responded, “Don’t you think it would be very,
very queer for a man like Senator Harrison, who came from Mississippi, a man like
Justice Black, who came from Alabama, to sponsor a bill that would interfere with State
rights?”67 Charles H. Houston, who represented the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the hearing on HR5962, was quite pleased
with the bill but made some suggestions. In the end, the bill was reported favorably out
of the Senate Committee but never brought up on the floor. Thomas submitted another
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Harrison-Thomas bill the following year but it was not reported favorably out of the
committee. Harrison was terminally ill by then and passed away the following year.68
The House Committee on Education, under chairman William H. Larrabee (DIN), created a similar bill to S1305, called the Larrabee Bill HR3517, but it was never
reported out of the committee. By early 1940, Larrabee was informing people that
hearings would not be held on HR3517 at the request of FDR. Mrs. Roosevelt informed
FDR what Larrabee was saying and suggested that hearings be held on the bill. 69 FDR
responded, “… I think frankly that in view of the political situation – not the need – it is
best to defer any education grant at this session.” 70
Legislation based on the President’s Advisory Committee on Education’s report
was never passed in the late 1930s. The question of federal aid to education continued
until the end of FDR’s presidency. Educators who were in favor of federal aid continued
to hope that FDR would support it. The formation of the Roosevelt Group indicated such
continued demands of FDR for federal aid. This group of prominent educators included
John Dewey, Albert Einstein, Abraham Flexner, and William H. Kilpatrick, who
collectively argued that FDR would be more willing to help the cause for federal aid to
education than a Republican. They added further, “President Roosevelt and the platform
of the Democratic party are definitely committed to Federal aid for public education.” 71
They were wrong; FDR was committed to keeping federal funds from supporting public
schools.
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As 1941 approached, Congress poured money into the Office of Education for
training defense production workers, starting at $15 million and reaching $116 million by
1941. This money was to be distributed to the states by the Office of Education which
Congress identified as the coordinator for vocational training related to defense. FDR
was in favor of federal aid for defense work as long as it went to the NYA. Both the
Office of Education and the NYA received funds for defense training until the NYA was
terminated in 1943.72

Analysis of FDR, Congress, and Federal Aid to Education
Upon studying the federal aid to education legislation, a pattern to circumvent
such bills can be detected. Bills would be presented to the committees of Congress and
they would either not be voted on in committee or on the House or Senate floors. If a bill
was gaining in popularity, Hopkins would use a minimum amount of relief funds that
would placate the committees so they would abandon their education bills. No archival
documents were found where FDR directly disapproved of specific bills, told chairmen of
committees to not vote on bills, or directed the majority leaders to ensure that bills do not
come to the floor, however, the fact that the chairman of the House Committee on
Education did not want to hold hearings unless FDR indicated he was interested in the
bill shows FDR’s influence was strong. Zeitlin suggested that if FDR wanted to pass a
federal aid to education bill in 1934 he certainly had enough political support in Congress
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to do so.73 I think that due to FDR’s unwillingness to get involved in the debate on
federal aid to education, he worked outside of public view to kill these bills. Swain’s
account of FDR’s hidden work on killing Harrison’s bill supports this claim. Tyack,
Lowe, and Hansot came to a similar conclusion: “Federal aid to education bills got
nowhere on the Hill, in large part because of the opposition of Roosevelt. The
president’s men in Congress managed quietly to bottle the bills up in committee.” 74
During the legislative process, FDR had ample opportunity to privately influence a bill
while in committee, on the floor, or within the Rules or Appropriations Committees.
Within this study, educational bills were killed or minimized in each of these steps.
Although no archival data was found to support the possible collaboration
between FDR and Hopkins to suppress federal aid to education legislation, it is logical to
assume that Hopkins acted on behalf of FDR’s desires, if not under his specific direction,
because of their intimate relationship. Hopkins was one of FDR’s closest advisers. They
both shared the same sentiment towards using relief money for education. From the
beginning of federal aid to education legislation during FDR’s presidency, Hopkins stated
that relief money was appropriated to assist with employment and any other uses of those
funds was not authorized. Similarly, FDR noted that the money used for emergency
education programs were relief funds and could only be used for relief purposes. 75 In
addition, FDR told members of the NCWC that he instructed Hopkins to spend $17
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million of relief funds to help schools, and that is exactly what Hopkins did. It seems to
me that such consistent statements indicated that the two of them strategized together.
What does the literature say about why federal aid to education legislation failed
to become law? Smith, in Limits of Reform: Politics and Federal Aid to Education 19371950, attributed failed federal aid to education legislation to 1) fear of federal control 2)
concern over the federal budget 3) and New Deal leaders who wanted see public schools
reformed instead of financially supported. Of those who did want to have federal aid to
education, according to Smith, argued over the details and implementation of such a bill
because of religion and race. Appell, who wrote a dissertation entitled “Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and Education,” concluded that FDR was unable to overcome the opposition of
federal aid of the Catholics. Zeitlin, in his dissertation “Federal Relations in American
Education, 1933-1943: A Study of New Deal Efforts and Innovations,” stated by 1939
few opposed federal aid to education at congressional hearings, except Catholics who
were against the idea unless they could also receive funds. Other factors included:
newspaper editors were not in favor of federal aid to education because they were wary
of bills that gave more power to the federal government, concern over federal debt,
unforeseen consequences of such a major change in educational policy, wealthier states
not wanting to take on extra financial burdens, Democratic Party fractioning, concern
over allocated funds without overseeing them, mixed public opinion, and states’ rights.76
Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot summarized that federal aid to education bills did not pass “in
large part because of the opposition of Roosevelt” and “race, religion, and fears about
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radical centralized government-the three Rs-undermined whatever slim support existed
on the Hill for federal aid.”77
Many authors including Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot and Smith, used the issue of
race as a reason that federal aid to education bills failed. 78 I, as well as Zeitlin, do not
think race prevented these bills from passing Congress. “Negro leaders were, by and
large, willing to accept much less in regard to equal rights provisions in the 1930’s and
this situation was not an obstacle to the passage of Federal aid.” 79 According to the
hearings for HR5962 and S1305, the NAACP was in favor of these bills.
Congressman Deen (D-GA) was so concerned HR5962 would pass on the House
floor that he had to kill the bill in committee. His comments at the hearing regarding the
possibility of amendments to limit funds to states with mixed race schools were used by
Smith as one of his reasons for citing that race divided supporters of federal aid to
education. 80 If Deen did believe that such an amendment could be ratified in the future
then his own bill, the George-Deen Act that provided federal aid for vocational
education, could also have such an amendment added in the future. Because Deen’s
concerns are not consistent I think more research is needed to determine if supporters of
vocational education and general education worked together or competed for federal
funds. Was Deen concerned about the racial implications of HR5962 or maximizing
funds for his George-Deen Act?
I think Deen might have tried to arouse racial concerns to kill HR5962 so that
more funds could be available for vocational education. FDR wanted to avoid allocating
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as much money as possible to either the George-Deen Act or the Harrison-Black-Fletcher
bill (HR5962), hence his reason for expanding the objectives of the President’s Advisory
Committee on Education. Both Deen and George (D-GA) were referred to by O’Coin as
FDR’s allies in defeating HR5962. Senate majority leader, Joseph Robinson (D-AR) was
helped by George in making sure HR5962 did not reach the floor. Robinson, who
represented a segregated state, was thought by Swain to be opposed to the bill because of
FDR’s financial concerns, not segregation. 81 Overall, if the issue of race was preventing
these bills from becoming law, then members of the community where segregated
schools primarily resided would be opposed to education bills. But some Southern
congressmen like Harrison (D-MS) and Black (D-AL) supported such bills; in fact, they
were the sponsors of these bills.
Most of the speakers during the hearings were in favor of these bills, with the
exception of the NCWC. FDR was certainly interested in pleasing the NCWC, but he
already had the support of the majority of Catholics. This religious group has historically
voted for the Democratic Party. Their working class and immigrant status closely aligned
their concerns with New Deal programs. 82 Father Johnson warned the NCWC Advisory
Board that, “Our own people are not really aware of our reasons for the opposition to
Federal Aid….”83 Based on this information, I think the likelihood of Catholics voting
against FDR seemed low.
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The Catholic position between 1934-1939 had switched from objection to federal
aid for education to supporting the idea as long as their schools could receive such aid.
Father Johnson was in an uncomfortable position because not everyone in his
organization had fully accepted federal aid to education, but because of his work on the
President’s Advisory Committee on Education, Father Johnson was in support of the
Harrison-Black-Fletcher bill of 1939 and understood why some amount of government
control was necessary. 84
The Catholic position of opposing federal aid to education, according to Father
Johnson, placed them in a quagmire. According to Father Johnson, politicians who did
not want to move forward on federal aid to education used the Catholic position as an
excuse to delay legislation, while the proponents blamed the Catholics for not supporting
public schools. Because of this situation, Father Johnson encouraged the NCWC to build
a strong case in support of the Catholic position. In an analysis on religion and federal
aid to education from the 1700s to 1945, William Mitchell cited eight reasons why such
legislation did not pass. Only one of the reasons given were related to parochial schools,
indicating that religion was not a primary reason that the federal aid to education
legislation did not pass. I think it is possible that Father Johnson was correct in his belief
that politicians used Catholics’ concerns over federal aid to education as an excuse to
delay moving a bill rather than admit they were not in favor of the idea themselves,
particularly FDR. Zeitlin also questioned if there was sufficient evidence to maintain the
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idea that Catholics were a major reason FDR did not want to have federal aid to
education, he stated FDR’s dislike of public schools was a better explanation. 85
FDR’s experiences as governor showed him that education funds easily require
larger portions of a state’s budget. This experience caused FDR to become concerned
about federal aid for education similarly enveloping a large portion of the federal budget.
He was consistent in his belief in and support of local control of education budgets.86
When the topic of federal aid to public schools was mentioned, FDR voiced
concern about the constitutionality of such a policy. He made it clear that he only would
consider federal aid if it went to those schools that could not operate without additional
funds. FDR must have known that it would be difficult to pass a bill based solely on
financial need. As Senator Black (D-AL) mentioned, an equalization bill is difficult to
pass because richer states would not receive many allocated funds and would therefore
not vote in favor of such a bill. 87 I did not find any evidence in the archives that FDR’s
restriction to federal aid for education to only the poorest schools was a tactic for
agreeing to something he knew would never come to fruition; however, that does not
mean it was not FDR’s strategy. Smith had a similar conclusion, “By firmly defining the
limits of acceptability, Roosevelt effectively blocked any legislation whatsoever, since no
measure giving aid only to poor states could attract the support of the wealthy states who
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would have had to foot the bill.” 88 Calculated or not, FDR was able to appear to the
general public as if he was cooperating with educators and that he supported public
schools by compromising on his stance against federal aid to education.
There were many instances in the archives when congressmen believed that given
the chance to vote on a federal aid to education bill, Congress would have supported it.
But FDR did not want federal aid to education even when it partially met his requirement
of aiding needy schools. He did not support non-targeted federal aid because he did not
want to support what he considered a broken public school system. Even though the
1939 education bill was a general aid bill, a significant amount of the money would have
gone to those states that needed it the most. Considering the poor state of schools, FDR,
out of concern for students, should have been willing to make that compromise, but he
did not. Public schools, according to FDR and New Dealers, needed to be reformed. The
educational components of the New Deal were used to fulfill FDR’s desire for federal aid
to those who were in need. Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot summarizes FDR’s tactics:
FDR’s conservative impulse to leave institutions intact was tempered by
his humanitarian desire to help the needy. One pragmatic way to preserve
the structure of public education while assisting those on the bottom of
society was to create alternative educational agencies to help the
“underprivileged,” and this is precisely what the New Dealers did through
the NYA, the WPA, the CCC, and other new ventures. From Roosevelt’s
point of view, that approach had a number of advantages. It targeted
funds and services directly to people who needed jobs and who could
benefit from the new educational services. It cost far less than general
federal aid, much of which would have gone to school systems that did not
need the money, and agencies designed to meet supposedly temporary
problems of relief could be cut back more easily than federal aid regarded
as a continuing entitlement…. In short, such ad hoc organizations gave
the president more control over budgets and programs and recipients while
he and his party reaped more political advantages than they would through
costly general aid. In fact, Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Aubrey Williams,
88
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and Harold Ickes did funnel money into the public schools, although they
did so through the mechanism of relief and public works rather than
through direct support under the control of public educators…. However
roundabout his strategies, Roosevelt’s purposes were fairly clear. He
wanted to use education to help people at the bottom of the social system.
While he gave some assistance to regular schools for regular programs –
as in paying rural teachers or building new schools-he and his staff were
primarily interested in expanding and reforming that system to make it
more responsive to what were called, in the language of the time, the
“underprivileged,” hoping that in time the innovations would be
incorporated into the regular system. 89

Supporting federal aid for education was controversial, and FDR did not think it
was politically wise to support such measures. That choice would have risked upsetting
voters and congressmen if he decided to provide non-targeted federal education aid. FDR
was confronted with the suffering of public schools, but his fiscal conservatism, the
constitutional implications, concerns of upsetting voters and congressmen, and doubts
about the competencies of educators steered him away from implementing federal aid for
education. Zeitlin similarly concludes “Roosevelt’s opposition [to federal aid to
education] must be judged a major cause of the failure to achieve a broad program of
direct Federal aid to general education during the New Deal period.” 90 The end result of
FDR’s educational policy decisions and leadership resulted in the weakening and closure
of many public schools throughout the United States.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary the literature review and archival research in this study has lead to
many important conclusions. New Deal youth and educational programs were created to
help people find jobs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and New Dealers were frustrated
with the lack of vocational and hands-on training that schools were offering. The number
of out-of-school youth and untrained adults reinforced the idea that schools were not
meeting the needs of a large segment of society. New Deal programs that had an
educational component were primarily focused on relief rather than education. The
success of these educational programs indirectly exposed the failure of public schools by
their ability to teach out-of-school youth how to read and write. FDR supported using
federal money for education in Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) programs to teach
about the value of nature that had the unintended consequence of supporting federal aid
to education. CCC, National Youth Administration (NYA), and Emergency Educational
Program (EEP) supported education particularly vocational training. He also supported
temporary emergency federal aid for education but under his administration’s control
through New Deal programs.
The archives showed whenever educators wanted to increase the importance of
CCC’s educational program, FDR made sure it did not interfere with its work program.
Even when Congress wanted to promote CCC’s educational program, FDR was silent
and boasted about all other aspects of CCC’s achievements. The budgets for educational
advisers and their programs were below the necessary amounts causing the program to
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suffer. Political discussions and reading material that was critical of society were
shunned with FDR’s backing. John W. Studebaker and CCC’s educational director tried
to strengthen the program but Robert Fechner, with FDR’s support, maintained CCC’s
original plan of being a work program.
Teachers in all three New Deal programs, with the exception of EEP’s rural
school program, were uncertified educators. Documentation from the archives shows
that FDR deliberately avoided educators and he did not have confidence in them to
participate in the creation or administration of educational programs. He distrusted
educators, did not view them as professionals with specialized knowledge, and thought
public schools failed youth. The root cause of FDR’s dislike for educators has not been
identified in the archival documents used in this study. Some historians have speculated
that his elite private school background and lack of enthusiasm for academics have
contributed to his negative feelings towards educators. The literature does mention that
FDR did not dedicate himself to his education and thought what was taught in his
universities was impractical. 1
The archival records showed that FDR selected the agency leaders for CCC,
NYA, and EEP programs. Educators, even those in his own administration were left out
of its administration. FDR’s poor relationship with educators was peculiar. Studebaker
and FDR did not get along. Loyalty to FDR was very important and Studebaker did not
support the president and disagreed with his educational policies. To try to force
Studebaker to resign FDR paid him little, gave him little control over New Deal
programs, decreased the Office of Education’s budget, and had fewer Office of Education
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employees. Educational organization who witnessed the treatment of the Office of
Education and educational programs in the New Deal were upset. They made numerous
attempts to meet and discuss their concerns with FDR but he almost always rebuffed
them. Correspondence to FDR was responded to without sympathy or interest in its
contents. National Education Association’s (NEA) main objective was to have educators
control educational programs and have federal funds allocated to state departments of
education without any restrictions on the use of these funds. Representative from
educational organizations were politically weak and ignored by FDR.
FDR’s educational policies can be extracted from his treatment of educational
issues. It is clear that FDR did not value educators based on the choices he made about
the people he relied on for information and opinions regarding educational problems and
policies. Studebaker, Clarence Marsh, Howard Oxley, and educational organizations for
the most part were superficially acknowledged and often even ignored by FDR. NEA, a
vocal educational organization, proclaimed it was the expert on educational issues and
assumed this stance would cause FDR to rely on it but the claim had the opposite effect.
FDR relied on non-educators, with the exception of those in higher education, such as
members of his administration. He consciously chose people from a social work
background to begin the first two steps in forming educational policies. He knew that
they would approach the issue from a relief and unemployment position rather than from
the perspective of educational institutions requiring financial assistance from the federal
government. Throughout FDR’s presidential term, NEA did not change their focus of
assisting public schools with federal aid.
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Like the NEA, George Zook, while serving as FDR’s first Commissioner of
Education, wanted federal aid to education but Zook was able to find a way to support
education within FDR’s relief programs. As a result, he was able to start the CCC’s
educational program, obtain student-aid for needy students, and was part of establishing
the EEP. Zook relinquished much of the control educators had in the CCC’s educational
program because he had to work with Robert Fechner and the Army. Clarence Marsh
and Howard Oxley had a hard time working on developing the CCC’s educational
program because of their lack of decision-making power, and most of their suggestions
and recommendations were denied. FDR’s CCC program was conservative and focused
on conservation. Educational plans that detracted from its image and goals, despite their
good intentions, were minimized.
In terms of the third step in the policymaking process of forming an action plan,
Studebaker was the epitome of rejection - his hard work on creating a youth program was
rebuffed. Studebaker continued designing programs and coming up with ideas but FDR
rarely liked any of them. Studebaker was seen by New Dealers as a representative of the
public school system and, like most educators, was not on good terms with FDR or many
of his staff. His unrestrained method of communication with FDR and his staff members
was inappropriate and gave no reason for them to change their negative opinions about
educators. FDR’s dislike for public school teachers and administrators came from his
feeling that they failed the nation’s low-income youth. The number of students who
dropped out or did not have basic skills reflected poorly on the public school system’s
ability to accommodate diverse students. During the 1930s, the curriculum, which was
primarily college preparatory, continued despite the need for more practical courses and
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hands-on experiences in the classroom. Instead of trying to change their curriculum and
methods of instruction, many educators and administrators became territorial and did not
want the federal government trying to influence their schools. But at the same time, they
wanted the federal government to give them funds to continue their ineffective ways of
teaching. Although the lack of funds made it hard to update schools, when money was
provided through the George-Deen funds, schools made great improvements in offering
new programs but still struggled to provide the training the unemployed youth required. 2
As governor of New York through his presidency, FDR believed in local control
of education. He valued education as indicated by the large amounts of money he put
towards it, even though he did not have a good relationship with educators and
disapproved of public school’s curriculum. FDR viewed education broadly and was
valuable to assist in employment, job skills, and cultivating good citizens.
Catholic representatives were in communication with FDR, who listened to their
concerns and valued their opinion. FDR was even willing to create a Department of
Education and Welfare when they reminded him of the dangers that would imply for
local rights. During the 1930s, their views switched from being against federal aid to
education to wanting to have the right to obtain federal funds for their parochial schools.
Their good working relationship with FDR provided them with NYA work-study funds,
communication with the president, a position on the President’s Advisory Committee on
Education, and NYA’s board.
One of the research questions I address is, Did FDR’s administrative decisions
support public schools? There are two positive actions that FDR implemented that
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helped support schools: 1) the rural education program of EEP that paid for teacher
salaries and 2) providing student-aid for high school students on relief in order to allow
them to stay in school. What public schools wanted the most, however, was federal aid,
which they did not receive. When the number of schools that closed and shortened their
school term are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that public schools were not
sufficiently supported by FDR.
Congress was able to make the necessary compromises on controversial issues
with a number of federal aid to education bills. The Harrison bills HR5962 and S1305
were created by Southern Democrats and were supported by the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). According to Congressman Deen, who
was against these bills, they had become popular in Congress and had a fair chance of
being passed. But the bills were either not reported out of committee or not put to a vote
on the floor.
Another of the research questions I posed is, what was FDR’s policy towards
federal aid to education? This research supports claims made in the literature that FDR
was not in favor of federal aid to education. As has been delineated, FDR did not want to
support public schools that he believed were failing students. Also, he believed that
educators were not willing to change in order to meet students’ unique needs, and he did
not want to financially support their lack of responsiveness. Finally, he was concerned
that the federal budget would increase exponentially if school systems became
accustomed to receiving regular federal aid. FDR was even reluctant to sign the GeorgeDeen Act because the budget for vocational education, which FDR believed should be a
state responsibility, was already growing beyond what he allocated. These beliefs, along
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with his experience as governor of New York, reinforced his fears of starting a new
federal program to aid public schools.
Most of the literature states that the reasons why federal aid to education
legislation for public schools failed was because of issues with: race, religion, federal
deficit, and federal control. In this study, I questioned if race and religion were the main
reasons why federal aid to education bills for public schools were not made into law. I
think FDR’s role in stopping these bills was larger than previously thought by most
historians. The archival documents in the chapter on Congress indicated that Hopkins
and FDR were working in the background to stymie federal aid to education bills.
In step four of the policymaking process, when considering what plans FDR
wanted to implement or which bills should become law, FDR wanted his agency leaders
to control programs. He created many New Deal programs by executive order. In doing
so, FDR and his administration ensured control over the various New Deal programs and
their budgets. This administrative decision gave FDR the flexibility he desired. It also
allowed him to use federal funds to provide education to the poorest segment of society,
something public schools failed to do. Despite his rejection of federal aid to education,
Fass described how his New Deal programs unintentionally and indirectly promoted the
federal government’s role in education:
The New Deal provided important precedents that fundamentally altered
beliefs about the role of the federal government in the area of education
and raised, without completely defining, a new ideal of education as an
entitlement…. The New Deal did not set out to establish a federal
responsibility for education…. In the end, the Roosevelt administration
injected the federal government into the educational arena in such a way
that it not only exposed educational failures but defined their redress as a
federal responsibility. 3
3
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Unlike most authors who have suggested that race, religion, and states’ rights
were the main reasons for the failure of a federal aid to education bill to pass, I argue that
FDR’s influence was the main reason these bills failed. Both FDR and Harry Hopkins
did what they could to block or kill these bills by not encouraging hearings, using relief
funds to make the bills unnecessary, or ensuring that the bills did not come to a vote.
Swain and Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot agree that FDR was working out of the public’s
eyes to obstruct these bills. Although they highlight FDR’s obstructionist role, neither of
them place the responsibility for failed federal aid bills primarily on FDR. It is surprising
and somewhat baffling that the lives of Americans changed so dramatically in the 1930s
in terms of their relationship to and dependence on the federal government, and yet the
federal government did not enact any major and direct federal educational changes. A
relatively large number of social programs were created at the federal level during FDR’s
presidency, and yet public schools besides vocational programs, construction, and repairs
were nearly untouched. Based on the extensive archival materials utilized for this
research, it seems likely that FDR had more of a role in preventing federal aid to
education than has been previously thought. In O’Coin’s dissertation, he highlights
Schott’s ideas on this issue:
There is an irony in Roosevelt’s failure of leadership in the area of
federal aid to education given his record as a strong and effective leader
in other areas. Schott attributed this to FDR’s negative attitude toward
the ability of public education to do the job it was supposed to do, and to
his opposition to general federal aid to education. 4
FDR’s displeasure with educators resulted in educational programs being
administered by non-educators, and the EEP, the NYA, and the CCC are all examples of
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this pattern. Studebaker and the staff in the Office of Education were placed on
committees and in positions that had little power or control over educational programs.
This lack of influence over programs was true of the CCC’s educational advisory
committee, the NYA’s executive committee, and Dr. Lewis R. Alderman and Mr. Cyril
F. Klinefelter’s placement under Hopkin’s EEP program. Within step five of the
policymaking process, FDR’s selected leaders matched his vision and goals of his
programs.
Did FDR’s government program emphasize or encourage the education of youth?
The New Deal educational programs were quite varied from: supporting rural teachers in
public schools, college correspondence courses, training for jobs, learning about
conservation, home economics, student-aid, public forums, remedial courses, literacy,
citizenship, adult education, workers’ rights programs, nursery schools, parent education,
and more. Fass described the role education played in the New Deal: “New Deal
structures were often vitally concerned with education, had an implicit educational
philosophy and purpose, and were critical to the maintenance of educational stability, but
they were organized and legitimated under the rubric of relief.” 5 All of these programs
showed that FDR cared for youth and wanted to support their education. Based on the
types of programs emphasized in the New Deal, the purpose of education to FDR was to
become a productive citizen. 6 Skills needed for employment and job training were the
focus of relief programs.
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The last policymaking process step, evaluation, allows for critiques to influence
programs and laws. As the Depression was becoming less severe, the needs of youth
changed. These changes caused Robert Fechner and Aubrey Williams to transform their
program objectives from ones focused on vocational and civic training to objectives
centered around defense training. Supporting the war efforts extended the value of their
programs and added to their popularity with the public and Congress. By revaluating
CCC’s program, Congress was able to establish the importance of its educational
program and require ten hours of training per enrollee. Years later the NEA, which
wanted control of the NYA and the CCC youth programs, was able to make an argument
to terminate them. After years of questioning the federal government’s role in youth
training, they were able to convince Congress that the defense training duplicated the
effort of the Office of Education. Prior to defense training, the Office of Education
suffered under FDR as he slashed its budget and decreased its staff. FDR’s evaluation of
this office showed he did not value its work as indicated by his treatment.
This study was significant for many reasons. Unlike the literature, this study was
able to divorce FDR’s educational policies from New Deal programs and their
administrators. Moreover, a better understanding of the historical relationship between
the federal government and public schools is added to the literature. This study was
unique because I analyzed FDR’s educational policies based on multiple areas of his
involvement - New Deal programs, relationships with educators, and Congress.
Large amounts of archival documentation were used in this study and the conclusions
made here will help reveal historical perceptions regarding FDR’s educational policies.
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By identifying FDR’s educational policies, a clearer picture emerged on why public
schools had little support from the federal government in the 1930s, why teachers were
ignored by FDR, and why federal aid to education legislation for public schools failed.
The last question I want to address in this research is, how could educators be
better prepared to participate in the policymaking process and consequently be better
equipped to support schools? Some but not all of today’s educators are already heavily
involved in the policymaking process through marketing, communicating, and educating
government officials and the public about problems in schools and their solutions.
Assessing the political risks that are involved with various educational proposals and
understanding what chances government officials are willing to take have helped them
become better at advocating for schools. Currently educators are involved with Congress
by lobbying and making suggestions about education bills to help steer conversation
towards the interests of educators. They must maintain a high level of involvement in
order to constructively address their concerns and keep educational issues a priority for
the public and for the politicians who represent the public. The efforts of educators must
be ongoing and future research can continue educational advocacy by designing new
ways of supporting schools.
Some authors like Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May believe that relevant
general trends can be found by studying history that can inform what we should do
today. 7 Information from the past can be applied to the present. Maris Vinovskis adds
that learning what has happened in the past inspires policymakers to promote change and
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helps to stimulate fresh ideas. 8 I agree with these authors and also enjoy history for its
own sake. Since educators today are already engaged in so many policymaking
activities, I recommend a future study on using the information in this dissertation to
answer how the past informs the present.

8

Maris A. Vinovski, History and Educational Policymaking, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999),
254.

154
References
Abramowitz, Mildred W. “Eleanor Roosevelt and the National Youth Administration
1935-1943: An Extension of the Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 14,
no. 4 (Fall 1984): 569–580.
“American Youth Congress.” American Youth Congress,
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/american-youth-congress.cfm
(accessed December 25, 2011).
Anderson, James E. Public Policymaking: An Introduction. 6th ed. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 2006.
Anderson, Patrick. The Presidents’ Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and
Lyndon B. Johnson. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969.
Appell, Morris Lionel. “Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Education.” Ph.D. dissertation,
The Ohio State University, 1947.
Badger, Anthony J. FDR: The First Hundred Days. New York, NY: Hill and Wang,
2008.
Barrett, John Q., ed. That Man: An Insider’s Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Barry, Arlene L. “Censorship During the Depression: The Banning of ‘You and
Machines’.” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History 16, no. 1.
The Great Depression (Fall 2001): 56–61.
Benze Jr., James G. “Presidential Reorganization as a Tactical Weapon: Putting Politics
Back into Administration.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter
1985): 145–147.
Billington, Monroe, and Cal Clark. “Catholic Clergymen, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the
New Deal.” The Catholic Historical Review 79, no. 1 (January 1993): 65–82.
“Birds of Roosevelt’s Little White House.”
http://www.gastateparks.org/content/georgia/pdf/lwh_checklist.pdf (accessed
August 23, 2011).
Bremner, Robert H., ed. Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History. Vol. 3.
1-3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974.

155
Burke, John Papers. National Catholic Welfare Conference. Catholic University
Archives. Washington, D.C.
Burke, John Private Files. National Catholic Welfare Conference. Catholic University
Archives. Washington, D.C.
Campbell, Thomas P. “A Best Friend in the White House.” April 2003.
http://scoutingmagazine.org/issues/0303/d-wwas.html (accessed March 3, 2012).
Civilian Conservation Corps. Record Group 95. National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.
“Civilian Conservation Corps and National Youth Administration Face Attacks in
Congress.” Congressional Digest 21, no. 6-7 (July 1942): 163.
Clegg, Jr., Ambrose A. “Church Groups and Federal Aid to Education, 1933-1939.”
History 4, no. 3 (September 1964): 137–154.
Cohen, Adam. Nothing to Fear: FDR’s Inner Circle and the Hundred Days that Created
Modern America. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
Cohen, Sol. “Remember the CCC?” The Phi Delta Kappan 49, no. 7 (March 1968): 369–
372.
Coker, Jeffrey W. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Biography. West Port, CT: Greenwood Press,
2005.
Cremin, Lawrence A. American Education, the Metropolitan Experience, 1876-1980. 1st
ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.
Degler, Carl N. The New Deal. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
Denton, Robert E., and Dan F. Hahn. Presidential Communication: Description and
Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1986.
Department of Interior. Office File 6e-6g. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, NY.
“ECONOMY: Where is the Waste?” Time Magazine. January 5, 1942.
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,795686,00.html (accessed
October 4, 2011).
Education. Office File 107. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, NY.
Fass, Paula. “Without Design: Education Policy in the New Deal.” American Journal of
Education 91, no. 1 (1982): 36–64.

156
Field, John. Learning through Labour: Training, Unemployment and the State 18901939. Leeds, England: Leeds University, School of Education, 1992.
“Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Address before the National Education Association.” June 30,
1938. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15668#axzz2hpQ9xURy
(accessed October 5, 2011).
Fuchs, James R. “Oral History Interview with Harry N. Rosenfield.” Truman Library Harry Rosenfield Oral History Interview, July 23, 1980.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rosenfld.htm (accessed December 26,
2011).
———. “Oral History Interview with Oscar R. Ewing.” Truman Library - Oscar R.
Ewing Oral History Interview, May 1, 1969, May 1, 1969.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ewing3.htm (accessed December 26, 2011).
Governance-Office of Executive Secretary. National Education Association Records.
George Washington University. Washington, D.C.
Gower, Calvin W. “The Civilian Conservation Corps and American Education: Threat to
Local Control?” History of Education Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1967): 58–70.
Graves, Franklin Papers. New York State Archives. Albany, NY.
Hicks, David, and Stephanie Van Hover. “‘A Magnificent Adventure’: Negotiating and
Structuring Curricular Change in Virginia.” In Education and the Great
Depression: Lessons from a Global History, edited by E. Thomas Ewing and
David Hicks. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006.
Hopkins, Harry Collection. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, NY.
Hopkins, June. “The Road Not Taken: Harry Hopkins and New Deal Work Relief.”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 1999): 306–316.
Jacob, Charles E. Leadership in the New Deal: The Administrative Challenge.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
Kliebard, H.M. Schooled to Work: Vocationalism and the American Curriculum, 18761946. New York: Teachers College Press/Columbia University, 1999.
Kornbluh, Joyce L. A New Deal for Workers’ Education: The Workers’ Service Program,
1933-1942. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
Kursh, Harry. The United States Office of Education: A Century of Service. Philadelphia:
Chilton Books, 1965.

157
LaFollette Family Collection. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress. Washington,
D.C.
Lammers, William W. The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership
Styles, FDR to Clinton. Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2000.
Lowi, Theodore J. The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985.
Louchheim, Katie, and Jonathan Dembo. The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders
Speak. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Lyons, John F. “Regional Variations in Union Activism of American Public
Schoolteachers.” In Education & the Great Depression: Lessons from a Global
History, edited by E. Thomas Ewing and David Hicks. New York: Peter Lang,
2006.
McElvaine, Robert S. The Great Depression: America 1929-1941. New York: Three
Rivers Press, 2009.
Memorandums and Related Materials of the Director. Record Group 12. National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
Mettler, Suzanne. Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Mitchell, William A. “Religion and Federal Aid to Education.” Law and Contemporary
Problems 14, no. 1. Religion and the State (Winter 1949): 113–143.
National Catholic Welfare Conference. Catholic University Archives. Washington, D.C.
“National Parks: America’s Best Idea: History Episode 5 Page 2.”
http://www.pbs.org/nationalparks/history/ep5/2/ (accessed February 5, 2012).
“National Youth Administration.” 2003.
http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/nya.htm (accessed September 18,
2009).
Neustadt, Richard E. “Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK.”
The American Political Science Review 57, no. 4 (December 1, 1963): 855–864.
Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for
Decision-Making. New York: The Free Press, 1986.
Niehoff, Richard O. Floyd W. Reeves: Innovative Educator and Distinguished
Practitioner of the Art of Public Administration. Lanham, MD: University Press
of America, 1991.

158

O’Coin, Andre Roger. “Vocational Education During the Great Depression and World
War II: Challenge, Innovation and Continuity.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Maryland, 1988.
Pickett, Paul Clifford. “Contributions of John Ward Studebaker to American Education.”
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1967.
President’s Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities
General Records, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, NY.
Presidential Advisory Committee on Education, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde
Park, NY.
Reagan, Patrick D. Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 18901943. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000.
Records of the Emergency Education Program. Record Group 69. National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD.
Records of the Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Vocational Education, Record
Group 12, NACP.
Records of Special Projects and Programs. Record Group 12. National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD.
“Regarding Appropriation for Vocational Education.” The Phi Delta Kappan 20, no. 2
(October 1937): 75–76.
Reiman, Richard A. The New Deal & American Youth: Ideas & Ideals in a Depression
Decade. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.
Richardson, Theresa. “Rethinking Progressive High School Reform in the 1930s: Youth,
Mental Hygiene, and General Education.” American Educational History Journal
33, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 77–87.
Rieken, John W. “George Frederick Zook: Educational Leader in a Crucial Decade.”
Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University, 2005.
Robinson, Joseph T. Office File 598. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, NY.
“Roosevelt Announces ‘Court-Packing’ Plan.” History.com This Day in History,
February 5, 1937. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/rooseveltannounces-court-packing-plan (accessed June 3, 2013).

159
Roosevelt, Eleanor. White House Correspondence 100. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
Hyde Park, NY.
Ryan, John A. Collection. Catholic University Archives. Washington, D.C.
Salmond, John A. The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study.
Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1967.
Salmond, John A. “Aubrey Williams: Atypical New Dealer?” In The New Deal: The
National Level, edited by John Braeman, Robert H Bremner, and David Brody.
Vol. 1. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975.
Sargent, James E. “Oral History, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the New Deal: Some
Recollections of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Lewis W. Douglas, and Raymond Moley.”
The Oral History Review 1 (1973): 92–109.
Sherwood, Robert E. The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate History.
London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949.
Smith, Gilbert E. The Limits of Reform: Politics and Federal Aid to Education, 19371950. Edited by Frank Freidel. New York: Garland Publishing, 1982.
Speakman, Joseph M. “Into the Woods: The First Year of the Civilian Conservation
Corps.” Prologue 38, no. 3 (Fall 2006).
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/fall/ccc.html (accessed
December 24, 2010).
Studebaker, John W. Presidential Personal File 2896. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
Hyde Park, NY.
“Student Movement of the 1930s Joseph P. Lash Interview.” Activist Impulses: Campus
Radicalism in the 1930s (Cohen), http://newdeal.feri.org/students/lash.htm#26
(accessed January 31, 2011).
Swain, Martha. Pat Harrison: The New Deal Years. Jackson, MS: University Press of
Mississippi, 1978.
Thinkquest. “Franklin Delano Roosevelt.” http://library.thinkquest.org/11492/cgibin/pres.cgi/roosevelt_franklin?domestic (accessed May 9, 2009).
Tyack, David B., Robert Lowe, and Elisabeth Hansot. Public Schools in Hard Times: The
Great Depression and Recent Years. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1984.
Urban, Wayne J., and Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr. American Education: A History. 3rd ed.
Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004.

160

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Catholic University Archives.
Washington, D.C.
United States Congress. House. 73rd Congress Papers Accompanying Specific Bills and
Resolutions. Record Group 233. The Center for Legislative Archives.
Washington, D.C.
United States Congress. House. 74th Congress House Committee on Education. Record
Group 233. The Center for Legislative Archives. Washington, D.C.
United States Congress. House. 75th Congress House Committee on Education. Record
Group 233. The Center for Legislative Archives. Washington, D.C.
United States Congress. House. Committee on Education. Federal Aid to the States for
the Support of Public Schools: Hearings on H.R. 5962 before the Committee on
Education House of Representatives. 75th Congress. 1st Session. 1937.
United States Congress. House. Committee Papers. Committee on Education. Record
Group 233. The Center for Legislative Archives. Washington, D.C.
United States Congress. Senate. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and
Labor. Federal Aid to Education Act of 1939: Hearings on S. 1305 before the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. 76th Congress. 1st
Session. 1939.
Vinovskis, Maris A. History and Educational Policymaking. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999.
Warren, Donald R. To Enforce Education: A History of the Founding Years of the United
States Office of Education. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1974.
Watkins, T.H. The Hungry Years: A Narrative History of the Great Depression in
America. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1999.
Williams, Charl O. Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.
Zeitlin, Harry. “Federal Relations in American Education, 1933-1943: A Study of New
Deal Efforts and Innovations.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1958.

